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llo This publication deals with problems relating to 
the progress of European integration: it analyses note-
worthy attitudes taken and articles written on these 
issues.  It  also reports on the efforts pursued by the 
European Parliament, the Parliaments of the Six 
Member States and by other European parliamentary 
bodies with a view to achieving the aim of uniting 
Europe. 
For further information on some of the problems 
tackled by the European Communities and,  in par-
ticular, on the work of the Executives,  readers are 
referred to the following official publications : 
Bulletin of the European Coal and Steel Community 
Bulletin of the European Economic Community 
Euratom-Bulletin of the European Atomic Energy 
Community 
The Council of Ministers issues a press release 
at the close of its sessions.  Its activities, however, 
are also covered in the Community Bulletins. CONTENTS 
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DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
at the National Level  -------------------
I.  GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS 
Belgium 
1.  The 196 8 budget and the EAGG F 
During autumn 1967 the Belgian Government drew up its budget estimates for 
1968.  These include details of agricultural expenditure which shows a marked 
increase. 
'The budget figure for agriculture is FB 6, 149. 6m.  This represents 
an increase of FB 2, 666. 2m  over the adjusted budget figure for 1967 and is 
due, in practice, to the introduction of the common agricultural policy  in the 
EEC.  Thus, credits for the  European Agricultural Guidance  and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF) have been raised by FB 1,400m  following the Fund's increased 
contribution to the financing of the common agricultural policy.  The Belgian 
Agricultural Fund is  also getting a  further FB 1, 447m  for prefinancing the 
common agricultural policy; the greater part of this prefinancing is later to be 
deducted from contributions to the EAGGF. ' 
The Belgian Government has tried to estimate the expenditure to be 
borne by future budgets following the application of the common agricultural 
policy  : 
- 1-Belgian contribu- Subsidy to Belgian 
tion to EAGGF  Agricultural Fund 
(million FB) 
1967  600  525 
1968  2,000  1,972 
1969  2,800  2,700 
1970  4,800 
1971  4,900 
1972  5,000 
The Belgian Government has the following comments to make on 
these figures: 
'Guidance' section of the EAGGF: 'The Commission has undertaken, 
under a gentleman's agreement,  to restrict its appeals for contributions from 
member States to the liquidity needs of this section. It is more than probable, 
therefore, that the payments to be made to this section will be spread over a 
period, so that the estimates of budgetary credits earmarked for the payment  • 
of our contributions to the EAGGF should,  in our opinion, be regarded as 
ceiling values. ' 
Difficulty of estimating expenditure: 'One great difficulty we have in 
estimating the Agricultural Fund's total expenditure throughout the definite 
period when the common market is complete is that presented by a possible 
shift in the pattern of trade following the introduction of the unified system. 
This new situation could lead to a fair proportion of our requirements of feed-
ing grain and wheat being imported via Rotterdam.  The levies due would then 
be paid to the Dutch authorities; as a result the Agricultural Fund's receipts 
would be reduced and the budgetary credit would have to be increased accor-
dingly.  Moreover, some of the French surplus of wheat might be exported to a 
non-member country through Belgian ports (Antwerp,  Ghent) which could mean 
that Belgium would have to pay the refunds due.  Although all these problems 
have been carefully studied, it has not yet been possible to foresee their prac-
tical effects.' 
Definitive period (1970 onwards): 'Some idea of the budgetary charg4 
involved by the adoption of the common agricultural policy can be gained from 
the fact that this expenditure (contribution to EAGGF and subsidy tothe Agri-
cultural Fund) will correspond to our share of the EAGGF's total expenditure 
less levies received. 
- 2-.. 
t 
For 1970,  the Commission's departments have estimated the 
EAGGF's total expenditure at FB97, OOOm.  Belgium's share can be put at 
about FB8, 300m.  This estimate is based (i)  on the transfer to the Community 
of our receipts from levies (FB3, 500m  ) and (ii) on a share in the part of the 
EAGGF's expenditure not covered by receipts  from levies at the rate of 7. 9 
per cent, our scale of contribution to the Community's budget. From our gross 
share in EAGGF expenditure (FB8, 300m  ) our receipts from levies 
(FB3, 500m  ) should be deducted to arrive at the budgetary charge springing 
from the common agricultural policy,  i. e.  FB4, BOOm. 
To get some idea of the subsequent growth of this charge, the figure 
last quoted could be weighted with a coefficient of 2 per cent per annum,  which 
reflects the tendency of Community prices to rise while cancelling out the ef-
fect on it of European integration which has the opposite influence on EAGGF 
expenditure. ' 
(Chamber of Deputies,  Doc.  4 and 4-I No.  2,  1967-1968) 
2.  Belgian Prime Minister outlines his Government's European policy 
(4  November) 
In an exclusive interview given to a French journal Mr. Vanden 
Boeynants, Belgian Prime Minister, outlined his Government's position on 
political  co-operation among the Six and co-ordination of their economic po-
licies, and on the enlargement of the European Community. 
'Belgium certainly is very eager to increase political co-operation 
among the Six and looks favourably on any move calculated to further European 
political solidarity and to bring about effective co-ordination of external pol-
icies. 
I should like to go back to what happened in Paris on 17 April 1962 
at the meeting of the, Foreign Ministers of the Six.  The Ministers had to study 
the proposals drawn up by the Committee presided over by Ambassador 
Fouchet. If the meeting did not achieve what it had set out to do,  it was be-
cause the Belgian and Dutch delegations failed to secure the inclusion in the 
text of a revision clause which,  at the end of three years and provided that 
sufficient progress had by then been made, would have enabled the Treaty to be 
revised along Community lines by endowing it with an institution designed to 
-3-seek out ways and means of solving the political problems of the day that truly 
reflected the Community spirit. 
At the time some political observers thought they had detected con-
tradictions in the Belgian attitude and maintained that our Government was 
asking, on one hand,  that the supranational aspect of the draft should be accen-
tuated and,  on the other, that the British, who were opposed to this particular 
aspect, should be allowed to take part in the discussions. 
In fact,  as pointed out by no less distinguished a  journalist than 
Roger Mas sip, the contradiction was only apparent. If Belgium accepted 
British participation, it was because it offered the small States guarantees 
which would render acceptable a union of States in which Britain's presence 
would preserve the necessary equilibrium.  In short, we do not want a Europe 
on British lines without the British. 
During the conference of Heads of State or Government held in Rome 
on 30  May 1967,  Belgium again made its position known.  We think that the 
first stage of the political unification of Europe should be carefully prepared 
with an eye to defining the framework and the objectives of any action that may 
subsequently be taken, as well as the subjects to be discussed and the proce-
dure to be followed at our political consultations. 1 
The Prime Minister then outlined the progress he expected from the 
European Community in the economic policy field. 
'I do not think we should exaggerate the repercussions on the Bel-
gian economy of the short-term economic fluctuations undergone in other 
Community member States. 
It seems to me,  rather, that it is the Community viewed as a whole 
which,  at the stage it has now reached, is feeling the effects of short-term 
variations which should often be seen in a broader context owing to the extent 
to which national economies throughout the world are dependent on each other. 
This is not to say that trends in one member State cannot have shar-
per repercussions than in the past on its partners' economies as a result ofthe 
ever-closer economic and other links, established among the Six in the course 
of ten years' application of the Treaty. 
-4-For this reason Belgium attaches great weight to co-ordination of 
national economic policies; this is, in any case, one of the aims set by the 
Treaty.  Belgium hopes that the Treaty provisions governing co-ordination of 
economic polic_ies will be implemented as soon as possible. ' 
Asked whether a system of priorities should be introduced for the 
future tasks of the Community,  Mr.  Vanden Boeynants replied: ' •.•.•  the 
closer we get to the end of the transitional period the more important it be-
comes to make parallel progress in all spheres of European integration so 
as to ensure smooth development of the Community.  The fact remains that 
certain problems will be given particular attention by the Community institu-
tions concerned in the coming months. 
I am thinking more than anything of the Community's external policy 
and the application of a common medium-term economic policy.' 
Turning to the question of enlarging the Community,  the Prime 
Minister recalled that 'the signatories to the Treaty of Rome stated,  in its 
preamble ,  that the Community was open to European countries that desired 
to join it.  Article 237 of the Treaty contains the provisions relating to the 
accession of new members. In principle, therefore,  Belgium is in favour of 
admitting other European States that agree to comply with the rules of the 
Treaty. Appropriate negotiations would of course have to be held to determine 
in each case the precise nature of the problems and the way in which they 
could be solved.' 
'It seems to me incredible that a member State of the EEC  should 
oppose, out of hand and systematically, attempts to enlarge it.  In fact I would 
draw attention to the fact that the preamble  to the Rome Treaty calls upon the 
other peoples of Europe who share the ideal of the Six signatory countries to 
join in their efforts.  This was the text signed on 25  March 1957. 
If  a country were to refuse to abide by its undertakings we could 
only persist in demanding that the Treaty be applied. ' 
(Entreprise, No.  634, 4 November 1967) 
- 5-Denmark 
Press Conference of the Danish Foreign Minister on Denmark's 
accession to the EEC (15  December) 
Following his talks with Mr.  Couve de Murville,  Mr.  Hans Tabor, 
Danish Foreign Minister,  gave a press conference in Paris on 14 December. 
Mr.  Hans Tabor made a preliminary statement in which he expres-
sed his country's attachment to the Atlantic Alliance,  which he said was 'as 
necessary as the Warsaw Pact in ensuring an atmosphere of security conducive 
to an easing of tension in Europe'.  He recalled that his country had applied 
for membership of the Common Market and was awaiting a reply from the Six 
on the 18th and 19th December 1967.  Denmark had taken careful note of the 
statements of General de  Gaulle but fully maintained its application for mem-
bership. 
In reply to questions,  Mr.  Tabor made clear that Denmark did not 
envisage taking any other stand than that of the United Kingdom and Norway. 
He did not think that France would make any fresh proposals to the United 
Kingdom,  for the latter had formally rejected any other arrangement than full 
membership of the EEC. 
Denmark's economy,  he said,  was adversely affected by the com-
mon agricultural policy of the Six : the usual exports of beef and veal to 
Germany had practically stopped.  Denmark,  was,  nevertheless,  ready to ac-
cept the common agricultural policy of the Six as it was,  provided,  of course, 
that Britain also entered the EEC. 
(Combat,  15  December 1967) 
- 6-.. 
1.  The renewal of the delegation to  the European Parliament 
It was on 24 May that the National Assembly was to have renewed its 
delegations to the European Parliament and to the Council of Europe.  To be 
elected,  an MP has to obtain an absolute majority in the first two ballots or a 
simple majority in the subsequent ballots. The list of candidates is drawn up 
by the political parties. With this procedure the Communist candidates have 
so far never been elected;. 
The question arose as to whether the renewal of the French delega-
tion should be done on the basis of a proportional representation of all the 
groups in the National Assembly,  including the Communists.  In that event the 
distribution of the 24  seats assigned to the National Assembly (12  seats are 
assigned to the Senate) would have been as follows  : 
10 members from the Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic 
(Gaullists); 
2 Independent Republicans; 
2 members of the Modern Democracy and Progress Party; 
6 members from the Federation of the Left 
and  4 Communists. 
Apart from the political reasons which may have influenced the 
attitude of. the various parties, it may be noted that according to the Rules of 
Procedure of the European Parliament, a minimum of 14 members is required 
to make up an independent political group.  In the proportional distribution of 
seats, the Gaullists would thus only have had 10 seats, with the addition of the 
2 senator.s from this party already elected. With 12 members they would  not 
have been able to form a group in the European Parliament. 
In fact,  the list submitted to the vote of the National Assembly on 
24 May,  which was based on agreements between the parties,  included 28 
names, broken down as follows : 
13  members from the Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic; 
3 Independent Republicans; 
2 members of the Modern Democracy and Progress Party; 
6 members of the Federation of the Left 
and 4 Communists. 
-7-At the first ballot only 22  members were elected, to wit for the ma-
jority:Messrs. Briot, Bousquet,  Fanton, Habib-Deloncle, Jarrot, Kaspereit, 
La Combe, Laudrin, de  Lipkowski, de  laMal~ne, Louis Terrenoire, Triboulet, 
Cost~, and, for the Independent Republicans :Messrs. Boscary Monsservin, 
de Broglie, Pianta,  and,  for the Opposition,  2 members of the Party for 
Modern Democracy and Progress : Messrs.  Pleven and Rossi,  4 members 
from the Federation of the Left : Messrs.  Spenale,  Loustau, Naveau and Vals. 
Mr.  Mitterrand was elected at the second ballot. 
On 25  May,  at the third ballot, Mr.  Maurice Faure, a candidate for 
the Federation, whose name was on the original list, only obtained 100 votes, 
whereas Mr.  Borocco, a Gaullist member who was not on the list, obtained 
145;  42 blank slips were returned.  Mr.  Borocco was elected and the Federa-
tion was thus to be represented by only 5 members instead of the anticipated 6. 
Speaking for the Federation, Mr.  Deferre then stated in protest : 
'The Majority has not only decided to eliminate the Communist Party, an act to 
which the Federation takes exception, but it has also broken its moral contract 
. . . . .  by appointing one of its members without his name having been entered 
on the list and has engaged in unfair proceedings against which we  should like 
to raise the strongest protest.' 
As a consequence, the 5 members of the Federation elected handed 
in their resignations. 
In a  communiqu~, the Democratic Union for the Fifth Republic re-
plied by stressing that  ' in two bailots Mr.  Maurice Faure failed to obtain all 
the Opposition votes, the latter going to their other candidates.  The members 
of the majority could not but take cognizance of the fact that the election of 
Mr.  Maurice Faure was not the wish of his own friends.' 
Was this resignation to be upheld ? On 31 May,  the Federation ofthe 
Left Group announced that,  in order to oblige the majority 'to assume its re-
sponsibilities', each of those resigning would confirm his decision by personal 
letter to the President of the National Assembly (1),  explaining to him the rea-
sons for doing so.  At the meeting, however, Mr.  Maurice Faure offered his 
resignation, which was not accepted by his friends. 
(1)  Combat,  31 May 1967;  Le Monde,  1 June 1967. 
- & -The delegation from the National Assembly to the European Parlia-
ment thus remained incomplete until after the Parliamentary recess. On 10 Oc-
tober, the Federation Group announced (1)  that, 'bearing in mind the difficulties 
arising in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe because of  the 
prolonged absence of its representatives', it had decided 'to ask the National 
Assembly  to vote for  its candidates to  the European Parliament  and to the 
Council of Europe.' 
This communiquli stated that  'it maintains its  protest against  the 
attitude taken by the majority which did not respect its undertakings concerning 
the representation of political parties in the European Parliament.'  Lastly, it 
expressed its thanks to Mr.  Maurice Faure,  'who,  again demonstrating  his 
European spirit, withdrew his own resignation.' 
It was, in the end,  on 24 October (2)  that five members were  ap-
pointed. These were: Messrs.  Loustau, Mitterrand, Naveau, Spenale and Vals, 
all of the Federation of the Left Group. 
2.  European problems discussed during the budgetary debates in the 
French Parliament  (12,  13,  17 October,  7 November) 
The Finance Bill was submitted  to the National Assemply on 11 Octo-
ber by Mr.  Philippe Rivain (Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic), who  suc-
ceeded Mr.  Louis Vallon as General Rapporteur ofthe Finance Committee (3). 
He analyzed the susceptibility of the French economy to outside influence as 
follows  : 'Contrary to the idea that has been only too widespread these last ten 
years, it is not, or it is no longer,  European integration that raises the most 
serious problems; this phase can now be regarded as over because what is in 
progress · at the moment  is a wholesale  internationalization  of the  economy 
which goes far beyond the frontiers of Little Europe.  Admittedly competition 
from Germany remains a serious factor but a real change in the national economy-
and to a large extent in that of the European Community - will, in all probability, 
come from contact with the American economy, the dynamic nature of which is 
indisputable. 
(1)  Le Monde,  12 October 1967. 
(2)  Combat- L'Aurore,  25 October 1967;  Le Monde,  29-30 October 1967. 
(3)  Journal Officiel, AssembMe N  ationale, Proceedings  12 October 1967. 
- 9-The problem today is no longer one of adjustment to the Common 
Market but of making preparations for a much larger  confrontation which, going 
beyond continental Europe,  will bring in the whole of the English-speaking 
world. With this in prospect, we must see to it that outside influences do not 
place France in a situation of excessive subordination because control over a 
country's future is preceded by control over its economy.' 
Mr.  Philippe Rivain' s speech was followed by a general debate. 
Mr.  Duffaut (SFIO Federation) took the view that : ' .....  To try to 
link French economic activity with that of the outside market seems to me to 
be going too far because French exports only amount to 12.5 to 13 per cent of 
the gross national product, whereas the rate in Germany is 20 per cent.  That 
is the rate we should endeavour to achieve. 
Then again, the fall-off in our exports to Germany  began even before 
the deterioration in that country's imports. 
On the German market our position has worsened whereas that of our 
Common Market partners and Switzerland has improved .....  ' 
The following day Mr.  Michel Debr~, Minister for Economic and 
Financial Affairs,  rejected these figures when he stated (1)  : 'I should like to 
reply to Mr.  Duff aut and to those who  dispute our right to refer to the position 
of our partners in explaining our difficulties. 
I freely acknowledge that this does not absolve us from our own re-
sponsibilities or  our own mistakes, whether they are the mistakes of the public 
authorities or of the nation as a whole ..... 
But we cannot have the Common Market cake and eat it. 
We  wanted the Common Market and the European Economic Commu-
nity so that markets might be open to us,  and also to others.  Some referred to 
· this as inter-penetration and others as integration.  When one partner, the 
largest of all, experiences difficulties and purchases less, the normal effect 
is inevitably afalling-off in business. It is up to the public authorities to reme-
dy this with the help of industrialists ..... 
(1)  Journal Officiel,  Assembl~e Nationale,  Proceedings·13 October 1967. 
- 10-The Common Market is not a panacea in itself. It is the creation of 
a common economic area, which should be an area of prosperity  .....  ' 
For his part, Mr.  Pierre Bernard Coust~ (Democratic Union of the 
Fifth Republic) said (1)  : 'We are in the final stage of the Common Market and 
it is its success which raises difficult problems for us.  Indeed,  we have  re-
ceived applications for accession not only from the United Kingdom but also 
from Denmark, Ireland and Norway.  I think it essential for the Government 
too to state its position on this matter because the Six cannot dispense with a 
joint approach to the problem. 
We have just learned the Opinion of the European Commission, 
which was sent to the Council of Ministers, on the negotiations to be initiated. 
This means that the enlargement of the Common Market cannot be an end in it-
self.  We  are faced with problems on such a scale that it is absolutelyessential 
for us to know for what political purposes we  are going to enlarge the Commu-
nity.  We cannot enlarge it without knowing precisely where we  are going. 
We have to be clear about what France and its partners are going to 
do  so that the economic union which is being built and the common policies 
now in operation are not swept aside and that they do not become, if I may say 
so, the subject of a sudden preliminary requirement at a·time when we  are 
forging ahead in the common agricultural, trade and fiscal policy spheres  .... 
1 
On 17 October the National Assembly (2)  held a debate on the prob-
lems of stock-breeding and meat-marketing; this was in connexion with ques-
tions put by five Members to the Minister of Agriculture. 
Mr.  Cointat (Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic), who put the 
first question, drew attention  to the paradoxical situation in French agriculture : 
not enough meat, a surplus of cereals.  1 •••••  What is the remedy ?'he asked;'to 
begin with there is no question of challenging the existence of"GreenEurope". 
Every one wanted this Europe of the Six.  Today we are at the stage of practical 
achievements.  Customs barriers are disappearing and we have to accept our 
responsibilities.  The Common Market remains and,  I shall not tire of re-
peating this, the chance for French agriculture. 
(1)  Journal Officiel,  Assembl~e Nationale, Proceedings 12 October 1967. 
(2)  Journal Officiel, AssembMe Nationale, Proceedings 19 October 1967. 
- 11-Indeed,  what would happen if Europe did not exist, if the French 
foodstuffs market were confined within our frontiers,  when we tend to have 
surpluses in most of the things we produce? We must adjust our policy to the 
new economic conditions.  We must get organized and make ready successfully 
to face a difficult period  - the great economic "set-to" between the six mem-
ber States of the Common Market .....  ' 
Mr.  Boscary-Monsservin (Independent Republican) expressed great 
concern about the future situation of agriculture 'should another nation in addi-
tion to Germany and Italy, become  France's partner  - the United Kingdom 
for example. ' 
'We can, of course,  challenge the political desirability of Britain's 
entry into the Common Market.  But I would affirm,  with all my faith as a con-
vinced European, that Britain's entry would inevitably lead to a very serious 
weakening of our external protection and a weakening of our internal disci-
plines.' 
In reply  Mr.  Edgar Faure, Minister for Agriculture, referred to 
'the cyclical and circumstantial difficulties'  to which French agriculture was 
subject in relation to other European countries.  ' .....  There is one principle 
which we  should always bear in mind when we talk about agricultural problems 
and that is that they no longer fall within a  national context but come now within 
the much larger frameworkof the European Community. 
Is this a good thing ? Should we continue to think in these terms ? 
We may well ask. 
A few years ago,  "when Europe was just emerging", we were, 
generally speaking, urged to build it up more quickly and people could only see 
benefits flowing from this.  Now that it has come about  - not without serious 
difficulties,  which are easy to understand in a venture on this scale and as 
novel as this  - we are being criticized for going too fast or not building it as 
we  should, or even for building it at all !  And it is often the ones who used to 
criticize us for not being European enough .....  who now criticize us for going 
too far in that direction ! 
I would make clear, however, that the Government intends to abide 
by the choice it made and that I personally intend to abide by mine and that is 
why I still  believe that Europe is necessary and that we cannot go back. I would 
add, however, that Europe itself is not a solution, nor is it a set of solutions; 
it is the context in which we must look for the solutions to the problems we have 
to deal with. 
-12-I consider that this framework must be preserved and that there is 
no  cause for going back. 
Why,  indeed,  should we  abide by our European option ?  Firstly and 
very simply because we have already taken it.  This may appear to be a sum-
mary argument but it is a good one.  There are always many snags when one 
changes course or goes back along it, or in breaking down one construction 
before rebuilding another, especially when one does not know what one is 
going to build. 
The second reason is that the agricultural Europe which already 
exists,  although only in part, is already proving beneficial despite the set-
backs which may occasion hasty judgments for reasons of discontent and 
genuine disappointment. 
Despite the temptation to make sweeping judgments, let us look at 
the figures.  Why do  we  argue that Europe has brought benefits ? Because 
agricultural Europe is already bringing in a positive and growing surplus in 
our balance of trade. Our intra-European trade has improved and increased, 
that is to say it has increased in  volume and improved in value, which repre-
sents a gain for our national production. 
Yet, you may say, perhaps this is not a specifically European phe-
nomenon ? Is this not general and is not trade growing everywhere on the 
same scale ?  My reply is no.  This is a European phenomenon and it is Euro-
pean trade which is growing the fastest ....•  ' 
The discussion on the foreign affairs budget was the occasion of a 
major debate on 7 November (1); it began in the morning with a speech by 
Mr.  Ren~ Pleven (Modern Democracy and Progress). Addressing Mr.  Couve 
de Murville,  Forei~  Minister, he stated : 'If we are to believe the press, the 
first question you asked is whether the United Kingdom would be able to meet 
the commitments and assume the obligations implicit in membership of the 
European Community ...••  We  can understand the Government's concern, 
which is, to  a large extent, shared by the Commission of the European Com-
munities and by our partners. There is no doubt that the weakness of sterling 
is a source of concern for the Six.  But our first point is to recall that in any 
case, whether or not the United Kingdom is part of the EEC, the question of 
the future and of support for the pound will come up in the international mone-
tary community, whether it is the Group of Ten or the International Monetary 
Fund  ...•. 
(I)  Journal Officiel,  Assembl~e Nationale, Proceedings 8 November 1967. 
- 13-...••  Even if you are justified in asking that sterling surrender its 
world role, the reserve currency that it constitutes would have to be replaced 
by another ..•..  Would we then not need a new reserve currency, perhaps a 
European one  ?  Yet during the international monetary negotiations you appear 
so far to have rejected the idea of creating such a currency ..... 
. . • • • It is one thing to say that no final decision can be taken on 
Britain's application before favourable  progress is registered with regard to 
the problems you have raised. It would be quite another matter to place a ban 
on the opening of a discussion between Britain and the Six on the conditions of 
its accession,  conditions which would take as long to finalize as those con-
cerning the common agricultural policy and the customs union vis-h-vis the 
Commonwealth countries. Indeed,  the negotiations will necessarily take a long 
time, perhaps even a very long time •....  but in our view what is important is 
to make a start  - and it is  therefore necessary that France should not oppose 
this and that the discussion should be fair and sincere. If you did not agree to 
the opening of talks, we would be bound to conclude that the economic argu-
ments you have put forward are not really the most important ones, but that 
your objection to Britain's presence in Europe is politically motivated. 
My friends and I attach the greatest importance to this aspect, for 
Britain's support would give Europe an extra chance to strike abalancebetween 
the American and Russian powers especially since, for the first time, Britain 
is willing or appears to be willing to take part in building a real political 
Europe ..... 
. . . . . My friends and I thus continue to have two fundamental criti-
cisms of your European policy.  You appear to have an almost philosophical 
horror of any form of supra-nationality  .....  It seems to us that this attitude is 
neither fair nor reasonable.  Any Community life presupposes some transfer 
of sovereignty .....  It is a question of accepting that, in certain cases, a Com-
munity authority set up by the six Governments could take decisions to which 
they might, on occasion, be subject. 
Our second criticism concerns what you might call the geo-political 
appearance which the Government would like Europe to have •...•  We take 
exception to the hostility on principle to what people persist in calling  "the 
Anglo-Saxon world" which is coupled with your movement towards better rela-
tions with the East European countries  ...•. 
. . • • . We  see that in all the world's hot points, where it would have 
been desirable for us to be able to try and reconcile the opponents or bring 
them closer together, neither France nor Europe has been there, nor have 
- 14-they been able to make any useful move : France, because the attitudes it has 
assumed would have meant that one or other of the parties involved would have 
objected to its intervening; Europe because, politically speaking, no-one has 
the power to speak in its name.  You have thus helped to maintain the double 
hegemony from which you claimed you were helping Europe to escape.' 
In the afternoon, Mr.  Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister, reported 
on the proceedings of the meeting of the Six on Britain's entry : 'Nothing could 
have been simpler than for Britain to have come in at the beginning.  This not 
having been the case, it can only now be a question of some other possible 
form of entry  •••.. The future of the United Kingdom is with Europe or rather 
in Europe.  France, with whom the United Kingdom has more links of friend-
ship and alliance than with any other country, cannot object to the principle of 
such an application and hopes that the final outcome, that is to say a success-
ful  outcome, would in the long run be the culmination of the evolution that the 
United Kingdom must go through. 
Enlarging the European Communities would necessarily involve a 
deep-seated change,  if not of the texts governing their existence, then at least 
of the spirit and operating conditions of the Communities concerned.  I was 
stating the obvious the other day in Luxembourg when I spoke to my colleagues 
of the Six and I was surprised to see them dismiss it out 9f hand,  as if they 
wished to avoid any discussion which might create the impression that the 
British application raised problems and that we ought to discuss them amongst 
ourselves. I did not do this, however, to create an argument for rejectingthis 
application a priori. 
The United Kingdom is an applicant State,  and following it come two 
other EFTA countries, Denmark and Norway .•... and then Ireland  •..••  It is 
thus a Community of at least ten that we now have to think in terms of,  and in 
practice all the other countries of Western Europe would conglomerate around 
it. 
How is it possible to imagine that such a Community could manage 
its affairs in the same way as the present one ••... ? It is the unity of the 
whole set-up which would,  to say the least, be very much weakened. 
There, it may be argued, would be a good opportunity  -so as to 
revive this Community - to re-introduce the majority voting system provided 
for,  in principle, in the Treaty of.Rome and which,  after the 1965 crisis, was 
in practice abandoned under the Luxembourg agreements of 1966.  But are we 
sure not only that this would be to the liking of the new members but also that 
this would be the best way of safeguarding the legitimate interests of France, 
- 15 -for example when it comes to setting agricultural prices,  and bearing in mind 
what happened in Luxembourg in this context ten days ago  ? ' 
Referring to the statements he made in Luxembourg to the Council 
of the Six on 23 October, Mr.  Couve de Murville stressed the followingpoints: 
'It is a question firstly  - I am only dealing now with the ideas which the 
Brussels Commission expressed in its report - of whether Britain is in a 
position to assume definite and considerable commitments which would be en-
tailed by its entry into the Common Market ..... 
We then have to ask if such an effort could be successful without a 
simultaneous, thorough-going reform of the British monetary system itself. Is 
not this system in itself a constant source of imbalance and consequently of 
weakness for the pound sterling ? ..... 
. . . . . There cannot be two categories of members, full members 
and provisionel members ? We  cannot take this view. 
Another argument is that the prospect of membership of the Com-
mon Market would induce the British Government to make the necessary ra-
tionalization effort.  Who would believe that a great country like the United 
Kingdom has not, in any case, the duty to re-establish its position or that itis 
not in its interest to do  so when that position is shaken ? ..... 
. . . , . Even supposing there were agreement  on the preliminary but 
essential matters, what would the conditions be for the possible accession of 
the United Kingdom  ? ..... 
. . . . . The relevant arrangements and the economic and monetary 
conditions of such a possible accession, which needs must be those applicable 
to a new member, the profound change that would flow from such an enlarge-
ment for the whole of Western Europe and for the Common 'Marketthatwehave 
built  - these are the problems that France submitted to its partners and 
which it asks them to look into with France ..... 
. . . . . I trust that it will also be understood that our first concern is 
to carry on with what we have undertaken, I mean the building of Europe. It is 
not a question of undoing or weakening what has so far been achieved but rather 
of rounding it off and strengthening it if we can.' 
- 16-Following this speech,  several members intervened in the debate. 
Mr.  de la Mal~ne (Democratic Union of the Fifth Republic) considered that,  in 
view of the 'succession of forward movements,  refusals and hesitations of the 
United Kingdom,  it would have been the worse for Europe if it had joined the 
Common Market sooner. ' 
'Today the United Kingdom speaks of a complete conversion,  of an 
unreserved support for the economic mechanisms set up and also for the ulti-
mate political goals of the enterprise ..... 
. . . . . One may, for internal or external policy reasons,  choose to 
open negotiations but it must be recognized that to accept accession is to give 
up, for God knows how long,  any progress towards political unification and it 
means giving up  the idea of a particular design for Europe.' 
For his part, Mr.  Destremau (Independent Republican) called upon 
the Government 'unequivocally to affirm the European outlook of its foreign 
policy' and he added : 'The building of Europe will call for concessions on the 
part of each one of us and, on our part, for taking our partners into our confi-
dence.  There can be no agreement without compromise, no compromise with-
out negotiation and no negotiation without discretion  ..... 
. . . • . It is of little value trying to outline in advance the contours of 
this Europe because it is so obvious that in our time the idea of frontiers is 
already becoming obsolete.  Hence, there is no question of saying from the 
start that the United Kingdom must or must not enter into the European 
Economic Community; it is rather a matter of discussing this possibilitywith-
out ulterior motives.' 
3.  Visit to Paris of the Prime Minister of Ireland 
On 3 November 1967 Mr. John Lynch, thePrimeMinisteroflreland, 
paid an official visit to Paris. 
At a luncheon given in his honour at the Elys~e, General de Gaulle 
proposed  a toast  (1)  to his guest,  stating : 'We are now  all faced with  an 
(1)  Combat, 4-5 November 1967  - Le Monde 5-6 November 1967. 
- 17-essential task, namely the construction of Europe. For this Europe to be 
European, it must embody the existing Community of the six continental States 
and it is of capital importance that  the Community should be strengthened and 
developed.  There must also be provision for the association to the Community 
of other Western States. There must finally be room  for greater  understanding 
and co-operation wi~  the States of Central and Eastern Europe.  Everything 
points to the fact that Ireland can and should be closely associated with that 
great aim.' 
In reply to a question at the close of his talks with the French  Head 
of State on the possibility of an association, Mr. John Lynch stated : 'I do not 
lmow whether Britain has a chance of becoming a member of the Common 
Market but I think that this is inevitable in the more or less long term.  We 
would prefer to become a member of the Common Market at the same time as 
the United Kingdom.' 
On 4 November the Prime Minister of Ireland made the following 
statement to the Agence France-Presse (1)  : 'We have not envisaged becoming 
an associate member of the Common Market.  We  wish to become a full part-
ner. Our application has been made.  We  are now awaiting the EEC's reply.If 
association were suggested, we would then consider the position.' 
4.  General de Gaulle's press conference 
On 27 November, General de Gaulle gave a press conference (2). 
The passages relating to the question of the United Kingdom's accession tothe 
EEC were as follows : 
'The idea of joining the British Isles to the Economic Community 
formed by six continental States is one that raises hopes everywhere for which, 
ideally, there is great justification; but the point is if and how,  at present, 
this could be done without rending apart or breaking up what already exists. 
Now the United Kingdom with a haste and with an earnestness that have been 
(1)  Combat,  6 November 1967. 
(2)  Le Monde,  29 November 1967. 
- 18-truly extraordinary  - possibly due to recent monetary events  - proposed 
that negotiations be opened with the Six without delay; at the same time Britain 
declared her readiness to accept unreservedly all the provisions and regula-
tions governing the Community of the Six; this appeared rather inconsistent 
with the request for negotiations; why negotiate about clauses agreed on and 
fully accepted in advance  ? 
....•  The British  people is  no doubt becoming increasingly aware _that, 
in the great movement which is sweeping  through the world, its sfructure  ,the pat-
tern of its activity and even its national identity are now being challenged. This has 
given rise to a tendency to seek a framework,  even a European one, within which 
Britain could a.re and safeguard its own substance, which would enable it to 
go on playing a leading part and which might lighten part of its burden  ..... 
In theory, there is nothing here which is not salutary for the people 
of Britain and which could not,  at an early date, be satisfactory for Europe, 
provided that the British people, like those it wishes to join, is able and knows 
how to bend its energies to the fundamental changes it needs to make to  re-
store its own balance ..•.. 
Politically, this is obvious; but today  - to mention only economic 
affairs  - the report which the Brussels Commission sent to the Six Govern-
ments on 29 September makes it abundantly clear that the Common Market is 
incompatible with the British economy,  such as it is today, with its chronic 
balance of payments deficit which proves its permanent imbalance ..... 
The Common Market is also incompatible with the way in which the 
British obtain their food supplies, both from their own highly subsidizedfarm-
ing and from the world at large, especially in the Commonwealth;this rules 
out any possibility of London's really accepting what whould be the crushing 
burden of the levy system laid down in the financial regulations. The Common 
Market is also incompatible with Britain's restrictions on the outflow of capi-
tal, which circulates without restriction in the Community ..... 
To bring Britain  in. and,  consequently,  to begin negotiations for this 
purpose now would be tantamount for the Six to an endorsement given in ad-
vance to all the tricks, delays and make-believe which would tend to conceal 
the destruction of an edifice which has been built with such labour and amid 
such hopes. 
It is true that, while recognizing the impossibility of bringing 
Britain into the Common Market as it is, one might all the same wish to 
- 19-sacrifice the latter for an  agreement with the former.  One might imagine ,for 
example,  a free trade area covering the whole of Western Europe.  One might 
also imagine a kind of multi-lateral Treaty like that which will emerge from 
the Kennedy Round and settle between 10,  12 or 15  European States their re-
spective quotas and reciprocal tariffs.  But in either eventuality,  it would first 
of all be necessary to abolish the Community and disperse its institutions;and 
I say that this is certainly not what France is asking for.  However, if one of 
France's partners, as is after all their right,  so proposed, France would 
examine it with the other signatories to the Treaty of Rome.  What France can-
not do is to enter at present, with the British and their associates, into nego-
tiations, which would ultimately destroy the European construction of which it 
is a part  ..... 
For Europe to be able to counterbalance the immense power of the 
United States, it mustnot weaken everything but, on the contrary, tighten up 
the rules and bonds of the Community  ..... 
Indeed, to make things easier, France is quite ready to enter into 
some arrangement,  whether it is called association or any other name, which 
would foster trade as of now between the continentals on the one hand and the 
British, Scandinavians and the Irish on the other.  It is not in Paris where one 
is ignorant of the psychological evolution which appears to be taking place 
amongst our friends across the Channel, or where one underestimates the 
merits of certain measures already taken and others they plan to take to re-
store their internal balance and external independence.  But for the British 
Isles really to join the continent a very vast and a very deep-going mutation 
would be required.  Everything depends, not at all on a negotiation, which would 
for the Six be a march to surrender, tolling the knell of their Community, but 
on the will and action of the great British people, which would make of it one 
of the pillars of the European Europe.' 
The reactions in : 
Belgium 
Following the press conference which General de Gaulle gave in 
Paris on 27  November 1967,  the spokesman for the Belgian ·Foreign Ministry 
said that the statements made by the French President added a highly serious 
note to the issue of the British application and that it would have to be the sub-
ject of consultations between Belgium and its Common Market partners before 
the next meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities. 
- 20-He added that the accession of four applicant States, while bringing 
great changes, would not thereby be such as to change the fundamental objec-
tives, the special features or the methods of the European Communities. 
Lastly the spokesman declared that the Council of Ministers had 
already had the opportunity to discuss the report of the Commission during its 
previous meetings and that it was on the Council of Ministers and  only there 
that the subsequent stages in the procedure could be discussed. 
(Le Soir, 29 November 1967) 
There were very strong reactions in French political circles to the 
press conference given bythePresidentoftheRepublic (1). Mr. Jean Lecanuet, 
Leader of the Democratic Party of the Centre, for example,  asked : 'How are 
our friends in the world and our European partners going to react to such in-
transigence  ? Is it not likely to aggravate the isolation of France and threaten 
European unity ? •.... 
General de Gaulle is now using the idea of European integration as 
an argument against Britain's entry into the Common Market. It is a singular 
and novel argument for him to exalt the cohesion of the Six in this way~ How 
better can we protect ourselves against American penetration than to begin by 
turning the economic potential of the United Kingdom towards the United 
States?' 
The reactions of the United Socialist Party, which published the 
following communiqu~, were equally strong : 
'Europe,and France in particular, must devise solutions that would 
enable a United Kingdom freed from its dependence on the dollar to join the 
Common Market, whose political bearings have still to be found and could be 
found with the British. This was the intention of the proposals made recently 
by Mr.  Pierre Mend~s France,  a Unified Socialist Party M. P. 
·  (1)  Le Monde,  29 November and 1 December 1967. 
- 21-An examination of such proposals or other similar ones presupposes 
at least  that discussions be held with the British, failing which General de Gaulle 
will consolidate Anglo-Saxon solidarity. ' 
On 13 November, Mr. Guy Mollet,Secretary-General of the SFIO 
Socialist Party, gave a press conference in reply to General de Gaulle (1).  He 
put the case for Britain's entry into the Common Market : 
'The President of the Republic is very willing to pose as the "guard-
ian of Europe" against the entry of those whose presence would be liable to 
change its nature. It is reasonable to ask what is the Europe that he seeks in 
this way to defend  ..•••  a genuine g-urope is inconsistent with a nationalist policy 
which could only adjust  to an autarchy  ...••  In reality  it appears quite clear that 
General de Gaulle is opposed  to anything that might make the construction of a 
political Europe inevitable :the pursuit and completion of a European economic 
construction and the enlargement of the geographical area  of the Common Market  . 
• . . . • a geographical enlargement and the entry  ofthe United Kingdom into the EEC 
would mean  that the economic problems  thrown up in managing the enlarged  .Ellrope 
would be on such a scale that the progress  to the political stage would be inevitable : 
this is  the fundamental reason for the General's opposition to the British applica-
tion  .....  For us the choice has been made.  The entry of the United Kingdom 
can not but be beneficial to Europe. 
In consolidating peace, if we are to avoid the problems becoming 
one which can only be settled by a confrontation or bargaining between the two 
great powers, the voice of Europe must make itself heard. 
To create a powerful economic Europe, capable of discussing and 
negotiating both with the East and the West, the British presence is likewise 
necessary. 
To assume the burden of the problems raised by Mediterranean 
Europe, we also need the counterweight of a Qighly industrialized State like the 
United Kingdom  • 
. . . . . It is obvious that there are real problems.  The negotiations 
will probably be long and difficult, but the EEC Commission made it quite clear 
even so that it was concluding in favour of opening negotiations •...• 
(1)  Combat,  1 December;  The Guardian,  1 December;  Le Populaire de  Paris~ 
2-3 December 1967. 
- 22-Everything is taking place as if the President of the French Repub-
lic, believing himself to be the chairman of a board of examiners and having 
learned of the application of a candidate for whom he has little love,  would 
prefer first to convene the board to decide to "fail" the candidate without 
giving him a hearing. The response of the five partners will certainly not be 
without interest. ' 
Germany 
On 28 November 1967 the Federal Government officially stated that 
its standpoint on the enlargement of the European Communities was well known 
and that it had furthermore not changed.  Following the tough 'No'  of de Gaulle 
to any opening of negotiations,  authorized spheres have not yet commented as 
to the possibility of an open crisis at future meetings of the Council of Minis-
ters. In political circles it was simply pointed out that the existing problems 
could be solved if all those involved were to proceed ' with caution '. 
Similar views were expressed by representatives of the coalition 
parties. The Christian Democrats stressed that it was now a question of 
'caution and patience '  so that despite the intransigent line taken by de Gaulle 
an irreparable split between the member States may be avoided.  They pointed 
out,  moreover, that no-one had expected that the negotiations would be easy or 
of short duration. 
The Federal Government and all parties stood by their positions that 
Britain's accession was desirable and possible without breaking upthe.existing 
Common Market construQtion.  This was, furthermore,  articulated in the 
statement of the CDU /CSU and in that of the SPD.  These statements were 
deliberately undramatic. 
The SPD was seeking a compromise which might perhaps provide a 
way of softening General de Gaulle's 'No'. Mr. Helmut Schmidt, SPD Chair-
man, pointed out that the Rome Treaty offered the possibility of'  adjustment 
phases' : 'Making use of this possibility would not seem to be inconsistent 
either with the ideas of de Gaulle or with the position of the United Kingdom. 
This course should therefore be pursued further. ' 
On 29 November 1967,  the Federal Cabinet met under the chair-
manship of the Chancellor and looked in detail into the press conference of 
President de Gaulle. On the basis of a report by Mr.  Brandt, German Foreign 
-23-Minister, the Cabinet noted that General de Gaulle  had raised no objection on 
principle to Britain's accession to the EEC.Mr.Ahlers,German Government 
spokesman,  stressed to the press that any judgment concerning the outcome 
of accession negotiations would be premature.  He further stated that the 
Federal Government maintained its view that negotiations with Britain shoulJ 
begin as soon as possible and that it would be reasonable to continue the efforts 
made so far and to consider all conceivable possibilities of accession. 
(Handelsblatt,  29 and 30 November 1967, 
Die Welt,  29 November 1967, 
Frankfurter Neue Presse,  29 November 1967, 
Stuttgarter Zeitung,  30 November 1967, 
Industriekurier,  30 November 1967, 
Le Monde,  30 November 1967). 
Great Britain 
A few hours after  General de Gaulle's Conference,  the Foreign 
Office published (1)  an official statement pointing out that,  under the terms of 
Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, the British application  called for  a joint 
reply from the Six and that this reply was still awaited. 
The following day- 28 November  - Prime Minister Wilson told (2) 
the House of Commons that the appli~ation would remain  unchanged.  ' There 
are no present alternatives .....  The decision to make application was not 
meant to be a fair-weather or short-run decision.  I believe it would be wrong 
to change direction on this issue because of any statements made yesterday.' 
Mr. Wilson then referred  to 'mis-statements' in  the French Presi-
dent's comments, but rejected any idea of replying in kind, by angry words or 
decisive actions in the EEC, to the Gaullist position. 
The Prime Minister answered to an MP that in the Treaty of Rome 
'there is no provision for negotiations with five,  four or any lesser number ... 
We shall maintain our close  relations with the Five,  and the best possible 
relations with France as well.' 
(1)  Le Figaro, 28 November 1967  - Le Monde,  29 November 1967. 
(2)  The New York Herald Tribune,  29 November 1967. 
Combat  - The Guardian  - The Times,  29 November 1967. 
- 24-In a speech on 29 November at a Parliamentary Press Gallery lunch 
Mr. Wilson  rebutted (1),  point by point,  the objections raised by General 
de Gaulle to opening negotiations on Britain's entry into the Community.  The 
speech contains no new proposals but outlines previously adopted British posi-
tions : 
(a)  As regards the alleged contradiction between Britain's proposal to open 
negotiations without delay and her declared willingness to accept all the 
Community's regulations and provisions, Mr.  Wilson quotedArticle 237 
to show that any agreement had obviously to be negotiated. 
(b)  It had been said that the report of the Brussels Commission showed that 
the Common Market was  incompatible with  the economy of  Britain  in 
many respects.  'Did the Commission,' asked Mr. Wilson, 'recommend, 
or did they not recommend, that negotiations  should be opened  ? ' 
(c)  It had been said,  as proof of this incompatibility, that Britain had a 
chronic balance-of-payments deficit.  'What,' Mr.  Wilson asked,  'was 
France's balance-of-payments disequilibrium in the two years after 
signing the Treaty of Rome  ? ••...  The IMF and OECD strongly support 
the view that the decisions we have taken offer a firm prospect of trans-
forming our balance  of  payments within twelve months.' 
(d)  As to the allegation that the British economy was incompatible because 
of its sources of supply, Mr. Wilson replied that Britain would follow 
the precedent of the  Yaound~ Convention and allow the developing countries 
concerned to trade freely with the Community. 
(e)  It had been said that Britain's agriculture was highly subsidized.  So  -
retorted Mr. Wilson  - was Community agriculture. Moreover, Britain 
had made it clear that it was prepared to come to terms with the Com-
munity's agricultural policy, 
(f)  General de Gaulle had said that British entry would lead to the break-up 
of a Community whose rules would not bear such a 'monumental excep-
tion.' But, Mr  •. Wilson said, it was not Britain whose policy in foreign 
affairs, defence,  and international monetary policy was 'the monumental 
exception'  to the European consensus on these questions.  Nor was  it 
Britain which  was now  rejecting the  artie}@"  of the (Common Market) 
treaty which provides that any European State may apply. 
(1}  The Guardian  - The Times  - The New York Herald Tribune,  30 Novem-
ber 1967. 
- 25.  -(g)  As regards Europe's independence, Mr. Wilson said that what mattered 
here was not words but action,  action such as the creation of a European 
technology .....  to which he had referred in his Guildhall speech.  But if 
Britain was prepared to take an initiative in this field prior to the nego-
tiations, this would not become a reality in terms of European indus-
trial independence unless, in Europe,  'we are ready to take all the steps 
necessary to create a single European industrial market  .....  ' 
(h)  As to the coincidence between the American balance-of-payments deficit 
and the total of American investments in Europe,  and the French wish 
'to put an end to this abuse', Mr. Wilson said that 'we are not going to 
solve our problems in Europe by attacks on one another's balance of 
payments, or on the balance of payments of the United States. 'A policy 
of beggar-my-neighbour was not the answer. What was needed was to 
build up  a vigorous and independent European industry.  Mr. Wilson 
expressed the view that Europe could lead the world, unless any of the 
partners insisted on becoming tributaries of American technology, 
which,  given co-operation, could be dispensed with.  Above all, however, 
no one could meet the threat to European industrial independence with-
out co-operation in a single enlarged Community based on a powerful 
technology,  the  s~le foundation of economic and political independence 
and of a truly European say in world affairs. 
Italian reactions to General de Gaulle's press conference were 
made known at a meeting of the Foreign Committee of the Chamber of Deputies 
on 6 December 1967. 
Mr.  Fanfani,  after recalling that the Italian Government had for 
years shown itself to be in favour of the admission to the Common Market of 
the United Kingdom and.other EFTA countries, said that the General's  press 
conference of 27  November, which had been held outside the Community con-
text and at which he had advanced questionable arguments, had not weakened 
the case for Britain's accession to the Community. 
The Italian position would be driven r  .  .Jme at the meeting of the 
Council of the Community on 18 December.  Tt,: need would be firmly stressed 
to give an affirmative reply to Britain's reqt... 3t for membership,  due  account 
also being taken of the conclusions reached ln the report submitted by the Com-
mission on 2 October. 
- 26-Mr.  Fanfani added that the deyaluation of the pound had been in line 
with requests made by the Commission and France. The statements made by 
the British Government, following General de Gaulle's conference, to the effect 
that Britain's application would be kept in, made all talk of alternatives point-
less•  Moreover,  alternatives would be used merely as a pretext for postponing 
the negotiations.  Great Britain, because of its accomplishments, the contribu-
tion it had made to civilization and to European democracy, and the integration 
it was capable of bringing about,  particularly in the technological and political 
fields,  was entitled to expect that its application would be treated  with the same 
respect which the EEC had so far shown,  even formally, to States of lesser 
importance and with looser relations with the Six. 
Minister Couve de Murville's statements to the effect that British 
membership would be a good thing for Europe would carry weight only if unac-
companied by vetoes on the opening of the negotiations provided for in Article 
237  of the Treaty.  This was the only way of finding out whether,  in practice, 
the conditions existed for an agreement on accession which,  without jeopard-
izing what had been already achieved,  specified the target dates, ways and 
means, rules and adjustment measures needed for any enlargement of the Com-
mon Market. 
Britain's application  - went on Mr.  Fanfani  - certainly posed a 
number of difficulties, but at the same time it opened up many opportunities 
making for a sound and solid European structure unhampered by dimensions no 
longer large enough to enable it to face up to other unified markets.  These op-
portunities had a profound bearing on the future of the world, whose equilibrium 
and peace had in recent years too often lacked the contribution that could have 
been made by a Europe not split by disputes or handicapped by a barren suc-
cession of plans that were either out-of-date or ineffectual. 
.  Mr.  Malagodi (Secretary of the Liberal Party) stated  that the econo-
mic grounds advanced by the French Government against British entry were 
less serious than might be thought.  The problem was essentially political.  A 
· French veto would offend Britain's dignity and lead her to withdraw from the 
continent.  As a result Europe would start breaking up.  Italy must therefore 
convey to France its determination to reject its veto and to go  ahead. A number 
of courses could be adopted.  For example, negotiations could be opened with 
Britain on parallel lines by each of the five,evenintheWesternEuropean Uriion. 
'There are moments in history and in politics,' concluded Mr.  Malagodi, 
'where the least prudent approach is a false prudence amounting to passive ac-
ceptance of negative circumstances. This would be a grave error which we ask 
the Italian Government not to commit. ' 
- 27-Mr.  Lombardi (Soc!alist) considered the Italian attitude to be at once 
correct and consistent.  Two considerations  underlay  General  de Gaulle's 
policy : one  - a sensible one  - was a consciousness of the need for Europe to 
be independent from the American hegemony; the other  - a false one  - his 
interest in a French hegemony over Europe. General de Gaulle reproached 
Great Britain for its links with the United States. Such an attitude was, however, 
contradictory. If Britain was to free itself of its ties with the United States its 
entry into the EEC should  be made smoother, for only on a broader territorial, 
economic and demographic basis could apolicyof autonomy make any progress. 
In order to overcome the French veto the Five should demonstrate, by words 
and deeds, that,  like France, they were willing to reduce and finally to elimi-
nate American dominance in Europe.  Mr.  Lombardi agreed with Mr.  Mendes 
France that the French 'No' should be countered not by a simple 'Yes' but by a 
reasoned 'Yes'. 
Finally, if the alternative of a simple association was rejected, con-
sideration could still be given to the possibilities existing for vertical and 
sector-by-sector collaboration with Britain (for example, in the field oftech-
nology) provided that it was made clear from the outset that the ultimate aim 
was Britain's accession within a brief period. 
Mr.  De Marsanich (Social Movement) spoke out in favour of the ad-
mission of Britain and other EFT  A States to the Common Market.  At the mo-
ment, however, it did not appear possible to open formal negotiations with the 
British Government in London  - against French wishes  - without damaging 
the Common Market.  The important issue of British parti~ipation in the eco-
nomic and political unification of Europe should be studied and dealt with along 
carefully-thought-out diplomatic lines and by common consent of all member 
States of the Community. If the Italian Government wanted the British applica-
tion to succeed, it would also have to consider the other, no less important, 
objective, i.e. that of not seriously disturbing economic and political relations 
between Italy and France and sapping the vitality of the European Community. 
Mr.  La Malia (Secretary of the Republican Party) said that a veto 
before the start of negotiations was contrary both to the letter and to the spirit  of 
the Treaties, with which the Commission and the five Governments ought to 
comply.  The responsibility for a decision that was contrary to the manifest 
will both of the other five member States and of the Commission would have to 
rest with France. Italy should insist that France and Britain alike were neces-
sary to the Common Market.,  even if only in terms of mere economic conven-
ience.  It should also point out that the Italian and British economies comple-
mented each other to a greater extent than the Italian and French economies. 
This emerged clearly from the sacrifices Italy had had to make to French 
agriculture. Mr.  La Malfa totally disagreed with Mr.  Lombardi's description of 
a Britain to be rescued from American colonization.  Britain was a great coun-
try with a profound sense of freedom and independence which it had demon-
strated in the course of its history.  Britain  would introduce this profound sense 
of freedom into Europe,  and it was to this legacy, which contrasted so sharply 
with the French desire for hegemony  - and not to the purely technical aspects 
of the problem  - that General de Gaulle really objected.  De Gaulle 'is not the 
champion of European independence but the fomenter of divisions within Europe, 
and this in the cause of French hegemony.' 
Mr.  Zaccagnini (President of the Christian Democrat Group)  said 
that this premature veto of General de Gaulle's ought not to be accepted;nego-
tiations should also be opened, however, in order to establish, in the one 
legitimate organization and with the sole instruments provided for in the Rome 
Treaties, the actual extent of the difficulties to be overcome. 
Mr.  Fanfani,  replying to various speakers, said that the weaknesses 
which British membership would today introduce into the monetary sector 
ought not to be  forgotten; at the same time they should not be allowed to  de-
tract from the benefits it would introduce into the technological sector. 
In reply to Mr. Malagodi, the Foreign Minister pointed out that it 
was not known whether Britain herself would accept, or the other Community 
member States support, his alternative to the so far unaccepted British appli-
cation for entry.  'My initial statements did not dwell on th~ alternative as I 
did not wish to weaken in any way the firm request for opening of the negotia-
tions.  They were not, however, intended to give the impression that a veto 
would open the door to an attitude of resignation.' 
(Bollettino della Commissione Esteri della Ol.mera dei Deputati - 6  Decem-
ber 1967) 
Netherlands 
On 27  November Minister Luns, commenting on the statements  of 
General de Gaulle,  said that these ought to be studied in the Benelux countries 
and with Rome,  Bonn and London.  He went on to say  that  the French President's 
remarks did not correspond with the facts.  It had been agreed that the  Euro-
pean Commission should contact the British and that the Council of Ministers 
should then meet again on 18 and 19 December. The 'moment of truth' had not 
-29-yet arrived, but he thought it would within a few months, or even within a few 
weeks.  Mr.  Luns thought that, given patience and perseverance, Britain  would 
certainly succeed in becoming a member of the EEC. 
Following the Benelux. talks, Mr.  Luns stated on 29NovemberatThe 
Hague that the three Governments hadnotedwithconcernPresident deGaulle's 
recent comments on British entry, and were unanimous in their analysis ofthe 
President's words. 
'We must state quite bluntly, '  said Mr. Luns, 'that we do not regard 
a press conference as a negotiating procedure since there exists a Treaty (the 
Treaty of Rome) which contains clearcut provisions on the handling of appli-
cations for entry. We all three agree that we cannot treat the General's  re-
marks as official since they have not been given an official character through 
the vote of our colleague,  and because this point of view was not put forward 
at the meeting of the Common Market Ministers on 18 and 19 December. 
We  mu-st insist that the procedure approved by us, and by France, 
too, be followed.' 
Before 18 December, when the Ministers of the EEC countries 
would come together, the Five would have to discuss on various occasions a 
common approach to the remarks of the French President. The interpretation 
to be given to those remarks would have to be decided at the EEC conference. 
The precise French standpoint would  - said Mr.  Luns  - have to be decided 
there. This was what he had been getting at  - he said at a press conference-
with his reference to ' the moment of truth '. There was nothing to suggest that 
Germany would act as mediator in the question.  Nor should the European 
movement expect too much from Benelux efforts to reach a solution. 
In an interview with a French journal, Mr.  Luns said that a choice 
between maintaining the EEC and rejecting Britain's candidature on the one 
hand,  and giving up the European Community on the other, could not be entirely 
ruled out. It would be a v,ery painful choice because France was an  'almost 
essential element' of Europe which in every case expected to hold up its con-
struction. It was certainly difficult to break up what already existed, but he 
expected a crisis which would prevent any further progress being made with 
many problems. President de Gaulle had never before spoken in such a definite 
manner.  France brought forward economic arguments but it had  been observed 
that once t;hese arguments ceased to hold water he would trot out others.  'I 
wonder whether, following the French rejection, he sees in Britain's admis-
sion a sure danger that the Common Market will lose the  - I would almost 
say  - French character it now possesses. ' 
- 30-Intalksheldin Londonon5DecemberwithMr. Wilson andMr. Brown, 
Mr.  Luns said : 'There has been no change in the British attitude to the EEC. 
England's application remains as valid as ever until the meeting of the Six on 
18 and 19 December.' Mr.  Luns' personal opinion was that even if there was a 
further French veto, the British would continue as determinedly as ever to 
seek full membership of the EEC. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 28 November, 30 November, 4 December 1967; 
De Tijd/Maasbode,  6 December 1967). 
5.  Mr. Georges Pompidou on the future of the European Community 
Over the New Year Mr.  Pompidou, the French Prime Minister, was 
asked by '~e Figaro' : 'What do you expect to happen  ? What are your hopes 
for the Community ?'  The following are the main points of Mr.  Pompidou's 
reply.  'Your question leads me at once to ask :what do we understand by 
Europe ? Clearly the term has taken on a restrictive sense.  You are thinking 
of the European Economic Community, of the Europe of the Six.  Perhaps  it 
might be as well to point outfrom the outset that the Community .is not Ehrope 
but a grouping of a few European countries.  And since it is inconceivable that 
all European countries will belong to it in the foreseeable future,  it may be in-
ferre~ that there is nothing abnormal in a European country's being outside it. 
Is there really any point, then, in stirring up public opinion over 
Britain's application for entry ? Negotiations are more or less under waywith 
other countries  - with Spain and Austria, for example  - and nobody feels 
shocked at the cautious attitude of some of our partners towards their possible 
accession.  From this I conclude that if people would only regard the Communi-
ty as a partial grouping of a few European countries, they would no longer con-
sider it monstrous to raise objections to the admission of another country. One 
can be in Europe without being in the Common Market.  And it is not shutting 
someone out from Europe to say to him : you are not yet ripe for membership 
of the Common Market. 
On the other hand it is for those countries which decided  - among 
themselves and by a free choice which at the time they alone made  - to sign 
the Treaty of Rome to carry on applying and to enjoy the major economic and 
political benefit of it. 
-31-•••..  I hope, first, that the decisions taken will be complied with  -
that is, that  the common agricultural market and customs union will be com-
pleted on 1 July 1968. 
I  also hope that, in the interests of the Six,  this union will be rounded 
off by harmonizing customs legislation so as to move towards a real economic 
union.  I hope that this union will embrace the harmonization of transport, 
energy, fiscal, monetary and other policies  .•...  There is still much to do which 
cannot all be finished in 1968.  But,  given the will,  a big step forward will be 
made  ••..• 
If member States would follow France along this path, then the Com-
munity would undoubtedly be  seen to take shape,  stage by stage, by the rest of 
the world and, without the nations composing it melting away, progressing 
beyond the economic to political reality. 
And if other European countries  - England, for example  - far 
from taking objection to such a development, could on their side fit themselves 
either to enter into association with the Community or even to become, one day, 
full members,  accepting the Community for what it is and for what it was  in-
tended to be, that is, a truly and exclusively European Community, why then 
should France raise even objections ? ••.•• ' 
(Le Figaro, 29 December 1967) 
6.  Britain's entry into the EEC as viewed by Maurice Schumann,Michel 
Debr~ and Maurice Couve de Murville 
Presiding over. the 23rd anniversary celebration of the Calais  liber-
ation, Mr.  Maurice Schumann, Minister of State, referred to Britain's entry 
into the Common Market. 
Recalling what Churchill told de Gaulle during the war : ' If I had to 
choose between you and the sea, I  would always prefer the sea,'  ·Mr.  Schumann 
said that 'If, without distrust and without any mental reservation, Britain  were 
to prefer the call of your cliffs to that of the sea, then we would welcome 
Britain with all our hearts and with all our gratitude into that Europe  - a 
community of anxiety and hope  - whose chances and rights it has preserved. 
- 32-It is in a Europe relieved of all tensions by the progressive and now 
definitely possible development of a permanent di.alogue between East and West 
that the right of the Germans to self-determination can be recognized, in 
exchange for an agreement on armaments and a guarantee for its frontiers.  It 
is thus,  and thus only, that Western Europe,economicallyunited in an outward-
looking Community,  will give rise to a politically united Europe. 
(L'Aurore,  9 October 1967) 
Speaking as guest of honour at a dinner-debate organized on 9 Octo-
ber by the daily "Les Echos", Mr.  Michel Debr~, Minister of Finance and 
Economy, pointed out that from a political standpoint,  the Common Markethad 
proved a great disappointment in that the construction of the Community was 
not first marked by an awareness on the part of European concerns of the 
necessity for independence and the need for them to work in close co-operation, 
but rather by competition based on American power and aimed at development 
within the· Common Market.  There is, therefore, no doubt that the enlarge-
ment of the Common Market cannot fail to accentuate that trend unless agree-
ment is reached on the necessity of having both an economy and a policy that 
will make Europe the real Europe it should be and not just another part of the 
world. We  are, therefore, confronted with a political choice. 
There is also, however,  an economic choice to be made.  On  this 
point, the Common Market has been partly achieved as regards the doctrine 
and,  in a number of cases, as regards its practical application. 
Mr.  Debr~ went on to say that it was not possible to envisage the 
entry into the Community of four partners and the maintenance of the common 
agricultural policy. It was extremely difficult to believe that the concepts that 
presided over the setting up of the common external tariff could resist an 
extension of the Common Market to nations whose interests are quite different 
from those of the Six.  If we opt for a free trade system, in other words, a 
more individual and .independent system in relation to a number of disciplines, 
then we could consider favourably an enlargement of the Community.  On the 
other hand,  the more we cling to that discipline and aim at co-ordinating  com-
mon interests,  the cooler  we become abOut the ideaofenlargingtheCommunity. 
Referring to the financial problems, Mr.  Debr~ stated : 'The Com-
mon Market was achieved not with a common currency, nor even with the hope 
of a common currency, but with financial policies founded on a certain degree 
of co-ordination and, in particular, on a relatively free movement of capital. 
If the Common Market were to be enlarged, these policies would be condemned 
through the immediate introduction of countries whose monetary and financial 
-33-development has not been taking place simultaneously with that of the countries 
that form the Common Market continent.  Thus, the problem of negotiations 
with Britain is a problem of choice. 
If Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway enter the Market, then be-
hind the expression "Common Market" there will be a completely different 
reality.  The rules will no longer be the same. 
Naturally, if there ·should be a rejection then it may be accepted  that 
the Common Market will no longer work very well because there are in its 
midst trends that are so favourable to B'ritain' sentry (and perhaps even more to 
the enlargement of the Community) that if that desire were not met, they might 
be tempted to delay the economic development that has been achieved over the 
past few years. 
Under these circumstances, I believe that the best approach is that 
already suggested by General de Gaulle in his first press conference. It is the 
idea of an association,  so that we  could at the same time maintain a number of 
disciplines and promote an approximation of financial and monetary develop-
ments. This would also induce a greater awareness of the choice that must be 
made by all the Europeans.  The choice is whether, on the basis of a concerted 
economy that is endeavouring to co-ordinate their interests, they wish to have 
a European policy or whether, in the final analysis, they wish to give up that 
idea. 
I believe,' concluded Mr.  Debr~, 'that the wisest course 'fo follow 
would be to conclude a provisional agreement, i.  e.  a trade or association 
treaty and to ascertain, in future years, to what extent there is, outside the 
Common Market,  a political, economic and financial evolution in keeping with 
what is wished for on the continent.' 
(Le Monde,  11 October 1967  - Le Nouveau Journal,  11 October 1967) 
Following the session of the Council of Ministers held on 23  and 
24 October in Luxembourg,  Mr.  Maurice Couve de Murville-,  Minister for 
Foreign Affairs emphatically denied (1)  in the course of a televised interview, 
that France had vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market.  'I began my 
(1)  Combat,  25 October 1967  - Le Monde,  26 October 1967. 
-34-statement to the Council', the Minister recalled, 'by saying that, with regard 
to the enlargement of the European Community, there was, on the part of the 
French, no opposition, no objection on principle.  In other words, there is no 
objection on principle to Britain's entry into the Common Market.' 
During an impromptu press conference, mainly followed by British 
journalists, Mr. Couve de Murville pointed out in Luxembourg : 
1.  That if the British press consider that France had vetoed Britain's 
entry  into the Common Market, this meant that the British are very 
pessimistic as to the possibilities of improving the situation. 
2.  That Britain's position is somewhat better than in 1961 for the prob-
lems are better known and can therefore be resolved. 
On 12 November,  an interview by Mr.  Couve de Murville was broad-
cast on the German television network SUdwestfunk.  Referring first (1)  to the 
rejection of the Fouchet plan, the Minister emphasized  that 'things did not work 
out as they should have done,  not because Germany or Italy refused to endorse 
that plan but because the other member countries refused to do  so. ' 
Mr.  Couve de Murville also mentioned the need for a common policy 
aimed at relieving international tension and achieving better understanding be-
tween the EEC and Europe, with a view to settling the Germ~  problem.  'I 
think it is in the interests of France and Germany, and therefore, in the inter-
ests of Europe as a whole that we  should continue together on that path.  We 
have no greater desire than to pursue that policy in agreement with Western 
Germany and,  in particular, to solve some day the problem of German reuni-
fication.' 
He finally came out in favour of Britain's application :Britain's 
natural destiny in the present age is to come closer to Europe and,  eventually, 
to become part of it.  As to the conditions for Britain's entry, what is required 
is its acceptance of what has been achieved hitherto in the Common Market. 
This means that what has been achieved so far by the present six Member 
nations must not be undone.  It must, on the contrary, be completed and con-
solidated. 
(AFP,  UPI) 
(1)  Combat,  13 November 1967  - Le Monde,  14 November 1967) 
-35-During the French television feature described as 'En direct avec', 
Mr.  Couve de Murville defended on 13 November France's foreign policy. 
Referring to Europe's independence, he stated: 'There is nothing in 
Europe's construction effort that clashes with the policy of the French Govern-
ment,  such as it has been carried out for the past eight to nine years.  I would 
even say that the construction of Europe has been largely promoted,  and prob-
ably  made  possible, by French policy in Europe. ' 
'All we ask for is that if we are going to enlarge the Common Mar-
ket we should not weaken it by the same token, for then we would not obtain the 
result we are seeking.' 
With regard to supranational Europe, the Minister asked 'What is, in 
fact,  this supranational Europe ? There are two possible definitions : either 
having a Parliament elected by universal  suffrage or taking majority decisions. 
As regards the former, i.e. the European Parliament, this reminds me of 
certain phases of the Fourth Republic when there was a Parliament without 
Government.  As for the second point, namely majority decisions, we have 
always been extremely reticent.  Do you really believe that relying on the ma-
jority is the best way to protect France's interests? ' 
The discussion then broached on Britain's accession.  Mr.  Couve de 
Murville was asked whether it was true that he was trying to prevent Britain 
from joining the Common Market in order that France should retain the leader-
ship in Europe.  This was his reply : 'Let me tell you,  first of all, that this 
sort of argument is sometimes used abroad .....  I note in passing that you feel 
that France is playing an important part in the Common Market.  You even 
speak of a very important part. 
But what you are accusing me of is in no way connected with our 
political aim.  Our aim,  and I will say so again, is that Europeans should co-
operate and come to an agreement amongst themselves. There is no question at all 
of opposing the entry of a new member into the Community.  But what must be 
made sure of is whether the entry of that new Member will not weaken the 
whole Community, both politically and economically. 
I believe that among the Six there are a number of things  - and this 
is the essential aspect of the matter  - that are shared in common and one of 
those things is  the European spirit. Those are the things that must be preserved. ' 
- 36-Germany 
1.  Debates in the Bundestag 
Development aid 
On 11 October 1967 Mr.  Wischnewski,  the Federal Minister for 
Economic Co-operation,  informed the Bundestag in a Government statement 
on development aid policy (1)  that,  despite the difficult budget position,  such 
a policy ought to be given priority. 
The staff of the German development services should be increased 
to 2, 000.  At the moment 1, 100 members were at work in 25  countries.  The 
Federal Republic ranked fourth - after the  United States,  France and Britain-
as a provider of development aid,  and seventh in the proportion of aid given to 
national product.  In principle,  1 per cent of the national product should be 
applied to development aid.  In the Federal Republic the aid given in the past 
year had amounted to 0. 81 per cent of the national product. 
The Federal Government - said Mr.  Wischnewski - was prepared to 
co-operate on development aid with the East European countries as soon as 
some basis for doing so had been established.  With the Government statement 
the Minister replied to questions from the three Bundestag groups before a 
poorly attended house. 
He emphasized the part played b~ the Federal Republic's develop-
ment aid l.n building up a positive world image of West Germany. For  Germany, 
too,  the crucial market reserves of the future lay in countries on the threshold 
of industrialization.  To open up these new markets at each end was one of the 
major tasks of German development policy,  which had often paved the way for 
German industry and laid the foundation for expanding business relations. 
During the last four years German exports to the developing countries had 
risen by more than 41 per cent. 
On the subject of German aid,  Mr.  Wischnewski said that if any 
country were to try to exploit the division of Germany,  the Federal Govern-
(!)  Questions by the CDU/CSU and SPD Groups on the Federal Government's 
development policy (publication V  /1978). 
Question by the FDP Group on development policy (publication V  /2144). 
- 37-ment would not let itself be forced to make concessions.  The developing coun-
tries' own efforts would always be given special attention.  In general,  aid 
would be strictly tied to specific projects and the use made of it strictly super-
vised. 
In answer to criticisms that  such procedure was time-wasting, 
Mr.  Wischnewskfpointed out that only useful projects were worth pursuing, 
and that all current projects were therefore now being investigated.  The Fed-
eral Government was drawing attention in Brussels and Paris to the inadequate 
share of the contracts  of the European Development Aid Fund being secured 
by German industry - the Federal Republic accounted for 34 per cent of the 
Fund's receipts while only 10 per cent of its expenditure went to Germanfirms. 
Mr.  BrUck (SPD)  complained that in the past the policy had been to 
scatter development aid among all and sundry,  in view of the Federal Repub-
lic's claim to sole representation.  But it was not in Burundi that German 
reunification would be decided.  Certain blackmailing attempts had to be coun-
tered and it was essential now and again to come down with a firm  'no'.  He 
felt that the number of development projects ought to be thinned down. 
Mr.  Ertl (FDP) described development aid as social policy on a 
world scale and paid tribute to the work of the former Development Minister, 
Mr.  Scheel (FDP).  Mr.  Kahn-Ackermann (Social Democrat) advocated caution 
in gauging the efforts made by the developing countries,  and.suggested thattoo 
short a measuring-rod should not be applied. 
Mr.  Leisler Kiep suggested that an institute should  be set  up for finan-
cing major projects.  Mr.  Hellige dealt with questions of social security for 
development workers,  to whom Mr. Wischnewski had already alluded.  One of 
the main concerns was to reintegrate these workers on their return to Germany, 
which at present could only be done with certainty in the case of civil servants. 
On  15 October 1967 Mr.  Wischnewski stated ina radio broadcast 
that the Federal Government would not make any concessions on development 
aid if anyone tried to exploit the division of Germany.  Cases had occurred 
where West Germany had been warned,  'If ~  won't,  then we shall apply to the 
other part of Germany'.  Under these circumstances one had been prepared to 
do things for which,  perhaps,  there had been no material justification. 
Mr. Wischnewski added that the investigation of development aid projects 
would lead to the preparation of a positive and a negative list.  With regard to 
co-operation with the Eastern bloc on development aid,  he pointed out that real 
interest was being shown in a number of countries in East and South-East 
Europe in the possibility of working hand in hand with  the Federal Republic in 
the developing countries. 
- 38-External and European :policies 
On  13  October 1967 the German Bundestag discussed external and 
European policies (1).  As far as Europe was concerned,  the debate was one 
of confessions of faith. 
'It is good to see,' said Mr.  Brandt,  'that the European Communi-
ties had made progress since the Bundestag debate of 22  February 1967.'  He 
paid tribute to the work of Professor Hallstein and added that the applications 
for entry received from the United Kingdom,  Ireland,  Denmark and Norway, 
as well as Sweden's approach,  underlined the success achieved by the EEC. 
'We believe  that this historic opportunity to progress on the road to Europe 
must not be missed.  We  are acting on the assumption that the applicant coun-
tries are prepared to work hand in hand with us,  and without reservations,  for 
a united Europe. ' 
'In addition to the internal conversion of the European Economic 
Community into an economic union and the enlargement of the Communities, 
the merger of the three European Communities will also come up for discus-
sion.  If our partners follow up the suggestions made by the German Presi-
dent of the Council,  the entry of Britain and the other EFTA countries will not 
be made more difficult but easier.'.....  'The Federal Government sees no 
contradiction between its efforts to ensure union of the West European coun-
tries and the aim of co-operating with the countries of the East. The essential, 
as always, is that the European Communities should be economically and poli-
tically strengthened. But this greater strength which will result from union 
must serve to facilitate the East-West dialogue with a view to ushering in co-
operation based  on sound interests beyond the bounds of the different systems. 
Co-operation and the unification of Europe belong to the logic of our 
:imes and cannot indefinitely be disregarded.  By pooling the limited forces of 
;he separate peoples,  we can assure Europe of a worthwhile place in theworld 
>f  tomorrow.  Only thus can Europe's voice attract the attention it deserves. 
After years during which no progress had been made,  the summit 
~onference held in Rome last May had breathed fresh life into the idea of 
~uropean political co-operation.  The Federal Government hopes that another 
:onference of this kind will soon be held. '  Mr.  Brandt added that there was no 
·eason to change this policy.  The Federal Government would resolutely pur-
:ue a policy of peace,  easing of tension and co-operation. 
Mr.  Brandt then turned to nuclear arms.  'The Federal Republic 
ontinues to adopt a constructive attitude towards the non-proliferation of nu-
lear arms.  It is in favour of a treaty acceptable throughout the world. 
L)  Motion and resolution of the Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe (CDU/CSU,  SPD,'FDP),  publication V  /2157. 
-39-Peaceful applications of atomic energy should not,  however,  be hindered but, 
rather,  promoted.  Obligations under the treaty will have to be balanced out 
as far as possible.  The  connexion  with wider-reaching measures for the 
control and restriction of armaments must be clearly brought out. Adaptation 
to scientific and technological development should not be hampered.  Finally, 
such a treaty should p.ot in any way endanger security.  Events have shown that 
these views are in no way specifically German. ' 
Turning to the policy towards the East,  Mr.  Brandt said this  had 
aroused considerable respect both in the West and among neutral countries 
throughout the world.  'As a result of our efforts and the support of ourfriends, 
no-one who says that the Federal Republic is a disturber of the peace or a 
hindrance to the easing of tension is any longer believed.  There has been a 
real change in climate.  Allegations that the Federal Government is preparing 
for aggression, that it is imperialistic, that it is a threat to peace, and so forth, 
fall on deaf ears.  Those who make them are,  as a result,  believed even less. 
No  propaganda can dispose of the fact that the Federal Republic is 
ready and willing to normalize its relations with all States of East and South-
East Europe,  and to build up and improve relations with the Soviet Union with-
out,  at the same time,  neglecting the problem of a divided Germany. 
We  shall reach a point at which it will become even more obvious 
than it i-s  already that it will depend alone on the good will of the leaders of 
the power centres in the East,  and not on the Federal Government's attitude, 
whether the easing of tension in Europe will be furthered by practical measu-
res, treaties of other arrangements.  The Federal Government's willingness is 
an established fact which cannot, even in East Berlin, be indefinitely ignored. 
The Federal Government has every reason to persist in its policy of 
constructive preparedness and to refrain from chasing will-o'-the-wisps; nor 
should it allow itself to be diverted from this policy by manoeuvres.  It is es-
sential that the Bundestag continues to support this policy with a wide measure 
of unanimity,  as it did in approving the Government statement of 13 December 
1966. I 
Mr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group,  dwelt during 
6e external policy debate on the need for 'European impulses' and 'Atlantic co-
operation'.  The economies of the Six had become so closely interwoven that 
no member could withdraw without suffering damage.  'From six eggs we havE 
made an omelette,  and no-one can change this into six eggs again.' 
On enlarging the EEC,  Mr. Barzel said: 'We have only one wish, 
one request to make,  and that is that serious talks be opened- and shortly-
with the States that wish to enter.  We  hope,' he continued,  in an allusion to 
President the Gaulle,  'that no-one will say "No"  at the door or round 
-40-the  table.' The accession of countries like  England or Denmark would un-
doubtedly change the quality of the Community. Mr. Barzel went on to raise the 
question which characterized the tenor of the debate : 'Would it not also change 
the quality of Europe if these applications were rejected?'  Amidst applause, 
he added : 'Within our reach we  have a chance to set up the largest market in 
the world while at the same time showing understanding for the neutrals.  If 
we want to remain a modern country,  we must want Europe.' 
In its acceptance of a larger economic community in Western Europe, 
the Federal Republic was 'open to the East and ready to co-operate.'  On this 
point there was complete agreement 'with the trade unions and the parties' in 
the six EEC member States. 
Mr. Walter Scheel,  first Opposition speaker,  felt that at themoment 
the outlines of external policy were blurred.  They should be more clearly de-
fined so that 'the Federal Republic can gain credibility. '  Interrupted twice by 
\1r.  Helmut Schmidt and Mr.  Walter Leisler Kiep,  Mr.  Scheel complained  that 
hat the  Free Democrats had not been informed in good time of Mr. Brandt's 
;tatement.  He went on to say that there were inconsistencies between the 
~oalition's external and defence policies.  'The Federal Government is not 
,repared to adjust its defence policy to its policy on the East.'  He thought it 
,bsurd that the Government should continue to insist on having atomic carrier 
veapons although it had no access to atomic weapons themselves,  did not want 
hem and,  in fact,  stood no chance of sharing them.  In this respect the Fede-
·al Government's peace policy was incomprehensible. 
'There is no sign of any proper aim in the entire European policy.' 
'here were only verbal agreements,  but in its attitude to France and England 
1e  Federal Government was paving the way to misunderstandings.  'We should 
:lt let ourselves be influenced by the bargaining and haggling going on in vari-
lS countries.'  A return to nationalistic thinking was not,  unfortunately,  con-
ned to France.  'General enthusiasm has become submerged in a freezing 
me.' But resignation was a  'particularly bad  habit in politics.'  Mr.  Scheel 
tid that it was only the prospect of one day belonging to a politically united 
1d economically important Europe that was keeping the hopes of youth from 
ling shattered. ' 
Mr.  Karl Mommer,  as spokesman for the SPD Group,  pleaded for 
e admission of Britain and other EFTA States  to the EEC.  He  referred to 
onomic expansion and the fact that Europe,  during the Kennedy Round and the 
gotiations on the reserve currency,  had begun 'to speak with one voice'. The 
ssibility of curing the congenital defect of the EEC and closing the gap be-
een it and EFTA presented a historic occasion. 
-41-'The British Government,  for better or for worse,  is committed to 
seeking entry. '  The SPD looked to the Federal Government to throw its weigh1 
into the scales with a view to ensuring Britain's admission.  It was not just a 
matter of 'welcoming' British entry; the Federal Government ought to bring it 
about with the means at its disposal.  The Federal Government should make it 
quite clear to the French Government that the expansion of the Communities 
was of vital interest and a major aim of the Federal Republic. 
'Franco-German relations are now so firmly entrenched that they 
can stand a shock, '  said Mr. Mommer.  This applied not only 'if de Gaulle 
does not meticulously say and do what pleases us, but also if we,  disdaining 
cowardice before a friend,  uphold our views and interests. '  'Britain, ' said 
Mr.  Mommer,  'is ripe for entry. '  A second veto would drive Britain away in 
the direction of the USA.  'This would result in the very opposite from what w 
too want - to make the European continent the equal partner of the USA. ' 
Mr.  Blachstein (SPD)  explained the reasons underlying the motion 
tabled by his Group calling on the Government to suspend economic and milita 
ry aid to Greece until democratic conditions had been restored in that country 
During the foreign policy debate Dr. Kiesinger said that there were 
wide differences of opinion between the Federal Government and the French 
Government as regards relations with the  United States and Britain's appli-
cation for entry into the EEC.  He  disagreed with Mr. Mommer's suggestion 
that a firmer tone should be taken with de Gaulle on British ~ntry.  That woul 
be the most unsuitable approach.  It was essential,  however,  to speak with th 
General as convincingly as possible. 
Dr. Kiesinger then explained German tactics for the negotiations. 
The  important thing was to keep the Six together round one table and to avoid 
a commotion.  The backing of five member States would not suffice to ensure 
British entry.  Talks with England on material issues must be so conducted 
that all the Six would remain at the table.  Otherwise negotiations would be 
wrecked straight away.  A phased plan on these lines had been discussed witl 
all the Governments concerned.  Despite all the delays,  disappointments and 
setbacks previously suffered,  'the great venture of this century' remained th 
completion of European union. 
Mr. Birrenbach (CDU)  went deeply · tto the political,  economic an 
technological aspects of broader European c ·-·operation.  'A united Europe c 
open itself to the East,  throwing bridges over the East-West demarcation lir. 
so as to make it conceivable in the future that the division of greater Europe 
can be healed. ' 
-42-The speaker later turned to the Geneva negotiations on a non-proli-
feration treaty.  'The Federal Government has always expressed recognition 
of the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear arms among third States. In the 
Paris Agreement it undertook to forgo production of these weapons.  We  are 
entitled,  however,  to see that our vital rights in the peaceful application of 
nuclear energy and in military security are respected. ' 
Following the discussions held by the Council of Ministers in 
Luxembourg, Foreign Minister Brandt made the following statement before the 
Bundestag on 26 October 1967 : 
'. . • . .  There have been contradictory and misleading reports on the 
Council of Ministers' discussions in Luxembourg.  Doubts have also been ex-
pressed as to whether the Federal Government is abiding by what it said in its 
official statement of 13  December last year,  and in the debate on Europe in  the 
Bundestag of 21 February and in its official statement of130ctober 1967.  This 
means that  we are in favour of expanding the European Community and are doing 
what we can to bring this about without endangering  what has already been achieved. 
The Opinion drawn up by the European Commission on 29 September 
was praised by the Foreign Minister and in general approved.  It was again 
made clear that the procedure for entry of new members under Article  237 of 
the EEC Treaty did not have to be started up but had already been under way 
ever since July 1967 when the Commission had been asked for its views. 
No fundamental objections to expanding the Community,  or -pending 
merger of the Treaties - the Communities,  had  been raised by  anyone in 
Luxembourg. 
The Question was raised in the Council of Ministers whether the 
character of the Community would be radically changed by the entry of new 
members and whether progress towards economic union would be delayed.  The 
French representatives said that this was the case and that they feared a chan-
ge of the Community's specific aims,  characteristics and methods.  The five 
other partners shared,  in different degrees,  the opinion that although quantita-
tive and qualitative changes would take place they would not threaten the charac-
ter of the Community. 
I have already pointed out in Luxembourg that satisfactory answers 
to material questions can only come from talks with Great Britain,  and this 
-43-also applies to the other applicants.  In our view,  therefore,  the attitudes of 
the Six cannot be finalized without first talking and negotiating with the British 
and the other applicants. 
The opinion expressed on the French side that Britain must stabilize 
its currency and its economy before entry also falls under this head.  The 
Federal Government believes that the Six should continue discussing all the 
material issues in detail.  In the process it will soon become apparent that 
such a discussion cannot be usefully continued in the absence of the State 
directly concerned.  We  also regard it as w1reasonable 'to impose harder con-
ditions on Britain than those which member States expected each other to ful-
fill when they signed the EEC Treaty.  Moreover it seems likely that the mere 
starting of talks between l3ritain and the Six will help towards solving the eco-
nomic and monetary problems of that country. 
French objections and misgivings did not come as a surprise to us, 
particularly after the French President's visit to Bonn last July.  During my 
Paris talks with the French Foreign Minister early last week,  he went no fur-
ther than to say that there was no French 'No' in principle.  Our efforts are 
naturally directed to dispelling French misgivings and at the same time to 
securing recognition of our own interests and proposals •....  ' 
Federal Chancellor Kiesinger made the following statement on the 
London talks : 
'Our main topic was Britain's desire to join the European Commu-
nities.  The Prime Minister and the other members of the Government with 
whom I spoke once again explained their attitude.  They said that their country 
had now taken a final decision which could be regarded as near revolutionary. 
It was not merely for economic reasons that Britain wanted to join the Com-
munities.  Indeed,  the political reasons were even more important.  The Bri-
tish were prepared to accept the full implications of the Rome Treaties and in 
future to co-operate to the full.  They appealed to Europe not to miss this great 
opportunity for finally turning Britain's face towards European development. 
I left no doubt in my British partner's minds that we - and this I 
could certainly do after the last debate in this House - also wanted and were 
striving for Britain's entry into the European Communities with an eye on an 
eventual and much to be desired political union.  I tried to show them that our 
attitude to this question so far did not spring from a lack of enthusiasm or to 
nervous hesitancy in the light,  say, of Franco-German relations.  I tried to 
make it clear to them that, in our opinion,  the methods to adopt were those that 
-44-seemed to hold out the greatest promise,  those best calculated to serve our 
purpose- unanimity among the Six and French approval. 
My partners showed complete understanding of our view that we 
should proceed in such a way as to satisfy all the partners, that is, by starting 
off with a round of talks among the Six.  Concern was naturally expressed in 
London over the possibility that these consultations might be drawn out indefi-
nitely.  The talks would have to be restricted to a reasonable period,  after 
which the question of opening negotiations with Britain would be seriously tack-
led.  I told them I fully understand their wish.  I will not hide the fact that this 
situation worries me.  At the same time I do not intend to indulge in the sort  of 
dramatics which we have seen here and there.  The situation is undoubtedly a 
difficult and complicated one.  At the moment we  can do no more than clearly 
and sensibly state our point of view in the round of talks now proceeding among 
the Six.  In the process,  we  must take care not to precipitate a  crisis. in the 
Comll\unities and not to  seriously disturb our relations either with our French 
friends or with our British friends and the other countries that wish to join the 
European Communities. ' 
On  15 December 1967,  three days before the crucial Brussels meet-
ing of Ministers on the opening of negotiations,  the Bundestag and the Govern-
ment in Bonn again confirmed their determination to work for the enlargement 
of the EEC. 
Mr.  Brandt,  the Foreign Minister,  stated: 
'It will be difficult to reach agreement.on entry into the final phase 
of the Community so long as the question of applications for admission remains 
unsolved.' 
There was a danger that the Community spirit might suffer damage 
if the impression was created that a single Government wanted to lay down the 
rules for negotiations.  Mr.  Brandt therefore urged the French neighbours not 
to make things difficult for themselves and for the others.  He gave an assu-
rance that the Federal Governement would do its utmost to bring about a deci-
sion,  in conformity with the Treaty,  on the opening of negotiations with Britain, 
Ireland, Denmark and Norway. 
On the key problem as to whether such a decision had to be taken 
unanimously or by a majority,  Mr. Brandt thought that procedural decisions 
-45-called only for a simple majority.  It might be said,  however,  that a decision 
to open official negotiations already went into the, heart of the matter. Six 
years previously the opening of such negotiations had been decided unanimous-
ly but it had not been explained whether unanimity was absolutely necessary. 
He personally was inclined to think that a unanimous decision' was not essential. 
In the last analysis only the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
could decide this,  and no-one wanted to institute proceedings there. 
Mr. Brandt stressed that on 19 December in Brussels the Federal 
Government had tried to get a vote taken on the Commission's recommendation 
that negotiations be opened with Britain.  Bonn would vote for the start of ne-
gotiations.  The President of the Council would then have to count the votes for 
and against.  Failure to open negotiations would give rise to a very serious 
situation which would then have to be studied in bilateral and multilateral talks 
and among the Five.· 
The main bone of contention,  according to Mr.  Brandt,  was France's 
requirement that the material conditions should first be established in Britain. 
The Five,  on the other hand,  thought that it was only through negotiations that 
one could judge whether the conditions for British entry existed.  France had 
no right to stand in the way of such an approach or to take measures that clashed 
with the Community's Treaty aim of seeking to enlarge itself. 
Mr. Brandt stated that the British Government - as clearly explain-
ed to him by Mr.  Wilson - now only wanted to know whether official negotiations 
would be started.  Mr. Brandt summed up the position with the words : 'We 
are concerned here not only with the four applications for entry but with the 
Community itself. ' 
Mr.  Furler,  (CDU/CSU) thanked Mr. Brandt for his comments.  His 
Group was in favour of British entry and of opening negotiations.  The public 
would be unable to grasp why talks were not being started with the British, 
particularly as opening negotiations did not necessarily imply approval of 
Britain's entry. 
Mr. Borm (FDP) spoke of a real conflict in the EEC.  President 
de Gaulle was going against the Treaty.  It was intolerable that a single authori-
ty should block any progress. 
Mr. Apel (SPD)  strongly condemned President de Gaulle's attitude 
but thought it important to keep the EEC in operation.  At all events,  the Fede-
ral Government had done its duty. 
-46-Mr. Metzger (SPD)  rejected President de Gaulle's statement that 
Britain was not ripe, from the economic and monetary point  of view,  for entry 
to the EEC as unsubstantiated; at any rate it needed to be checked and called 
for further fact-finding talks by the Commission. 
The reason for the Brandt vote before the Bundestag was a joint 
motion of the CDU/CSU and the SPD calling for a  'decision in pursuance of the 
Treaty' on the opening of negotiations with Great Britain,  Ireland,  Denmark 
and Norway.  In the ranks of the CDU,  and still more of the Social Democrats, 
there had been a growing feeling of impatience in recent weeks at the course 
steered between Paris and London by the Kiesinger Government and its Foreign 
Minister.  Criticism had not however taken a more tangible form. 
Mr.  Mommer (SPD),  Bundestag Vice President and one of de Gaulle's 
severest critics, pointed out in the explanatory statement accompanying the 
motion that President de Gaulle had failed to get his way on this occasion be-
cause the ·Five had decided in Brussels to put the question of negotiations on 
the agenda.  For this reason the Parliament saw no need to address a formal 
demand to Mr. Brandt. 
Agricultural policy 
On 24  October 1967 Mr. Strauss,  the Finance Minister,  pointed out 
in presenting the 1968 budget and the tax amendment law 1967 to the  Bundestag~ 
that the financial risks attaching to Federal Germany's commitments in con-
nexion with the EEC's agricultural policy were a special problem of long-term 
budgetary accounting. 
The market organizations already decided upon, with automatic com-
pulsory interventions and refunds on exports,  were already entailing a constant 
rise in expenditure at a rate which was causing great concern.  The introduc-
tion of further mark~t organizations or future decisions of the EEC Council of 
Ministers on new agricultural prices could lead in this sector to yet a further 
rise in expenditure beyond all reasonable limits. 
Financial accounting could only take into account the unmistakable 
financial effects of existing or foreseeable EEC market organizations. Experi-
ence  had shown that agricultural policy decisions- particularly those on pri-
ces - had not taken sufficient account of the ins and outs of the matter.  Such 
decisions encouraged overproduction,  and had already led to this in a number 
of sectors.  Given compulsory intervention, little risk was incurred by produ-
cers in expanding production.  But for member States,  and particularly for the 
-47-Federal Republic,  they meant a constantly heavier burden.  Mr.  Strauss quo-
ted the glut of butter as a case in point.  The cost of warehousing,  handling 
and exporting butter in some cases exceeded the value of the butter itself. 
Such a policy could not be pursued indefinitely.  Steps would therefore have to 
be taken to ensure that the agricultural policy decisions of the EEC Council of 
Ministers were in future kept within limits tolerable to the member States. 
The agricultural financing regulation expiring in 1969 ought to be replaced by 
one calculated to yieid sound results not only from a financial but also from a 
trade policy point of view. 
Mr. Strauss felt that the entire concept in the agricultural sector 
needed reviewing.  German agriculture would continue to need help to equip it 
for the tasks and the competitive conditions of the future.  At the same time it 
was also in the interests of agriculture itself to shift the emphasis somewhat 
as regards production.  The main aim of a long-term agricultural policy must 
be to create operating structures designed to remain permanently competitive. 
This had been expressly recognized by the Federal Government in its budgetary 
plan..  The matters to be considered ranged over a wide field - laying down 
long-term objectives,  improving agricultural structures,  technical moderni-
zation of farms likely to remain efficient over a long period,  leasehold law and 
agricultural social policy. 
On  15  November 1967 a debate was held in the Bundestag on the po-
sition of German agriculture in the EEC. 
The present and future agricultural policy in the EEC must be built 
around the family-operated farm,  said Mr.  Hocherl,  the Minister for Agricul-
ture,  in his reply to an FDP question (1)  on the situation of agriculture.  The 
family-operated farm should not,  however,  be regarded as something static 
but as a dynamic undertaking caught up in the revolutionary progress of all 
aspects of existing life,  including that of agriculture in an industrial society. 
As regards falls in prices in the current season,  Mr.  lfocherl thought 
that,  on the basis of conservative estimates,  a drop in revenue of about 
DM  280m  could be reckoned with.  However,  views on the trend in farming 
incomes varied widely and forecasts not lightly to be dismissed suggested that, 
in the light of price movements to date and the unprecedentedly good 1967/68 
harvest,  revenues would not be lower than in the previous year.  Moreover, 
because of the good  feed-grain harvest,  farmers' expenditure on extra fodder 
would probably be less than usual. 
(1)  Publication V  /2099 
-48-Mr.  Hocherl dealt searchingly with agriculture against the back-
ground of the Federal Government's medium-term budgetary accounting.  He 
quoted the now familiar figures suggesting that budget estimates for agriculture 
in 1968 would rise to DM  5, 433m  and,  in the following years,  fall back to 
DM. 5, 300m  ,  DM  4, 669m.  and DM. 4, 473m.  To this were to be added pay-
ments from the  Guidance Section of the EEC Agricultural Fund which in 1969 
would probably be of the order of DM  200m.  The budget estimates for 1967 
amounted to DM  4, 400m  excluding expenditure under the investment program-
me (DM  320m ) to be charged to the 1967 agricultural budget.  The Federal 
Government,  in addition to meeting the high cost of achieving the price policy 
aims of the Brussels market organizations,  would have to lay out substantial 
sums for the permanent tasks still to be tackled at national level.  These in-
cluded the improvement of agricultural structure,  the modernization of farm-
ing equipment,  rationalization,  marketing,  and  raising social standards in 
agriculture. 
Mr.  Loge  mann said that the FDP Group had introduced its question 
because the Coalition had so far not taken up a position on agricultural policy. 
As regards the integration of  agriculture into the overall economy,  it was not 
special rights that German farmers demanded but equality of treatment.  The 
extent to which modern industrial society had become  interwoven with agri-
culture was also recognized by farmers.  Falling German cereals prices and 
cuts in agricultural investment aid had already,  in the past few months,  led to 
a noticeable drop in purchases from the farm equipment industry and in other 
sectors. 
Mr.  Loge  mann called for agricultural production aimed at covering 
demand,  pointing out that the Federal Republic obtained only 70 per cent of its 
requirements from its own agricultural production.  Judging by F AO surveys, 
prospects also existed in the export trade. 
Failure to discharge the obligations entered into under the EEC's 
adaptation law was-according to the Free Democrats - regarded by farmers 
as a breach of faith by the Chancellor and his Government,  all the more so as 
the Government was not making the  slightest effort to offset cuts in allocations 
of funds by means of price policy measures.  Mr.  Loge  mann criticized the 
Government for not yet having made known its views on the payment of com-
pensation for the cereals price amounting to DM  560m.  He repeated that the 
Free Democrats thought that compensation should be made on the basis of the 
area under cultivation.  They were opposed to any suggestion that any part of 
this sum should be diverted into other channels. 
Turning  to agricultural price movements over the year, Mr. Loge  mann 
complained of the fact that the beef and veal price had not been improved by 
-49-'timely measures',  that the producer target price for milk had not been attain-
ed for 1967,  and finally that the Federal Government had done nothing to pre-
vent the substantial drop in the potato price. 
The FDP ~atly disagreed with the recent statements by the Vice-
President of the EEC Commission on agricultural structure in the EEC,  and 
with the views expressed by Finance Minister Strauss in his budget speech. 
(Mr.  Strauss had warned against taking on excessive financial burdens in the 
EEC  and advocated a sensible overhaul of the system.)  The FDP also felt that 
the EEC's price policy still left room for manoeuvre. 
The second part of the agricultural debate was devoted to the forth-
coming EEC market organization for milk and milk products on which the SPD 
Group had put forward a question.  The common target price was no more a 
guaranteed price than the current national target price, but- saidMr. Hocherl 
in his reply - served as an aim for agricultural policy in the EEC and as a 
yardstick for fixing tariff protection.  The target price of Pf41. 2 free dairy had 
had been fixed on 24  July 1966 on the assumption that the economic situation 
continued to improve and that the production and consumption of milk kept pace 
with it.  Consumption of milk and milk products in the EEC had,  however,  lag-
ged far behind production.  Structural surpluses,  particularly of butter and 
skim milk,  were not to be ruled out under existing arrangements and in the 
light of experience to date.  The cost of the common market organization for 
milk had been estimated by the Commission at DM  2, 240m  whereas new cal-
culations carried out jointly by the Agricultural and Finance Ministries had 
yielded a sum of DM  2, 730m.  What actually happened would depend mainly on 
the nature of the arrangement finally made and on production and consumption 
trends in the EE  C. 
(Federal Bundestag,  124th session,  11 October 
126th session,  13 October 
12 7th session,  24  October 
129th session,  26 October 
145~h session,  15 December 
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung,  Bulletin No.  121, 
27 October and No.  122,  28  October 1967; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  16 December 1967; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  17 December 1967) 
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European policy 
In a German broadcast on 5 November Dr. Kiesinger was interview-
ed on the subject of Franco-German relations, the European question and the 
structural crisis in NATO. 
'Now,  as in the past,' said the Chancellor, 'abiding good relations 
between Germany and France are one of the mainsprings of German foreign 
policy.  The fact that there are differences of opinion and differences of inter-
est between  our two countries is clear and was clear when I delivered the 
Government's statement. And in the meantime this has not changed. We 
should strive all the more, therefore, to keep this relationship in good repair -
a relationship important not only for our two countries but also for the whole 
of Europe, and one that I might perhaps best describe as the key relationship 
of Europe. 
I should, however, like this to be clearly understood. It cannot 
mean that Germany and France together can lay down a line of conduct for the 
other European countries. This would be the most wrong-headed thing the two 
countries could do.  This Europe must grow up naturally on the basis of a 
partnership between equals.  By this I mean that if a European solution can 
be achieved at all, it can only occur if  the Franco-Germ~  relationship is and 
remains satisfactory. This question, therefore, should be of interest to all. 
Politics is, in fact,  the art of the possible,  and the better is often the enemy 
of the good.  I repeat, it is essential that Europeans pool their efforts.  Since 
this can only be done in common,  a solution has to be found with which every-
one can agree. If, for example, there were no dispute over Britain's acces-
sion, the old conflict would still remain over the choice between European 
integration with the ultimate objective of a Federal State of Europe, and a 
'Europe of Nation States', although the latter -to do justice to General de 
Gaulle - would be in a very close union which could be built up into a political 
union.  I am one of those who believed, without being over-optimistic about 
the political consequences of integration policy, that a policy of European in-
tegration was the best course to follow.  And today I still take this view.' 
With reference to de  Gaulle's theme of a 'Europe of Nation States', 
the Chancellor had this to say: 
'I believe this to be a completely feasible concept. I, too, am of the 
opinion that it will be a long time before we can speak of a European nation; 
whereas there will long be a French nation,  a German nation,  and so on. What 
is important is that we should achieve this co-operation.  We have no simple 
formulas  such as  are current in  France  - 'unified  Europe'  and  'united 
Europe'  - which,  as it were,  sum up  what is at stake. I  also believe that 
we have learned something. In the years immediately following the collapse, 
-51-the disaster that overtook our country,  there can be no doubt that many Ger-
mans saw in Europe nothing more than a means of escaping their own history 
and,  indeed - with a certain satisfaction in their own decline - saw a chance of 
losing their national identity and,  with it,  the enormous difficulties it entailed. 
This was not a sound reason.  In this respect we have become more 
reasonable and per.haps,  too,  a little more self-assured. Certainly it is no 
longer possible for us to carry the national idea to absurd lengths.  A glance 
at  our young people suffices to prove this.  After all we have been through, 
I may perhaps be allowed to say that  here we have really learned something. 
But we realize that the nation is something of value,  something of crucial value 
that we cannot do without.  What matters is that we should bring our relation-
ship with,  and our sense of responsibility for,  our own nation into line with our 
relationship with,  and our sense of responsibility for,  first of all Europe,  and 
then of course,  peace in the world.' 
With reference to the enlargement of the European Communities, 
Dr. Kiesinger went on to say : 'Now we do not think that the Community's 
intrinsic nature will be changed by Britain's accession,  nor by the accession 
of the other applicants.  On the other hand,  we take certain French arguments 
seriously.  There is no doubt that with every new member· and with every new 
set of interests - and each people and State will bring in its particular set of 
interests -the more difficult it will become to reach agreement.  That goes 
without saying.  The economic arguments advanced by France can be discussed 
thoroughly and calmly.  They can be discussed among the Six and also with the 
United Kingdom and the other applicant States.  I am convinced that even for 
all those who urgently want Britain's accession there will still be many serious 
problems. 
The crucial differences lie in the variety of ways of looking at 
Europe.  General de Gaulle has a clear-cut view of Europe,  a united Europe of 
the Six in which France,  naturally,  is to play a special rOle.  I am not going to 
make the easy mistake of simply saying that the idea of a French hegemony or 
of exclusive French leadership lies behind this.  But France would naturally 
have,  in the General's  view,  a special part to play in this united Europe of the 
Six.  Moreover,  he links up such a Europe with his ideas of a Europe stretch-
ing beyond the Iron Curtain. 
All this would naturally change if a power as great as the United 
Kingdom entered this Europe of the Six,  and if the others,  including certain 
neutral countries like Ireland and Sweden,  also came in.  This is why,  right 
from the start,  I pointed out to our British friends how difficult it would be to 
carry through this concept of an enlarged Europe and that one should entertain 
no illusions on the subject.  On the other hand,  we can only say to our French 
-52 -friends that the balance of public opinion in Europe in favour of the accession 
of the United Kingdom and the other applicant States is so overwhelming,  that 
one can safely say that their admission cannot be resisted indefinitely. 
We  therefore have to convince France -a  by no means easy under-
taking- that such an overwhelming trend now exists.  We must also tell her 
that it is in the interests of our own country and our own people for Great 
Britain to join the EEC (1). 
Writing in 'Politische Meinung',  Mr.  Strauss,  the Federal Finance 
Minister and CSU Chairman,  pointed out that the Federal Republic wished to be 
united with the other part of Germany under the broad roof of a European 
fatherland.  The Germans had been made vividly aware of the adverse effects 
of nationalism and had tasted the dangers that lurked beneath.  It was first and 
foremost as the vehicle of a national organism that a nation fulfilled its pur-
pose. 
As the German people lived in the middle of a divided Europe,  it 
ought not to dissipate its efforts in trying to restore its nationhood.  In the 
Europe of today the nation state was an anachronism.  The German's national 
sense of responsibility could therefore find appropriate expression not so much 
in insisting upon national reunification - in any case not very realistic at the 
moment - as in deciding to help bring about conditions in Europe calculated to 
ensure - not least for the  coming generations of the entire people - a life of 
freedom and a high degree of cultural and economic capacity. 
Since the nation state was a thing of the past,  the German people 
should identify its national interests mainly with the creation of a large-scale 
territorial system in which the two parts of Germany could again live naturally 
together.  'To remain German,  we must become European. ' 
'Our concept',  went on Mr.  Strauss,  'is of a Europe of nations 
which,  in overcoming its disunion would become a greater fatherland. '  In this 
the nation would remain the spiritual fatherland,  but the political fatherland 
would be created by the European community of peoples in the form of a federal 
State. 
(1)  Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
No.  127,  8 November 1967. 
-53-On 30 October 1967 Mr.  Strauss spent a considerable time in private 
audience with General Franco. In the evening he delivered an address at the 
celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the German Chamber of Commerce in 
Spain,  which were attented by several members of the Madrid Government and 
numerous Spanish and German economic experts,  on the main problems of 
European policy today. 
Germany,  he said,  was faced with the difficult double task of acting 
as Europe's bulwark against the penetration of Communist ideas and at the 
same time as a bridge to the East.  It was the genuine aim of German policy to 
improve relations with the peoples of the East and to arrive at a workable com-
promise in official relati.ons with the governments in Eastern Europe. Experi-
ence so far,  however,  had given little grounds for hope. 
The world today was witnessing the double game of the two nuclear 
super-powers which, were indeed arming themselves and already accepted the 
fact that they must sooner or later pool forces against a third power - China. 
Under these circumstances their policies were conducted on two levels.  They 
waged propaganda battles against each other and,  in the name of easing ten-
sion,  pushed up their defence budgets to record heights.  At the same time they 
were already feeling out the possibility of co-operating with each other so as to 
build up a strong political and military position vis-a-vis China. Soviet-Ameri-
can bilateralism was therefore increasingly,  taking precedence over the earlier 
policy of European alliance. 
On the basis of his demand for the economic and political unity of 
Europe,  Mr. Strauss advocated a consistent EEC policy and expressed satis-
faction at the fact that the talks with  Spain held in Brussels had now taken the 
concrete form of negotiations.  As a member of the German Government,  he 
hoped that this would lay new foundations,  within the context of the EEC,  for 
greater co-operation between Germany and Spain. 
Mr. Strauss called for vigorous development of the European Com-
munities on the basis of Franco-German friendship.  Efforts must be concen-
trated first on co-ordinated,  and then on integrated European defenG:e  and 
foreign policies.  (1) 
(1)  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  11 and 14 October 1967; 
Die Welt,  31 October 1967. 
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In the event ofan enlargement of the EuropeanEconomic Community, 
the German Government would endeavour to ensure that no untoward burdens 
were placed on the German economy; this assurance was given in Bonn by 
State Secretary Dr.  Fritz Neef of the Federal Ministry for  Economic Affairs 
on 8 December 1967.  The  problems arising in connexion with the accession 
of the United Kingdom and those regarding the Commonwealth countries were 
considered from the German point of view as being perfectly soluble.  The EEC 
was mature enough to tackle any risks that might be contingent on the accession 
of new members. 
Dr. Neef,  who was speaking at the annual general meeting of the 
General Federation of Textile Industries, described the removal of the still-
existing competitive distortions as one of the essential prerequisites for the 
progress of European integration.  The work beginning in Brussels on a com-
mon policy ·for industry and trade was one of 'the decisive moments in Euro-
pean policy'.  The purpose of the common industrial policy had to be to streng-
then the efficiency and competitiveness of industries in the EEC.  This predi-
cated,  in Dr.  Neef' s view,  that the question of an optimal size of enterprises 
and co-operation should be the subject of harmonizations.  As regards the 
rules of competition,  this was a sphere which had to be clarified. 
On 4 December 1967,  in a supplement on Europe in 'The Financial 
Times', Mr. Karl Schiller,  Federal Minister for Economic Affairs,  stressed 
the German Government's desire for the United Kingdom to join the European 
Community.  He  emphasized that the will to co-operate with the United King-
dom had become very clearly manifest in recent weeks and he recommended 
to those countries 'still outside the EEC' that they should have confidence and 
patience. 
The Federal Minister felt that one could not build a united Europe 
over the weekend but one could come closer to this objective if one were pre-
pared to face all the attendant problems.  This was not a question of philoso-
phy or linguistics,  it was the economic and political challenge of the moment. 
The enlargement of the European Community should be taken for 
granted by all Europeans.  Professor Schiller,  the Federal Minister for Eco-
nomic Affairs,  stressed this point at the annual general meeting of the Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industry of Hagen on  13  December 1967.  He went on to 
say that he did not regard the accession of Britain,  Ireland,  Norway and Den-
mark as an act of charity 'after the manner of the good Samaritan'.  The Bri-
tish Government's decision last November to devalue the pound had been a 
-55-courageous step.  In Brussels the Federal Government would vigorously pur-
sue its objective of creating a basis for talks between the Community and the 
applicant States. 
The accession to the EEC of the United Kingdom,  as well as Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway,  was advocated by Mr. Willy Brandt on 3 0 November 
1967 at the annual general meeting of the trustees of the Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation in DUsseldorf.  The Federal Government,  he said, was exertingits 
efforts to this end although it did not wish the existence of the Community itself 
to be endangered in the process.  The Community had in recent years made 
such marked progress that no member State could call the EEC into question 
without itself suffering prejudice. 
Mr.  Brandt emphasized the advantages of a larger Community, 
which would permit a wider division of work; greater competition,  a larger 
market and an increase in the Community's economic potential.  Transitional 
difficulties,  for example in the coal and steel sector and in the textile industry, 
which also affected major economic interests in Germany,  should,  he thought, 
be solved by means of reasonable interim arrangements. 
Mr.  Brandt emphasized that the concept of the economic unity of 
free Europe through an enlargement of the EEC would finally prevail and he 
advocated that the talks begun in Brussels between the Six should be brought to 
a  successful conclusion.  He said it would not be clear within what period of 
time the United Kingdom would be in a position to accept the ·provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome and the decisions of the Council of Ministers in Brussels until 
after negotiations had been held with the United Kingdom.  For this reason, the 
Federal Government considered it ill-advised 'to delay or to prevent the open-
ing of negotiations'. 
The German Government was 'clearly and unequivocably' in favour 
of British accession to the EEC and was in favour of practical negotiations. 
This point was made on 1 December 1967 by Mr.  Gerhard Jahn,  Secretary of 
State in the Federal Foreign Office,  at question time in the Bundestag (follow-
ing the statement by the French President de Gaulle on 27 November) and with 
it confirmed the attitude of the German Government which had already been 
outlined on many occasions by Government members and spokesmen. 
A French veto on British entry into the EEC could not be accepted 
at this juncture,  said Mr.  Helmut Schmidt,  Chairman of the SPD party in the 
Bundestag.  In an interview on the South West German Radio on 3 December 
1967,  he said that to his knowledge the Social Democrats in the Bundestag had 
no intention of falling into line with the ideas of de Gaulle.  'It is much rather 
-56 -our view that if the French intend to impose a veto,  they can only do this at 
the close of negotiations which must first be held with Britain or the other 
States that wish to enter into the European Economic Community'. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  12  and 19 December 1967; 
Financial Times, 4 December 1967) 
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1.  Debate in· the House of Commons on Britain's entry into the Common 
Market 
Addressing the Commons on 24 October (i) in connexion with the 
outcome of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Six in Luxembourg, 
Mr. Harold Wilson,  Prime Minister,  firmly rejected suggestions that Britain's 
application to join the Common Market had been killed by conditions reported 
to have been laid down in Luxembourg by Mr.  Couve de  Murville. 
Mr. Wilson steadfastly refused to be downcast by any of the gloomy 
reports that had been coming out of Luxembourg. 
Mr.  Shinwell (Bedfordshire) led the anti-Marketeerfactions as usual 
but the Prime Minister rejected suggestions that the present application was 
humiliating or that it had already failed,  or even that a time limit for its ac-
ceptance should be set in advance. 
The very robust attitude of the large majority of the Six made their 
position clear.  He emphasized that the full support of the German Govern-
ment for British entry had never been in doubt ..... 
In one sense,  said Mr. Wilson,  time was on Britain's side but it 
was not on the side of those in Europe and in Britain who wanted to see a stron-
ger, technologically-based Europe Nith a greater power to influence world 
events. 
It was then the turn of Mr.  George Brown,  Foreign Secretary (2), 
to answer Members' questions on 26 October.  He stated in particular : 'We 
want to join the Communities as they are,  on equal terms with the other mem-
bers.  And we want,  with our partners,  to go from there and build with them 
on the foundations they have laid,  so that together we achieve a more united 
and more powerful Europe.  I am glad to think th3.t our purposes in this are 
now clearly recognized  ..... 
(1)  The Times,  25  October 1967;  I~erald Tribune,  25  October 1967. 
(2)  The Times,  27 October 1967;  The Guardian,  27 October 1967. 
-58-We  are confident that the procedures laid down in the Treaty will 
continue to be followed.  The Treaty provides that the member States and the 
applicant States shall agree on the conditions of admission and the adjustments 
required.  This means negotiations. 
We  therefore continue to expect a reply from the Six as a whole that, 
having received the Commission's opinion on the point,  they are ready to open 
negotiations with us. ' 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home,  former Conservative Prime Minister, then 
said for the Opposition : 'We agree with the Foreign Secretary that our appli-
cation should lie on the table and not be withdrawn.  We  support the Govern-
ment's request that negotiations should start as soon as possible.' 
The debate contined on 2 November and Mr.  George Brown summed 
up the situation (1)  as follows  : 'We have said quite firmly we  want to workout 
with other Europeans our own destiny - not just our economic destiny but our 
political destiny too.  Our commitment is total ..... 
We  have been able to remove the last doubts wl).ich some of our 
friends might have had about our motives ,  and caused them to see more clear-
ly the greater opportunities now within Europe's grasp if only we can unite. 
There is a tide of public opinion now flowing throughout Western 
Europe which is pressing us all forward to the really effective united Europe 
we want and an essential prerequisite,  the admission of Britain into the EEC, 
is accepted as part of it. 
The forces which are building up more and more in support of our 
entry into the Community are not ranged against France, or against the French 
Government.  The tide of public opinion is for Europe,  and France,  not less 
than Britain,  is an essential part of Europe ...•• 
France might now be less worried than she had earlier seemed  to be that 
Britain's entry would in some manner introduce unwelcome "Atlantic features" 
and thereby damage the prospects of a  d~tente between East and West Europe. 
She now claimed to see the rOle of sterling and Britain's economic position as 
the principal obstacles to British entry ....• 
(1)  The Times,  3 November 1967 
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ties for financial and commercial expansion it will bring to Europe will add 
greatly to their collective influence in the world at large.  They are entitled 
to be reassured on these points and we are willing to discuss them ..•.• 
It is they·- the Community as a whole - who must reply to our appli-
cation.  If the Community remains true to itself,  and to the spirit and letter of 
the Rome Treaty,  there can only be one reply :"Let negotiations begin".' 
On 7 November,  Mr.  Barnett,  MP (1)  asked if it would not be better 
to have some form of associate membership which would bring Britain entry in 
1972. 
Mr.  Wilson said that apart from the arguments against association 
they should not underrate the difficulties of negotiating an associate agreement 
which migth take even longer than to negotiate entry. 
2.  Mr. Wilson proposes to the Six a plan for European technological 
integration 
Speaking at the Lord Mayor's banquet in London on 13  November (2}, 
Prime Minister Wilson offered British co-operation with all European part-
ners in technological projects.  The originality of his proposals lay in-the fact 
that he did not intend them as a substitute for negotiations on Britain's entry 
into the Common Market.  There were 'a catalyst to a deeper and closer eco-
nomic integration'.  Mr.  Wilson went on to say : 'If we - Europe - are to be 
fully competitive in a technological sense,  we have to think more and more on 
mergers on a European scale,  proceeding from working arrangements and bi-
lateral agreements to a more truly multilateral approach.  This will mean not 
only an acceptance of broader horizons for our new industrial pattern; it will 
meanldevising machinery to forward this process. ' 
.....  'We can create a vast and powerful European teclmology.  The 
immediate task is to stop the gap between Europe and the United States today, 
later the Soviet Union,  from widening.  The next step is to narrow it.  This, 
and not prolonged and inconclusive exchanges about prenegotiations positions, 
(1)  The Guardian,  8 November 1967. 
(2)  The Times,  14  November 1967; Le Monde,  15  November 1967. 
-60-is the way to enable all of us,  good Europeans,  to unite in the interest of 
Europe.' 
'There is no future for Europe, ' Mr.  Wilson continued,  'or for 
Britain,  if we  allow American business and American industry so to dominate 
the strategic growth industries of our individual countries that they,  and not 
we,  are able to determine the pace and direction of Europe's industrial advan-
ce,  that we  are left as the hewers of wood and drawers of water while they ••.. 
come to enjoy a growing monopoly in the production of technological instru-
ments of industrial advance. ' 
'The message that must go out tonight from Guildhall is that while 
negotiations for British entry must inevitably take some time,  the widening of 
the technological gap will not wait for negotiating timetables.' 
3.  Reactions to remarks made by Lord Chalfont about the possibility 
of a change in British foreign policy 
Rumours of a distinct toughening in the British Government's attitu-
de were echoed in the British press towards the end of November (1). 
The rumours had it that Mr. Wilson was considering a wholesale 
'change in Britain's alliances' if his country's application for membership of 
the EEC were rejected by France. 
This change would mean,  in particular : 
1)  BAOR's withdrawal from Germany; 
2)  denunciation of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin; 
3)  a refusal to support Bonn on Germany's reunification and 
4)  a reduction in Britain's contribution to Western Europe's defence. 
(1)  The Sunday Times,  29 October 1967;  Le Monde 29-30 October 1967. 
-61-The rumours started, it would appear,  from remarks made by Lord 
Chalfont,  the Minister responsible for negotiations with the EEC,  to journa-
lists at the time of the EFTA ministerial meeting. 
These rumours were strongly denied by the Foreign Office on 
28  October (1)  :  'This is absolutely and completely untrue.  No  such threats 
have been made.' 
Yet the remarks attributed to Lord Chalfont provoked strong reac-
tions in political circles in London. 
Mr.  McLeod (2),  Shadow Chancellor,  was interviewed on the BBC 
on 2 9 October.  He  said 'this affair is going to do  a great deal of harm and 
will provide Britain's opponents in Europe with more ammunition.' 
On 31 October,  there was a debate on the Queen's Speech in which 
Her Majesty had stated (3)  : 'My Government look forward to the opening of 
negotiations to provide for Britain's entry into the European Communities.' 
Mr.  Heath,  Leader of the Opposition,  opened the debate (4)  by 
stressing that Lord Chalfont's  remarks  had not made things easier for 
Mr.  Brown,  the Foreign Minister : 'This was not just an odd sentence produ-
ced off the cuff.  Apparently it was a full and detailed discus·sion. '  Lord 
Chalfont had been unwise to say that it had only come to the notice of the coun-
try through the activities of the anti-European press. 
Mr.  Heath asked for an explanation.  Going on to Britain's request 
for membership of the EEC,  Mr.  Heath said: 'It was evident that negotiations 
would take a long time.  There could be no  short cut.' 
(1)  The Times,  30 October 1967; Herald Tribune,  30 October l967. 
(2)  The Guardian,  30  October; Herald Tribune,  30  October 1967; 
The Times,  30 October 1967. 
(3)  The Times,  1 November 1967. 
(4)  The Guardian,  1 November 1967; The Times, November 1967; 
Combat, November 1967; Le Monde,  1 November 1967. 
-62-'It may be necessary to face a situation in which negotiations are not 
allowed to begin',  Mr.  Heath went on.  'The Government must consider not 
only the impact on Europe but on this country and on the people of Britain  .•...  ' 
Every business man would have to fight for his life,  not only in the EEC and 
EFTA but in North America and the Commonwealth if  negotiations were not 
permitted to begin ..•.. 
'We have to make ourselves strong by our own efforts and then, if 
we are rejected from Europe now,  the time will come when Europe will want 
us in the Community because of our own strength which we  are building up 
ourselves.' 
In reply,  Mr.  Wilson tried to clear the air and to defend Lord 
Chalfont,  whose resignation he had just refused: 'It was a free-ranging dis-
cussion - not an interview.  Lord Chalfont repeatedly made clear that if,  con-
trary to hopes a veto were imposed or,  if in any other way negotiations to 
enter were· indefinitely frustrated,  we should still regard ourselves as unequi-
vocally committed to our main purpose .•.•. 
He  made quite clear,  and I do  again today,  that there is no Govern-
ment decision or thought of a decision,  even on a contingency basis,  to change 
the course we  have set ourselves.' 
'Equally,  no doubt has been entertained about Britain's determina-
tion to continue  with that policy in relation to the alliance and in relation to 
Europe in a wider sense - policies central for them and which have been 
Britain's approach to world affairs. 
Our approach to problems of alliance are based on Britain's interest 
and they have never been considered to be part of a system or arrangement for 
getting into the Common Market.  They long pre-date the growth and develop-
ment of the Common Market. ' 
But Lord Chalfont himself had finally to intervene in the controversy 
in an interview to 'Paris Match' (1),  in which he said: 'We have not envisaged 
any alternative solution (in the case of Britain's being refused admission to the 
Common Market) because we cannot believe that the negotiations in progress 
will fail.  Of course,  if we have to,  we will look for a solution in terms of the 
Europe of the Seven and the Commonwealth. ' 
(1)  Le Monde,  1 November 1967 
·- 63-He put an end to the incident by stating in the House of Lords  on 
2 November (1)  that he did not think that this affair was an anti-Common Mar-
ket plot and he added: 'I would like to state clearly and unambiguously my own 
position.  I believe strongly,  as I have said many times, that Britain's future 
lies in Europe and that the first step towards that future is that Britain should 
join the Common Market. 
This is no time to waver in our determination to pursue these pol-
ICies.  I am confident that they will succeed.  Britain is part of Europe and it 
would be foolish to suggest that we should turn our back on Europe or threat-
en to do so for any doubtful reason of tactics.' 
4.  The visit of Federal Chancellor Kiesinger to London 
From 23 to 25  October 1967 Federal Chancellor Kiesinger was in 
London for political talks with the British Government. 
Prior to the meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers in Luxem-
bourg and to the Chancellor's visit to London,  both the latter and Lord Chal-
font,  Minister of State at the Foreign Office said in Stuttgart on 22  October 
1967 that they were both confident that the difficulties standing in the way of 
Britain's accession to the EEC could be overcome.  They were taking part in 
the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Institute of Foreign Relations; the 
Chancellor gave an assurance that  he would do his utmost when he was in 
London to secure Britain's membership of the Community. 
In connexion with the Federal Chancellor's trip to London and with 
the EEC Council Meeting in Luxembourg,  Mr.  Fritz-Robert Schultz,  the FDP 
member of the Bundestag, called upon the Federal Government on 23  October 
1967 to further Europeal}. co-operation not only with words but with deeds and 
to make serious efforts to overcome the economic split across Europe. 
Mr.  Schultz called upon the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister to 
tackle the matter with France, their political friend,  in bold plain language, 
otherwis~ there would be no chance of getting the European idea out of the 
narrow straits it had so far remained in, or of magnifying it into the concept 
of the 'greater Europe. ' 
(1)  The Guardian,  3 November 1967. 
-64-An early decision in favour of the United Kingdom was also neces-
sary, he felt,  on economic grounds.  The external trade policy of the Federal 
Republic and of the EEC would have,  in future,  to be more closely in line with 
the principles of world-wide free trade.  Competitive distortions in interna-
tional trade, in the provision of services and in the movement of capital, as 
well as customs' duties,  countervailing taxes and certain other obstacles to 
trade between States had to be eliminated on a basis of reciprocity.  These 
purposes could be served by opening the EEC to Britain's accession and to 
that of the other EFTA States and by putting the Kennedy Round into practical 
effect. 
The focal points of the political talks were the question of Britain's 
accession to the EEC, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the policy for 
easing tension, the future of NATO and offsetting the costs of the British Army 
of the Rhine.  The particularly inflexible stand taken in Luxembourg by 
Mr.  Couve de Murville,  French Foreign Minister, induced the two heads of 
government to proceed, contrary to the originally planned agenda,  to a further 
exchange of views on the subject of Britain's accession.  All the signs seem to 
indicate that Federal Chancellor Kiesinger was also surprised at the tough 
line taken by the French Foreign Minister in Luxembourg.  However,  in a 
speech after a dinner given in his honour by the British Prime Minister in 
Downing Street, the Chancellor stated: 'I am sure that the first steps taken in 
Luxembourg will lead to encouraging results. 1 
In the EEC discussions between the two heads of Government on 
24  October 1967,  Chancellor Kiesinger emphasized that the German Govern-
ment considered that the economic and financial problems of the  United King-
dom constituted no grounds. for rejecting its admission to the EEC.  He again 
explained the German standpoint on this question: 'We do not share France 's 
reservations on this subject but we are ready to have a detailed discussion 
about it with all the EEC member States.' 
The Chancellor stressed that it was the unwavering wish of his 
Government to make Britain's entry into the EEC possible.  This had not, 
however, to lead to a crisis or to a split within the EEC; such a crisis would 
not be in the interests of the British Government either. The Chancellor made 
it clear that the common approach on the part of the Six had first to be worked 
out with regard to the British application before negotiations with the United 
Kingdom could begin. It was therefore necessary first to convince France that 
Britain's entry into the EEC would be to the benefit of Europe. 
In an after-dinner speech, the Chancellor asked for understanding 
about the fact that the German Government was not prepared to bring strong 
pressure to bear on the question of Britain's accession to the EEC.  'We would 
-65-ask your indulgence for the fact that we did not bang hard on the table', the 
Chancellor said and went on:'Perhaps in Germany's recent past there has been 
too much banging on the table, so that we may perhaps be forgiven for wishing 
to put our case in a slightly less ostentatious style. But we mean what we say. ' 
The British public heard Chancellor Kiesinger in English on tele-
vision; he outlined the procedure for British entry and explained the basic 
issues involved.  The Chancellor countered the British criticism, whether 
expressed openly or otherwise, that Germany was being cowardly with the 
words: 'You cannot get President de Gaulle's agreement when you try to bring 
pressure to bear on him. We all know him.  He  is a very proud man. ' 
What must have surprised the British viewers particularly was the 
Chancellor's answer to the question as to whether Britain's entry would 
strengthen the Common Market: 'Yes and no, possibly not.  I am not sure, for 
the more members there-are, the greater the difficulties'.  Dr. Kiesinger 
concluded that all in all, the advantages of Britain's accession  would be greater. 
The Chancellor paid his millions of British listeners the compliment that he 
did not wish to dazzle them with words but that he simply wanted them to know 
what he thought. 
At the close of his talks with the British Government in London, Dr. 
Kiesinger again explained the GermanviewpointonBritain's accession to the 
Common Market before flying back to Bonn on 25  October: 'The Federal Gov-
ernment considers that the United Kingdom should be a member of the European 
Communities. It  will examine with care the objections raised within the Six 
against British membership. It will endeavour, inthepreliminaryconsultations 
between the Six, to overcome the existing difficulties and it trusts that these 
consultations will soon lead to the opening of negotiations with the United King-
dom.' 
On his return from London on 25 October 1967, the Chancellor made 
the following statement at KBln-Wahn airport: ·' ••••• This trip occurred at the 
same time as the  Luxembourg meeting of the Six.  This was coincidental; and 
we naturally discussed Britain's wish  to enter into the European Community. 
While I was in London,  we learned of the objections and reservations expres-
sed in Luxembourg by the French Foreign Minister and we discussed them. 
I explained when I left England that we - and this is already well 
known- want Britain in the EEC  and that we will give our attention to the ob-
jections that have been raised within the Six or that may still be raised and we 
shall look into these and examine them in the weeks ahead.  We  shall endeavour 
to overcome the existing difficulties and disagreements within the Six,  and we 
-66-hope that  in so doing it may be possible to begin negotiations with the United 
Kingdom soon ••••• ' 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  23, 24,25 and 27  October 1967; Die Welt, 
25 October 1967; Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  25  October 1967; Le Monde,  25 Oc-
tober 196 7; Herald Tribune,  26  October 196 7) 
5.  London statement by the Dutch Finance Minister 
Speaking on 30 October to the Dutch Chamber of Commerce in Lon-
don,  Mr.  Witteveen,  Dutch Finance Minister, stressedthattheUnitedKingdom 
had to be brought in on the European integration process at an early date. 
With regard to this accession, the real problems involved in co-operation be-
tween the EEC  and the United Kingdom had to be solved by both parties acting 
together and alleged problems should not be allowed to stand in the way. 
One of the real problems was Britain's economic situation and her 
balance of payments, he said. It had been learned from France's experience, 
where major problems also arose when the Common Market was founded,  that 
solutions could be found.  He was sure that it would be possible in this case 
too.  The Dutch Government would give its full support and co-operation in 
seeking a solution. 
He concluded his address by saying, inter alia, that at present the 
EEC could hardly be said to constitute a Community system and that this 
could not, therefore, be used as an argument against Britain's accession. 
As regards the reserve currency status of the pound sterling, he 
explained that the giving up of this reserve function would, if  the case arose, 
necessitate a comprehensive consolidation of the official British sterling 
balances. Apart from the question whether this was feasible from the mone-
tary and technical standpoints, it had to be clearly recognized that it would 
have far-reaching economic, financial and political implications. 
He considered that the question of the possible burdens involved with 
a reserve currency were of sufficient moment for a high priority to be given to 
the consolidation problem.  He added that he thought that this problem ought 
not to attract over-riding importance in connexion with Britain's accession to 
the EEC. 
-67-If the United Kingdom and other countries feel that the existence of 
the sterling area is going to remain a problem, then it is a long-term one 
which has, because of its origins and implications, an international character 
and has, therefore, to be dealt with within a wider framework,  independently 
of whether Britain should enter the EEC or not. 
With reference to the suggested monetary union in the EEC, based 
on a common currency which could operate as a reserve one, he wondered 
whether it was desirable, now that the International Monetary Fund had creat-
ed special drawing rights.  A further widening of the reserve currency system 
was, he thought,  inconsistent with the principle of the deliberate creation of 
reserves which had now,  rightly, been adopted. 
A monetary union in the EEC could not indeed be created to provide 
a new reserve currency overnight any more than the reserve function of the 
pound sterling could be ended from one day to the next. 
All in all, monetary integration had far-reaching economic, finan-
cial and political implications because of which it could not be carried through 
hastily. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  31 October 196 7) 
6.  Anglo-Belgian talks in London 
Mr.  Vanden Boeynants, Prime Minister, and Mr.  Harmel,  Foreign 
Minister, were received in London by the British Government on an official 
visit on 14 and 15 November 1967. 
The Belgian Prime Minister explained the purpose of this visit: 
'We have not come to London to negotiate, but this visit has enabled us to 
gather important new facts regarding Britain's application for membership of 
the Common Market.  At  all  events we have once again established that Britain, 
in seeki~g admission, is aiming not merely to enlarge its market but at full 
integration with a view to the progress and expansion of the Community. 
Mr.  Harold Wilson clearly confirmed that he was thinking bothoftheeconomic 
and of the political union of Europe.  The proposals for European technological 
co-operation made by him on Monday are yet another token -andaparticularly 
-68-direct and practical one - of this intention.  Under present circumstances, 
this means a great deal. ' 
.•••• 'The Belgian Government, like others, is very eager to enter 
into bilateral talks on this point with our British friends at this would amount, 
as it were, to a foreshadowing of a multilateral action for the success ofwhich 
there is little time to lose. ' 
For Mr. Vanden Boeynants,  Mr.  Wilson's proposals on European 
technological co-operation could not be  regarded as an alternative to enlarg-
ing the Community.  Nor did he think that the formula of a mere association 
could finally be entertained. In his view 'an association would not enable the 
parties to balance up their obligations with their advantages,  and it is not by 
half-measures of this kind that Europe's current problems will be solved.' 
••••• 'Negotiations between London and the EEC must be opened as 
soon as the Council of Ministers of the Six has completed its searching study 
of the European Commission's report.  This moment is not far off. Anyfurther 
delay would be a waste of time and as useless as it might be fraught with re-
grettable consequences.  How can the objections be narrowed down and differ-
ences be ironed out exceptbyfacingthemsquarely and discussing them, and 
by negotiating the essential compromises ? 
To-day,  as in the past, we firmly maintain and will continue to 
maintain that Great Britain's place is in Europe, with Europe and inside 
Europe.' 
(Le Soir,  Le Monde,  16  November 1967) 
- 69-Indonesia 
Mr. Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister, on Indonesia's relations 
with the European Community 
On 27 October, Mr. Adam Malik, Indonesian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, had talks with the Dutch Government on the possibilities open to Indo-
nesia of developing trade with the EEC.  In the joint communiqu~ issued at the 
close of the talks, it was stated that the Dutch Government would endeavour to 
further Indonesia's interests in the Community context. An association, 
Mr. Malik felt, would not be the best arrangement for Indonesia, in that it 
might have an adverse effect on its imports. A solution consisting in a trade 
agreement would best meet the interests of the Indonesian Government. 
(De Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  27 October 1967) 
- 70-1.  Debate in the Senate on European Problems 
The Italian Senate held a major debate on foreign policy on 
October 17-19;  the basis for the debate was a report by Mr. Fanfani, Minister 
for Foreign Mfairs, who opened the debate by making a detailed analysis of the 
various problems piling up on the international horizon and he described the 
action taken by the Government. 
With reference to European policy, Mr. F anfani said that in recent 
times there had been no lack of events which had put this fundamental option of 
Italian policy to the test.  Yet, despite the set-backs that had been suffered in 
the pursuit of this policy, proof of the justness of the ultimate goal was coming 
in all the time and, with it, confirmation that the course towards this aim 
should be resumed in a way consistent with the methods, the rules and the 
time limits laid down in the Treaties of Rome. 
In this connexion,  Mr. Fanfani said he was convinced of the need to 
go forward in a rational way towards merging the  Communities;  the struc-
tures of the Executives that had been merged in the unification process needed 
to be reviewed,  as did the machinery governing the existence and operation of 
their various departments; his Government regarded it as essential that there 
should be a gradual change in the relations between the Community Executive 
and the European Parliament, so as to ensure that the unification process 
carried with it the irreplaceable guarantee embodied in the operation of a 
sovereign legislative assembly. 
However, the Government could do no less than ask itself if all these 
problems should be t~ckled and placed on the agenda for decisions and for 
implementation at the very moment when the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark 
and Norway had confronted the Six with a fundamental problem for,  on the reply 
given, depended the enlargement or otherwise of the economic Community to 
limits that had been inconceivable ten years  ago;  if this were achieved by 
recourse to appropriate and sound arrangements, with full respect for the 
Treaties of Rome, it would create the essential conditions for irreversible 
progress towards a great, real and decisive European Community. 
Mr. F anfani recalled that these countries had submitted formal 
requests for admission to the European Communities and pointed out that the 
- 71-danger of a refusal on principle had been avoided; this was consistent with the 
request made at the time by the Parliament and was also due to the summit 
meeting held in Rome in May by the heads of State and Government of the 
member countries. 
The single Commission had,  at the time, been asked to express its 
opinion on the new applications for accession and had submitted a favourable 
report on 2 October, although further clarification was needed on some points. 
On 23 October, this report would be considered by the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of the Community.  Consequently, it would be incumbent on the 
Council and the single Commission to hold a discussion and negotiations,  and 
Italy was in favour of their being initiated at an early date. The Government 
considered that under these conditions it was in the interests of the Commu-
nity and of the development of the economic and political unity  of Europe, for 
all other matters to take second place and for them to be kept until the right 
time before they were taken up again so as not to prejudice or delay the great, 
historical decision which faced the Six. 
In conclusion, Mr. F anfani said that the Italian Government intended 
to continue working, both in the Community and through frequent bilateral 
contacts with the Governments of the other member States and with the British 
Government, towards a satisfactory solution to this problem of fundamental 
importance; the requirement still stood, however, that institutions, which it 
had been possible to create through ten years of efforts had to be maintained 
as did that of not slowing down the process of economic integration. 
Senator Jannuzzi (Christian Democrat) drew attention to the need 
gradually to strengthen the bonds of political friendship between the States of 
the Community; he trusted that there would be a closer 'organic link' between 
discussions held in the European Parliament and those held in the national 
parliaments of the Six. 
With regard tQ Britain's accession to the Communities, Senator 
Jannuzzi recalled that Mr. Harold Wilson had, at the Council of Europe, re-
affirmed his country's resolve to enter and· 'become part of Europe' ,  while 
stressing the need to safeguard the interests inherent in its membership ofthe 
Commonwealth and of EFTA. 
In this connexion, Senator J annuzzi pointed out that these conditions 
did not stand in the way of Britain's will to belong to Europe and that they 
should not be a source of concern for Italy; it was to be hoped that Britain's 
entry would simply be the first step to a greater enlargement, not only terri-
torially and economically, but also politically and democratically, of the Com-
munity. 
- 72-The speaker concluded by expressing the hope that when the Commu-
nities were merged, the single Commission would be given a wider and more 
responsible range of functions in conjunction, however, with greater powers 
for the European Parliament which would have to be elected by direct  universal 
suffrage in order to awaken in the populations at large a true European spirit. 
Senator Ferretti (neo-F  ascist) restricted his contribution to deploring 
the serious situation in the Alto Adige area created by terrorism and by the 
exceptionable attitude of the Austrian authorities;  he expressed the agreement 
of his Party with the veto which Italy had placed on the opening ofnegotiations 
between Austria and the European Community. 
Senator Bergamasco (Liberal), referring to the problem of European 
unity,  stated that there was now  an irreversible movement in favour of such 
unity. This had, in fact,  induced the United Kingdom and other countries of 
Northern Europe to apply for accession to the European Community. 
If Britain's admission to the Communities was still a long way from 
being achieved because of the difficulties referred to, these could be overcome 
if there was a firm resolve on all sides to reach agreement. 
He expressed the opinion that if agreement could be reached on this 
)roblem, it would represent a vital step on the road towards the final unity of 
E:urope,  especially since in the future, the election of the European Parliament 
)y universal suffrage would give the Community that democratic stamp which 
~onstituted the prerequisite  for the achievement of political Europe; he 
~mphasized the need,  in the meanwhile, for extending the powers of the Com-
nunity' s authorities.  Immediate action was also necessary to introduce a 
;ystem of consultations at regular intervals  between the European Govern-
nents with a view to working out a common external policy within the frame-
IVork  of NATO  and on the basis of friendship with the United States.  This 
IVOuld  be the first step towards the balanced alliance which was to be desired. 
Speaking for the Unified Socialist Group, Senator Battino Vittorelli 
~ecalled that the Socialists were in favour of a European political and economic 
~ommunity - a political context which was very strongly influenced by the 
~ealization of what constructive co-operation could achieve. 
The Group was also in favour of the entry into the Community of 
1ther countries which had long-established democratic and trade-union tra-
litions, particularly at a time when France's internal vicissitudes had thrown 
~  shadow over the democratic future of the Community itself. 
- 73-The Socialists had also noted with satisfaction the efforts made by 
the Government to prevent a veto being entered on the principle of Britain's 
application for accession to the EEC. The Socialists wished, however, thatall 
the statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be followed,  on 
the part of the Government, by constant action at every level to promote 
Britain's entry into the Common Market and to avoid an indefinite postpone-
ment of discussions of this question. Such action should aim at bringing an 
effective influence to bear on the attitude not only of the French Government, 
but also of the German Government which,  if Italy did not make the weight of 
its initiatives felt, might be attracted by the French position. 
Lastly, Senator Gava, President of the Christian Democrat Group, 
said, in his statement relating to the vote, that he supported It~ian policy in 
favour of Britain's entry into the Community and in favour of a united Europe 
- the only construction which was capable of neutralizing the dangerous germs 
of  'national exasperation' and restoring the balance between the two super-
powers. A united Europe would ensure peace and progress. 
At the close of the debate, Mr. Fanfani, Foreign Minister, assured 
the Senate that the Government would pursue its task in the manner in which 
he had described it and along the lines suggested in the course of the debate 
in order·to give practical expression to the process of European  unification. 
(Senate of the Italian Republic,  Summary Report, 18, 18, 19 October, 1967) 
2.  President Saragat reaffirms Italy's faithfulness to the Atlantic 
Alliance and to the ideal of a united Europe 
Mr. Saragat, President of the Republic, accompanied by Mr. Fanfani, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a lengthy trip abroad from 11 September  to 
3 October, during the course of which he had a series of important discussions 
with political leaders in Canada, the United States and Australia. 
His trip thus enabled him personally to explain Italy's reading of the 
present international situation, to listen to the viE".'7S  of the host- countries at 
first hand and to draw up a realistic balance  sf.. 'et of points of agreement and 
disagreement. Among the issues discussed.  ·  _curity assumed particular pro-
minence,  as did co-operation between Euro1.::c  and America and the political 
and economic unification of Europe. 
- 74-In Canada, during the first stage of his trip, President Saragat 
argued that only co-operation and solidarity between the European and Ameri-
can continents would save the world from a repetition of the tragic experiences 
which had twice thrown a pall over the present century. This solidarity had to 
leave its roots in the Atlantic Alliance which was designed both for defence 
purposes and as a factor for balance and security in the world, to guarantee 
peace; it had to be consolidated in the non-military sectors, so as to foster 
closer co-operation between the allied countries. 
The achievement of this objective would be made easier as European 
integration gathered momentum through the participation of the United Kingdom; 
this would allow for a true and genuine partnership within the Atlantic context, 
founded on equality between the United States and Western Europe. 
These ideas came up again and were supported in the discussions 
President Saragat had in Washington with President Johnson; they reaffirmed 
that they  .were in complete 'agreement on the importance of the North Atlantic 
Alliance which has, since its origin, been an instrument both of defence and 
'progress; it is still important for the security of its members and for the 
world peace. By consolidating international stability, it contributes to mutual 
understanding and trust between peoples'. The two Presidents also 'agreed 
that Atlantic peace and security are based on a partnership between Western 
Europe and America, founded in turn on an equality of rights and duties and on 
a balanced development which could be consolidated by an even closer co-oper-
ation in the technological field'. 
Mter visiting Canada and the United States, President Saragat went 
to Australia, where he addressed the Parliament in Canberra. In his speech 
he said :  'The principles underlying our European policy at all times rule out 
the possibility of the Common Market's becoming protectionist. Italy wants 
Europe to be united but at the same time it wants Europe to be open to co-oper-
ation with every country in the world and particularly the English-speaking 
nations, which are so close to Italy by virtue of their history, their traditions 
and their customs. Proof of our friendship with the United States of America 
and with the United Kingdom is to be found in the attitudl:l that we have always 
maintained with regard to the problems arising from the British application to 
join the European Economic Community. We  are fully aware of the ties which 
bind the United Kingdom to the other countries of the Commonwealth and we 
are fully convinced that these links, if appropriately harmonized with the 
exigencies of the Community, will prove of great advantage to all of us and 
promote a more rapid spread of prosperity in the world.  For this reason we 
shall always be ready to work out ways and means of reconciling, within a 
wider framework the interests of the Economic Community and those of the 
Commonwealth nations. 
-75-On his return to Rcme on 3 October, President Saragat emphasized 
the significance of his trip and the subjects discussed :  'It was a peace missiot 
in that in Ottawa, Washington and Canberra, we reaffirmed Italy's resolve to 
welcome the United Kingdom into the Common Market.  It is a condition for the 
progress of all and the prerequisite for a European integration guaranteeing 
absolute equality between Western Europe and America along the lines of that 
partnership which was the loftiest and brightest objective of President 
Kennedy.' 
(Relazioni Internazionali, September-October 1967, N. 38,  38, 40) 
3.  Exchange of views on European problems between the Italian 
Government and President Rey 
The talks held in Rome on 14 and 15 November by Mr. Rey, 
President of the Commission of the Communities, centred on the EEC'sforth-
coming activities and the prospects of enlarging the European Communities. 
President- Rey, who was accompanied by Vice-President Levi·-Sandri and 
Commissioners Colonna di Paliano and Martino, met Mr. Saragat, President 
of the Italian Republic,  and many representatives of the Italian Government 
such as Messrs. Moro, Nenni, Fanfani, Pieraccini and Andreotti. 
The talks provided an opportunity to review the state of the Commu-
nities, their future work and the prospects of enlarging them. 
As regards the question of enlarging the Communities, and more 
particularly as regards the United Kingdom's application for entry, Mr. Fanfani 
confirmed Italy's favourable attitude which would be maintained when the 
Council of Ministers of the European Communities next met in Brussels on 
20 November. 
Mr. F anfani also took advantage of the meeting to draw attention to 
the statements made on 14 November by Prime Minister Wilson on the question 
of technology which,  even at a first view,  again confirmed that the British 
Government was also ready and willing to participate in developments in the 
European Community in a sector of this outstanding importance. 
At a dinner given by the hosts, Mr. Fanfani expressed his best 
wishes for the activities on which the European Commission, under Mr.  Rey, 
-76-had already embarked with energy and success in every field, including the 
timely preparation and submission to the Council of Ministers of the report on 
the  accession of the United Kingdom.  Mr. Fanfani gave an assurance that 
Italy would continue to play an active rOle in the Community with a view to 
stepping up the contribution it was making to progress in Europe. 
President Rey, for his part, said he had come to Rome to underline 
the European Commission's willingness to work hand in hand with the Govern-
ments of the Six,  adding that this co-operation was essential for the success of 
the Commission's work.  He hoped that a solution would be found as soon as 
possible to the major European problems, above all that of enlarging the Com-
munity. 
After pointing out that the Commission was fully alive to Italy's 
particular problems in Europe, President Rey stressed the wide scope that 
was now opening up to the Commission to tackle the problems of co-operation 
in the fields of energy, technological research, tax harmonization and industri-
al and regional policy. All departments of the European Commission were very 
keen to play their part in solving these problems in a spirit of close co-oper-
ation and in the higher interest of Europe. 
(Il Corriere della Sera, 11 Popolo, Avanti,  La Nazione,  15 November 1967) 
4.  Italian Government's favourable reactions to Prime Minister  Wilson's 
proposals on technological collaboration between the United Kingdom 
and Europe 
Mr. Wilson's suggestions regarding greater technological collabo-
ration between Britain and Europe met with an immediate and favourable re-
sponse from the Italian Government.  Finance Minister Pieraccini stated  that 
Italy ' ..... cannot but feel interest in the British initiative which,  apart fr9m 
anything else, would enable the Community to acquire Britain's considerable 
experience in this field as a means of building up its own technology.  As a 
minister, I should like to recall our own attitude - underlined in the recent 
annual report - which is directed towards building up in Italy a number of key 
industries, and first and foremost the electronics industry on which Mr. Wilson 
has particularly dwelt. We regard increased Community collaboration in this 
field as a means of hastening on this development. Technological collaboration 
between Britain and the other European countries confirms, indeed accentu-
ates, the need for admitting Britain  into the Common Market because it  is  yet 
further proof of how many factors are working in favour of European integration. ' 
- 77-Mr. Zagari, Under-Secretary for Foreign Mfairs, said that 
Mr. Wilson's proposal 'falls on particularly fertile soil since there is wide-
spread uneasiness in Western Europe about the growing technological gap 
separating it from powers more advanced in this field. Some form ofbilateral 
or multilateral collaboration, such as that suggested by Mr. Wilson,  could 
certainly act as a decisive spur to technological progress in Europe.  What is 
essential, however, is that any such collaboration should tie in with the process 
of economic and political integration of the European Community.' 
(11 Giorno, Avanti, 15 November 1967) 
5.  Mr. Colombo,  Minister for the Treasury, looks forward to closer 
co-operation between the Community and Latin America 
In an article published in the Italiar~ weekly 'L'Europa', Mr. Colombo, 
Italian Minister for the Treasury, discussed relations between Europe and 
Latin America. 
He observed that the Latin American continent had extraordinary 
potential resources which had still to be exploited and said that only co-oper-
ation between all its States could enable it to play its rightful part in the world 
context. 
It seemed more necessary than ever to try and find some formula 
for association.  This had,  moreover, been one of the constants in the history 
of Latin America. Throughout the 19th Century, Latin Americans worked with 
the United States to find and to finalize a co-operation formula even though 
their efforts had not met with quite the success hoped for. The need for a real 
common market of Latin America is today more apparent than ever before. 
Financial imbalances in the various national budgets,  serious infla-
tion,  a restrictive trade policy regarding consumer goods imports, requests 
for international financial co-operation on the basis of a deferred repayment 
of funds supplied and for loans - which have increased the indebtedness of 
these nations vis-a-vis the world :  this has been the economic policy pattern 
in Latin America for some decades. The limited potentialities of the markets 
of the individual States, especially the smaller ones, does not allow them to 
re-organize their production system to match the exigencies of today' s level 
of technological development or to give it the scale needed for world compe-
tition.  Lastly, the lack of definite, common rules for customs, trade and 
- 78  -financial policy among the States and  vis-~-vis the world at large has made the 
regional policies subject to contingencies which have not often been consistent 
with  a long-term policy designed to free latent energies and direct them 
towards fixed,  meaningful development objectives. 
Although there has been no lack of attempts to lay the bases for a 
solution to these problems the initiatives taken have run up against difficulties 
and resistance. 
In view of this situation Europe should pay closer attention and 
assume greater responsibility for the problems of Latin America. 'To think 
and act in the European key' ,  Mr. Colombo went on,  'means thinking and 
acting internationally. The flow of ideas, the confluence of interests and the 
development of the institutions which are taking us towards European unity and 
which are already to some extent making it a reality stem not only from 
reasons domestic to Europe but also from the need, which is  not always heeded, 
for a wider dialogue with the world at large. 
The Governments of some of the larger Latin American States in-
tend to give greater impetus to their economies, to establish order, to put a 
brake on the increase in prices, to consolidate their currencies and to increase 
their reserves.  This restoration to economic health should be the prerequisite 
for more thorough-going changes in the economic structure. 
There is evidence on all sides of a desire to move along constructive 
lines and Europe should be present to give encouragement and stimulate this 
trend.  Not Europe in terms of its member States, but Europe in its Commu-
nity institutions. 
There are trade problems arising between the EEC and Latin  Ameri-
ca which have been partly solved through the concessions made on tropical 
products coincidentally with the renewal of the Convention between the Commu-
nity and the African States, or in the Kennedy Round agreements.  Other 
problems could be solved under world agreements for,temperate zone products; 
again other issues could be the subject of direct agreements with the Commu-
nity. 
There are financial problems involved in co-operation in the devel-
opment of the Latin American countries.  Every European country is acting on 
its own account by reference to bilateral agreements.  It was our hope in Rio 
de Janeiro at the meeting of the International Monetary Fund that ' . • . • .  the 
countries of Europe, particularly the EEC States, step up the present level of 
- 79-co-operation with the Latin American countries and possibly fit it into a new 
institutional framework to guarantee the .continuity of more consistent support'. 
Co-ordinating the action of Europe in the ·Latin American States, particularly 
through common financial institutions, would certainly be more effective from 
the point of view of the countries attracting co-operation.  But it is a political 
reality of particular importance for Europe itself concertedly to affirm its 
interest in a world ·which today represents one of the greatest problems in our 
international life..  Who can understand it better than Europe ? 
But we  must not be content with psychological or intellectual under-
standing.  We  must arrive at the stage of organic, practical, co-operation. 
We Europeans, in a world which is becoming increasingly interdependent, are 
faced with many problems.  Distinctions no longer divide us as in the past. 
'The problems of Latin America' ,  Mr. Colombo concluded, 'are also our 
problems :  peace, freedom, progress are and always will  be indivisible values 
and realities. ' 
(L'Europa, No.  6,  20 October 1967) 
-80-Luxembourg 
1.  Statement by Mr.  Gr~goire, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 
progress of the European Communities (5 December) 
On  5 December 1967 the Chamber of Deputies discussed the Foreign 
Affairs budget.  On that occasion, Mr. Pierre Gr~goire, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, set forth the point of view of his Government on some aspects of the 
future of the European Communities : 
'Beyond the merger of the Executives, there is the problem of the 
progress of the Communities.  The merger will undoubtedly facilitate the 
introduction of a common energy policy and give fresh impetus to regional and 
social policy.  It will also usher in an overall industrial policy for the Com-
munities as well as, in general, a greater measure of unification with regard 
to European planning aims. 
The merger of the Executives, whilst not actually necessary for the 
merger of the Communities, will pave the way for it. Indeed, it is normal that 
unified institutions should be in a better position to decide on amendments and 
adjustments to be made to each of the three Treaties and that they should be 
able to assess the basis on which the approximation to a common denominator 
is to be carried out. 
Five points deserve closer consideration in that respect : 
The first point is that the merger of the Treaties is at present not 
governed by any date-limit requirement  and, that it is, therefore not bound to 
be completed by a particular date,  as is sometimes claimed. 
The second point is that, in our opinion, the merger has no  bearing 
on negotiations dealing with Community membership applications. 
Thirdly, we are aware of the importance for our national economy 
of some basic provisions of the ECSC Treaty.  We are, therefore, not prepared 
to accept a pure and simple alignment of that Treaty with the technical, econ<r 
mic, financial and institutional stipulations of the EEC Treaty. 
- 81-Fourthly, we consider that the merger of the Treaties should be 
followed by a strengthening of democratic powers in the institutional balance 
of the Communities . 
Finally, we  are conscious of the risk of a reappearance of the 
problem of a Community seat or seats when we shall next negotiate the fusion 
of the Paris and R<?me Treaties.  We are, naturally, determined to defend,  as 
they should, the rights of our capital in that matter.' 
(Bulletin de Documentation. Service Information et Presse du Minis~re 
d'Etat, Grand Duch~ de Luxembourg. No. 14, 10 December 1967) 
2 .  Statement by Mr. Gr~goire on the foreign policy of the Luxembourg 
Government 
In an interview which he gave to the editor of the Luxembourg news-
paper 'Tageblatt', Mr. Pierre Gr~goire, Luxembourg Foreign Minister, 
explained 'his Government's position on the problems raised by the association 
of Greece with the European Community and the Grand Duchy's relations with 
the East European countries. 
With reference to the present political r~gime in Greece, 
Mr. Pierre Gr~goire stated : 
'There has been talk of joint action by the Benelux countries. The 
Dutch have now entered a protest, the grounds for which have none of the 
acerbity of the protest made by the Scandinavian countries.  In the meantime, 
Belgium and Luxembourg  have decided for two reasons to refrain  from addressing 
a protest to the Court of Human Rights.  First of all, the Council of Europe, 
under the presidency of Mr. Pierre Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, has 
decided to have a report drawn up on the political situation in Greece. It was 
our view that we  should wait until this report·  is published.  Secondly we  are 
reserving judgement for what are more in the nature of legal considerations • 
Greece does not recognize the Court of Human Rights.  Hence the protests 
addressed to this Court will automatically be referred to the Council of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe.  If too many European countries enter protests 
against the present Greek r~gime, then this Council of Ministers\willcomprise 
solely judges who are at the same time plaintiffs. We,  in common with Belgium, 
wish to prevent such a situation. 
-82-Nonetheless, we  clearly expressed our concern about the way the 
political situation is developing in Greece and made quite clear in our letter  to 
the Council of Europe that we approved the action taken by the Dutch and the 
Scandinavians.' 
With regard to the debate on Greece in the Council of Europe, this 
depends on the preparations made for it.  It is to be hoped, however, that this 
debate will take place before the end of the year. 
With reference to the Association Agreement with Greece, the EEC 
Council of Ministers decided some time ago to await political developments in 
Greece before consolidating economic relations between the Six and Greece, 
dealing only with  current business.  The Brussels Commission, as already 
stated, has discontinued development assistance for Greece.  This led the 
Greek Government to protest.  to the Six Governments and these protests are 
at the moment being dealt with through the usual channels. 
(Tageblatt,  6 October 1967) 
3.  Statement by Mr.  Gr~goire in Vienna on 7 November on the future 
of the small States in the Communities 
During his official visit to Vienna, Mr. Pierre  Gr~goire, Luxembourg 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave an address on 7 November to the Austrian 
Society for International Relations and Foreign Policy in which he described 
the position of the small States in the international communities. 
He discussed the question of unanimous and majority voting within 
the decision-taking boPies of the Community of the Six. 
'So long as the rule of equal voting for individual members and that 
of unanimity for decisions continue to apply, the smaller States will not do 
badly in the matter of equal rights, even though they may not be allowed  to 
forget that it will be they above all who,  because of the delaying tactics of one 
or other of the heavyweights, will have to pay in terms of extra patience, 
clear-sightedness and concessions if a disintegration of the Community is to 
be avoided. 
- 83-What will happen, however, when the situation changes and a system 
of weighted voting calling for an absolute majority replaces the unanimity 
rule ?  Majority decisions, no matter how carefully the weighting of votes is 
determined, will not resolve the continuous conflict between those States that 
are assured of equal treatment and those that are not. How  could three small 
States feel otherwise than at a disadvantage when they are allowed no more 
than 5 out of 17 votes ?  What else can they do but to hope that the big powers 
will be magnanimous enough not to impose their will or seek constantly to 
exploit the majority rule at their expense ? 
•••••  All we can do is ultimately to seek refuge in the procedure 
under which decisions should be taken at Community level. And what, after 
all, does this amount to ?  A mere semblance of a right to play adecisivepart 
in Community consultations, and nothing more !  , 
•••••  We know this all too well, for this is the lot awaiting us in the 
European Economic Community.  This is to say that our absence would in no 
way alter the outcome of a vote unfavourable to any given minority.  Our 
presence is "accepted" and our views are listened to as though they carried 
some weight.  In our particular case, however,  the rule will be carried to 
absurd lengths till a point is reached where our protests are recognized to be 
well-founded and our right to share in discussions is changed into a right to 
take part in framing decisions on lines of equality.  The right of the strongest, 
whether openly or covertly exercised, must give way to a legal system whose 
main object is as much to ensure equality as to prevent any form of discrimi-
nation.  Any institutions likely to serve as the instruments,ofdominationshould 
be subject to control and to the sanction of a higher Community court  • 
. . • • •  Since the Foreign Ministers act at meetings of the Union as the 
spokesmen of their respective countries, the big powers tend readily to shift 
the emphasis from diplomacy to their military, economic and intellectual 
resources, whereas the smaller countries have to fall back on their  diplomatic 
potential.  Even the most ingenious system of control of the supranational 
Community, covering all possible rights in respect of  information, supervision, 
inspection and correction, can change nothing so long as the representatives of 
member States remain preoccupied with national interests rather than those of 
a federal order  •  1 
Mr. Gr~goire went on to consider the chances of small countries 
joining the Community of the Six. 
'In the meantime, certainly, we are eagerly discussing  the prospects 
of further accessions, or of the Six and other countries coming closer together 
under special conditions.  If accession would appear to be the answer for 
- 84-States that have committed themselves, the second solution could be contem-
plated for neutral countries, namely,  association, which establishes between 
different States links deliberately based on inequality,  conferring only limited 
rights and imposing only limited obligations which make no inroads on the 
autonomy of the countries concerned,  although they tend to give the impression 
that their drawbacks are outweighed by their advantages.  Perhaps this is the 
case.  Perhaps this represents for applicants an extension of that fertile soil 
tilled so successfully by the Community - or, perhaps, the ground in which 
will be driven the piles of a bridge later to span a vaster union.  Such a vaster 
union must be the final outcome of the interdependence of States which,  under 
the pressure of events, of technical and economic progress and of the general 
trend towards closer and closer cultural affinities, is clearly becoming inevi-
table.' 
(Luxemburger Wort,  23  November 1967) 
- 85-Netherlands 
1.  The Government's standpoint on European integration in respect of 
transport, agriculture and economic affairs 
The Dutch Government's standpoint on European integration was set 
out in the explanatory statements attached to the budgetary estimates of the 
various ministries for 1967-196"8. 
Concerning the estimates for economic affairs, the minister con-
cerned drew attention to the importance of industrial research in the EEC 
context through, for example,  a medium-term plan.  The fact remained that 
co-operation with other countries could not be confined to the EEC or  Euratom 
but had to be extended to many other international organizations embracing 
many countries. 
The minister then discussed the rOle of the consumer  'in the Common 
Market.  The degree to which the consumer was involved in framing Commu-
nity policy was still too limited.  The initiative of the European Commission in 
creating a 'Consumer Contact Committee' was only a modest step in the right 
direction.  In many western nations,  including those outside the EEC, the 
authorities were very active in the consumer field.  These countries had a lot 
in common concerning these problems so regular international contacts would 
be useful at governmental level, not only to co-ordinate measures taken bythe 
authorities but also to allow for discussions on the aims and underlying princi-
ples of the policy to be pursued in this sector.  There was little doubt that in-
creased financial support for activities in the consumer field remained de-
sirable. 
With reference to the common energy policy, the minister discussed 
the first EEC Commission memorandum on the policy for oil and natural gas. 
The group of government spokesmen for the member States had agreed on the 
majority of points in the memorandum.  A fairly deep disagreement emerged, 
however, with regard to the implementation of the Commission's conclusion 
that suita)Jle measures should be prepared to enable Community enterprises to 
play their part on the EEC markets under conditions of equal competition. 
There were enterprises that benefited directly or indirectly from fiscal advan-
tages extended by third countries to their parent companies. TheDutchGovern-
ment thought that efforts should be confined - at least. within the common energy 
policy - to eliminating disparities due to direct governmental intervention. 
- 86-The crucial point was how to define the concept of 'Communityenter-
prise'. It had been seen that some member States only wanted to bring a limited 
group of oil companies within this definition, their unspoken intention being to 
foster their development in a number of ways.  The Dutch Government thought 
that the concept of 'Community enterprise' should have the broadest definition, 
as laid down in Article 58 of the EEC Treaty (companies and firms formed in 
compliance with the law of a member State and having their registered  office, 
central administration or principal place of business within the Community). 
With reference to the ECSC,  the explanatory statement notes that 
the Dutch Government has not yet been able to give its agreement to the High 
Authority's renewal of Decision 3/65, due to expire on 31 December 1967.  It 
considers that the High Authority had neglected to intervene (as it shouldhave 
done under the aforesaid Decision) to deal with price manipulation in certain 
States in respect of household coal. Similarly, the High Authority did not seem 
correctly to have  interpreted the criterion laid down in the Decision, namely 
that 'aid' should not be 'liable to prejudice the sound operation of the Common 
Market'.  At the ECSC  Council meeting, on 29 July, the Dutch delegation 
made its agreement dependent on the conclusions that would be drawn in the 
High Authority's report with regard to household fuel. 
After stressing the need for a common fisheries policy, the Minister 
responsible said :  'In the EEC' s agricultural policy, the main emphasis is on 
market and prices policy.  Now that this important part of the agricultural 
policy is entering its final phase the setting of common prices will necessitate 
an annual decision of great significance.  The Netherlands have urged that the 
Commission should each year submit a detailed report to the Council in 
Brussels dealing,  inter alia, with recent developments and restrictions re-
garding production,  marketing and the incomes of farmers and horticulturists, 
as well as budgetary implications of the decisions to be taken by reference to 
the relevant data.  The Dutch Government would give firm backing to the 
principle of annual consultations with the European Parliament on the setting 
of prices which are the mainspring of farm incomes.  The Minister felt that it 
was the responsibility of industrial organizations to consider how they can best 
make known their ideas on practical policy matters.  The explanatory state-
ment attached to the agricultural estimates found it regrettable that the Com-
mission had not yet submitted its first report on farm structures.  A serious 
comparative analysis of structural developments and the policies pursued in 
the member States was a prerequisite for a co-ordinated Community approach. 
In the  explanatory  statement attached to .the  estimates for  Trans-
port and Waterways the  Minister  responsible  said that approximating com-
petitive  conditions  in the  EEC  should not be the over-riding consideration; 
the main point was  to  secure freedom  of  transport movement.  Govern-
- 87-mental intervention deliberately distorting  competition had to be eliminated 
as  soon  as possible.  In this field harmonization was  a  matter of urgency. 
(1967-68  Session,  Doc.  9300,  National Budget,  Explanatory Statements, 
Chapter xm: Econ,omic Mfairs; XIV:  Agriculture and Fisheries; · 
XII:  Transport and Waterways and 'New Europe' No·.  10-11, 1967) 
2.  Standing Committee on Foreign Mfairs and European integration 
At its meetings of 16, 21  and 22 November the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Mfairs debated development aid -particularly the renewal of the 
Yaound6 Convention- the policy on easing East-West tension, NATO, European 
security, the results of the work done by the Monnet Committee on European 
integration, parliamentary control, the summit conference and the merger of 
the Treaties  • 
. With regard to the third European Development Fund,  Minister 
Udink said that the form of the preferential system provided for by theYaound6 
Convention could not be separated from the broad policy outlines to  be sketched 
out at UNCTAD-11.  The Dutch Government favoured a general system of 
preferences which, in principle, should not be on a basis of reciprocity. As 
UNCTAD-11 would be mainly concerned with the least developed countries, 
among them many of the Associated States, the policy decided in New Delhi 
would be bound to affect the new Convention of Association.  Asked whether the 
activities of the EEC Development Fund might not be put under the wing of the 
International Development Association, Mr. U  dink said it was more important 
to co-ordinate the Development Fund's aid with the emergency help given in 
Africa by the United Nations or the AID. 
As regards East-West relations and the easing of tension, Mr.  Luns 
thought  the countries of the West should create, both on a bilateral and on a 
multilateral basis, a climate that would make it easier to solve problems such 
as that of the division of Germany, the security of Europe and the partitioning 
of the world in separate blocs. 
According to Mr. Luns, one way of doing this would be to step up 
official contacts between Governments in the East and West and to improve 
economic, scientific and cultural relations.  No effort should be spared, more-
over,  to improve all-round co-operation in bodies such as the Economic Com-
mission for Europe and its subsidiary institutions.  The activities of the 
- 88-'Group of Nine' (1)  ought also to be backed to the hilt.  Although this had not, 
strictly speaking,  any official status and was a rather loosely-knit affair, it 
could be of help in improving commercial, technological and cultural co-oper-
ation.  The East European countries were not, however,  at all inclined to 
tackle problems of a political nature, whereas the Dutch Government saw no 
objection at all to doing so. 
The Standing Committee decided to submit to the Second Chamber a 
motion by Mr. Van Mierlo (Democracy '66) asking the Government to seek 
more than representation on the Council of the Group ofNine and to take an 
active part in its proceedings.  For the Government, Mr. Luns undertook to 
participate in the talks in person. 
Following a discussion on the possibility of making of NATO  an in-
strument for the easing of tension - on which doubts had been voiced by 
Mr. Schuijt (Catholic People's Party) -Mr. Luns said that the DutchGov:ern-
ment was inclined to favour a European conference on security.  He added that 
concrete results could not, however, be expected from such a conference while 
the views of East and West diverged so widely on European problem No  1  -
the German question.  It would clearly be impossible to establish a lasting 
European order while the German question was neglected.  Even the countries 
of the Eastern bloc now recognized this. 
With regard to NATO,  Mr. Visser (Democracy '66) tabled a motion 
of which the following are the salient points : 
The Chamber, 
believing that the utmost advantage should be taken of the improved 
relations between the West and the Soviet Union and its Eastern allies; 
endorsing the Government's view that the aim of foreign policy is not 
only to preserve the security of the Kingdom and prevent war but also, in the 
end, to achieve a lasting compromise with the Soviet Union and its allies; 
having noted with satisfaction the bilateral contacts recently es-
tablished by the Government with Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia; 
believing that the Nether  lands, because of their good international 
relations, are particularly suited to playing a major part in an active policy of 
peace, even in a multilateral context; 
(1)  Denmark, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Finland, 
Austria and Sweden. 
-89-urges the Government to take the necessary steps, with a view to 
fostering political co-operation and the easing of tension throughout Europe, to 
ensure that a carefully prepared security conference, to be attended by the 
members of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact and the other European countries, 
is held as soon as possible. 
The motion was passed by the Standing Committee and submitted  for 
approval to the Second Chamber. 
During discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, 
Mr. Schuijt pointed out that the signing of the Treaty called for an equivalent 
return on the part of the nuclear powers.  Mr. Luns summed up the Govern-
ment's views as follows : 
The Government felt that a non-proliferation treaty must provide for 
effective checks and controls;  this was important for the success of the treaty 
itself and, indirectly, as a precedent for future regulations on armaments 
control.  The Netherlands also thought it desirable that the International 
Atomic Energy Agency should act as central supervisory organ under the non-
prolifer~tion treaty.  Details of such supervision in non-nuclear countries 
that were members of Euratom should be governed by a special regulation to 
be negotiated between Euratom and the IAEA.  This should satisfy the following 
conditions :  All parties to the treaty must be able to rely on the supervision of 
the Vienna Agency.  The regulation must therefore guarantee a real possibility 
of supervision in non-nuclear Euratom member States,  pa~ticularly as regards 
compliance with undertakings not to engage in production.  A regulation that 
merely gave the IAEA facilities to acquaint itself with Euratom's methods of 
supervision would not meet the Netherlands minimum requirements. The 
methods and procedures of the regulation should not clash with the principles 
governing collaboration in Euratom,  such as free circulation of nuclear ma-
terial within the Community.  Finally, they should, as far as possible, be such 
that duplication and red tape were as far  as possible avoided. 
The group chairmen then tabled four motions based on the Monnet 
Committee's resolutions of June 1967.  These related to British entry, the 
creation of 'European' companies, Atlantic partnership, and co-operation with 
East European countries.  The motions were passed for approval by the Second 
Chamber. 
Referring  to the meeting  held by the': vuncil of the Community on 
23 October, Mr.  Luns recalled  that,  on being:,  ::>ked by the President  whether they 
thought that  the fundamental objectives, distinctive characteristics and methods 
of the European Communities would be changed by the admission of new members, 
five answered 'no', while the French representative said 'yes'. 
- 90-On the question of parliamentary supervision, which had been  brought 
up by Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party), Mr. De Koster, Secretary of 
State, promised that the Dutch Government would not discuss handing over 
financial levies without first having brought up the problem of the European 
Parliament's powers for consideration.  Moreover, the Government was very 
pleased with the European Parliament's own proposals.  'I think that, under 
present circumstances, the only thing to do is to make the most of the facili-
ties offered by the existing Treaty provisions.  I would add that the Dutch 
Government will not remain idle when the European Parliament's resolutions 
come up for discussion but will give them its full attention.' 
With regard to the summit conference, to which Mr. Boertien (Anti-
revolutionary Party), Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) and Mr. Van 
der Stoel (Labour Party) had referred, the Secretary of State had this to say : 
'The Dutch Government's view is that, while serious differences persist among 
the EEC member States regarding, among other things - and these are not 
trifles  - the principles of European and Atlantic co-operation, we  shall com-
pletely oppose any institutionalized political discussions.' 
On the merger of the Treaties, Mr. Westerterp warned the Govern-
ment against undue haste, in view of the unpromising political climate, and 
urged it to take steps to see that the few  remaining supranational powers would 
not be sacrificed in the merger.  The question of widening the European Parlia-
ment's powers should be again brought up for discussion when the Treaties 
were merged. 
The Secretary of State replied that the Dutch Government was com-
mitted in principle to negotiating the merger.  No time-limit, however, had 
been fixed.  At the Council session of 2 October, Minister Schiller, then in  the 
chair, had coupled the merger of the Treaties with Britain's accession in his 
programme. 
The Dutch- member of the Council had objected to this, and finally, 
during the same session, it was unanimously decided that Britain's accession 
and the merger of the Treaties were two completely separate processes which 
should not be bracketed together but be allowed to proceed independently. 
(Second Chamber, 1967-68 Session, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
meetings of 16, 21  and 22 November) 
- 91-3.  Policy on agricultural structures 
At a meeting of the Standing Committee on Agriculture held on 
16 November, Mr. Lardinois, Dutch Minister for Agriculture, criticized the 
European Commission's ideas on investment subsidies. 
In the absence of strict rules, it was not unusual for the European 
Commission to change the cr.iteria governing priorities.  The possibility that 
the Community might take decisions that might introduce factors distorting 
competition at national level could therefore not be ruled out. 
Mr • Lardinois thought that, under these circumstances, there was 
no point in calling for higher subsidies from  the European Agricultural  Guidance 
and Guarantee Furid.  It would be better first to devote closer attention to 
adapting the common structural policy to the common interests of the Six. 
Mr. Lardinois added that his views on the subject were shared by the Council 
of Ministers of Agriculture of the Six. 
(Standing Committee on Agriculture, 16 November 1967) 
4.  Management Committees 
In a written question Mr. Vredeling asked the Government's opinion 
on the procedures envisaged for the management committees to be set up to 
implement the common agricultural policy.  He was in fact afraid that these 
procedures might invelve a curtailment of the prerogatives of the European 
Commission. 
On 26 October Mr. De J ong, the Prime Minister, replied that with 
regard to the implementing provisions concerning animal fodders and food-
stuffs, the European Commission had proposed to set up official committees 
with powers that went a good deal further than the consultative powers of the 
committees that had been set up for agricultural products. 
- 92  -v 
It emerged from the deliberations of the Permanent Representatives 
that France wished to go much further,  so that each member State would,  on 
these joint committees, have a right of veto over the implementing measures 
that the European Commission wished to take. 
The Dutch Government considered that no undesirable precedent 
should be introduce·d into the context of the present committee procedures. It 
felt that any such endeavour to introduce a change in the existing procedures 
and which would imply a curtailment of the powers of the European Commis-
sion should be resisted.  It further considered that an attempt should be made 
in areas covered by Community legislation to make a link with existing pro-
cedures.  -
On 16 November, Mr. Lardinois explained to the Standing Committee 
on Agriculture that the greatest opposition on  the Permanent Representatives' 
Committee to following the normal procedure on the management committee on 
veterinary questions had come from the German side. He thought this stemmed 
mainly from domestic policy considerations in that these questions were dealt 
with in Germany by the ~  so t~at it was much more difficult to transpose 
them to the supranational sphere. 
(Second Chamber, 1967-68 Session, annex p. 207. Standing Committee on 
Agriculture, 16 November 1967) 
On 21  November, in reply to a question from Mr. Van der Stoel 
(Socialist) on the attitude of the Five to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
Foreign Ministter stated : 
'The Governments of Belgium, The Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg agreed on a number of principles which 
could serve as a common basis for further consideration of the article con-
cerning control in the draft non-proliferation treaty.  These principles are as 
follows:. 
The control article in the non-proliferation treaty must be applied 
to basic measures and special fissionable materials and not to installations. 
- 93-There must be no misunderstanding about the fact that as far as 
Euratom member States are concerned the control article of the non-proli-
feration treaty must be applied on the basis of an agreement to be concluded 
between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
This agreement should be based on the principle of a check on 
Euratom's control through the IAEA;  negotiations should be conducted between 
the two organizations in the implementation of this principle. 
Pending an agreement between Euratom and the IAEA, the Euratom 
member States concerned stress the need to avoid any misunderstanding over 
the fact that any supply commitments entered into with Euratom or its member 
States by any party to the non-proliferation treaty must not be prejudiced by 
the provisions of Article III. 
The Euratom member States concerned, resolved to act together, 
must endeavour to ensure that Euratom's position in negotiations to be held to 
reach a  satisfactory agreement with the IAEA are not prejudiced by any stipu-
lation in Article III relating, for example, to time-limits. 
In the agreement between the five Governments there was no mention 
of conditions but solely of principles. 
The Government wished that the IAEA should operate as the main 
control authority under the non-proliferation treaty.  It felt that co-operation 
between Euratom and the IAEA,  as regards nuclear power plant inspection, 
should involve no technical difficulty and was desirable, from a political view-
point, if IAEA control were to be unchallenged and acceptable to all parties. 
(Annex, Proceedings in the Second Chamber, 1967-68 Session, p. 311) 
On 1 December Mr. Burger (Labour Party) asked the Foreign Minis-
ter if his position was the same as that of the European Parliament, as it 
emerged from the colloquy of 2 8 November concerning the alleged right of the 
United Kingdom and other applicant States to the opening of negotiations. The 
European Parliament had taken the view that the United Kingdom had a right, 
by virtue of the Treaty of Rome and by virtue ofits application to join, to negoti-
ations about its accession. 
-94-The Minister stated in his reply on 27 December that in view of 
Article 237,2 of the Treaty of Rome he did not share the European Parliament's 
position.  He  agreed with the European Parliament, however, that specialcare 
had to be taken to preserve the legal character of the Community both in the 
context of the accession of new member States and in every other instance. 
(First Chamber,  Annex,  1967-68 Session, p, 67) 
5.  Official visit of Mr. Luns to Ankara 
Mr. Luns, Dutch Foreign Minister, said, during his official visit  to 
Ankara (17 -18 October) that only through political co-operation and military 
integration could a safe and peaceful future be guaranteed for the Atlantic Pact 
countries : 'Through its great military tradition Turkey is one of the pillars of 
NATO. This organization has amply demonstrated how indispensable it is for 
preserving peace and maintaining our independence.  This is the result of the 
firm resolve and the joint efforts of all the member nations', he said. 
With reference to the association between Turkey and the EEC, he 
said that Turkey, as a European and democratic State was closely linked with 
the Common Market.  The recent meeting of the Association Council, which 
was held in Ankara, had again demonstrated that the basis f.or  this co-oper-
ation was a sound one and that the links between Turkey and the EE  C were 
becoming stronger. 
Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
praised Mr. Luns for his sustained efforts in the interests of European  unity 
and he said that Turkey counted on the understanding and support of friendly 
States in her economic and social development, which should lead to her be-
coming increasingly int~grated in the European Community. 
In the communiqu~ issued at the close of the visit the two Ministers 
made clear that  promoting closer mutual relations to foster a climate of trust and 
mutual comprehension was a factor for easing tension  between East and West. 
The Atlantic Alliance was a vital factor for preserving balance and 
peace.  The Ministers agreed about the peace-keeping rOle of NATO. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 17-19 October 1967) 
- 95-Switzerland 
Conference held by Ambassador Weitnauer on Switzerland's position 
in the face of the great international economic communities 
(11 December 1967) 
Ambassador Alberto Weitnauer, who headed the Swiss delegation 
during the Kennedy Round negotiations, held a conference in Milan on 
11 December on the subject 'Switzerland in the face of the great international 
economic communities'. 
'The two major aspects of Switzerland's activities in the internatio:rr 
al sphere, '  said Mr. W  eitnauer, 'are a desire for independence and neutrality, 
and a desire to participate actively in any form of international economic col-
laboration.  This accounts for a certain diffidence in Switzerland's approach 
to the EEC, or, rather, to those political aims which in some cases  threaten 
to overshadow economic objectives.  But it also explains why Switzerland 
heartily approves of any attempts to remove obstacles to international trade.' 
Mr. Weitnauer went on to say that although the Kennnedy Round had 
not achieved all the results originally planned - for example, a 50 per cent cut 
in all customs duties -it  had nevertheless provided a wonderful opportunity for 
Switzerland, as for other countries, to reaffirm these liberal ideals. At the 
same time it had opened the door to greater liberalization of trade between 
Europe and the United States and reduced the distance -that is, customs dis-
crimination- between the EEC and EFTA. 
The Kennedy Round had also provided -and particularly for Switzer-
land - a welcome opportunity to establish close links with EEC representatives 
on all the major problems of trade :and,  in most cases, to arrive at satisfactory 
solutions.  Interest in the solution of these problems had not, however, been 
entirely confined to Switzerland;  the EEC, too, was interested in preserving 
the sizeable market represented by Switzerland.  Some 11 per cent of the 
EEC's agricultural exports went to Switzerland, and -to give but one example-
Switzerland absorbed about a quarter of Italy's total exports of wine.  Every 
year the EEC finished up with a $1,000m  surplus in itstradewithSwitzerland. 
Little Switzerland on its own thus covered half the EEC's balance of trade 
deficit with the United States. 
- 96  -Mr. Weitnauer wound up by emphasizing the importance, from the 
Swiss point of view, not only of pressing on with the liberalization of world 
trade but also of reaching agreement, at European level, on outstanding prob-
lems.  It would be highly regrettable if political discussions were to unduly 
hamper consideration of economic necessities.  Europe was an economic unit; 
trade patterns were. traditional, marked, and highly diversified.  The timehad 
therefore come to push dogmatic discussions on the future European organi-
zation into the background and to face the fact that the problems to be settled 
were of a highly practical nature.  Switzerland was ready and willing to make 
its full contribution. 
(Corriere della Sera, 12 December 1967  - Relazioni Internazionali, No.  52, 
30 December 1967) 
-97-II.  PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS 
1.  Position taken up by  the Agricultural Committee of the Italian Unified 
Socialist Party on the common agricultural policy 
Following the National Farm Conference held on 29 September and 
1 October, the Agricultural Committee of the merged Socialist and Social 
Democrat parties (PSI-PSDI) reviewed the results of the debate and passed a 
resolution commenting as follows on the common agricultural policy: 'The 
National Farm Conference points out that the priority so far given,  in the 
course of implementing the EEC  1 s  a~ricultural policy,  to the organization of 
the agricultural market,  and the resulting regulations on separate products, 
have not been conducive to balanced conditions of production in keeping with 
the nature either of the resources available to us or with the problems facing 
us,  and are liable to prove an obstacle to a harmonious relationship between 
the interests of Italian agriculture and those of other countries. 
The Conference feels that new moves by the Commission of the 
Communities, aimed at strenghthening the common policy on agricultural 
structures, and the elaboration of a European plan for their review and over-
haul,  could help to establish the balanced conditions earlier referred to, pro-
vided that they are carried out in such a way as to satisfy the urgent needs of 
less favoured areas. 
It is therefore essential that the five-year economic  policy programme 
should provide a clear-cut  definition of the aims of the medium-term agricultural 
policy as well as of the means by which it should be pursued, due attentton 
being given to the need for more balanced administration and distribution ofthe 
funds of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. 
1 
(For a socialist policy on the land - Resolution of the Agricultural Committee 
following the national conference, October 196 7) 
- 99-2.  Labour Party Conference endorses the British Government's Euro-
pean policy 
From the outset of the Labour Party Conference which opened in 
Scarborough on 1 October, a violent attack was made on Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson.  Mr.  Douglas Jay, former President of the  Board  of Trade, 
launched out on a bitter indictment (1) of the Government's European policy 
with the backing of Mr.  Shinwell,  former Defence Minister.  He first under-
lined the Government's 'unreasonable haste' in seeking to join the EEC.  He 
said that there were extreme advocates of entry into the Common Market who 
would accept any terms whatsoever. If Britain accepted 'the whole parapher-
nalia of the Common Market's antiquated highcost agricultural policy and 
extravagant dear-food policy' it would disastrously weaken the country's en-
tire economic position in the world.  Mr.  Jay warned his audience that if 
Britain swallowed the undemocratic power of the Common Market Commission, 
it would be handing over to an outside legislating body the power to intervene 
in Britain's internal economic policy.  He felt that the electorate should be 
told clearly what was involved and be given the chance to say whether they 
approved or not.  But Mr.  Jay said also that he was prepared to accept a sort 
of wider industrial free trade association, possibly even an Atlantic free 
trade area. Anything more, he felt, would be risking serious dangers to Brit-
ain's long-term future both politically and economically.  'A settlement on the 
wrong terms would be worse for Britain and the world th:~m no settlement at 
all. I 
These attacks led to a vigorous reaction by the Executive Commit-
tee of the Labour Party. On the evening of 1 October this committee published 
a statement (2)  approving Mr.  Wilson's submission of Britain's application to 
join the EEC on the grounds that it was fully in line with the principles and 
aims of the Labour Party.  Politically there was nothing to fear because free-
dom to decide a nation  1 s foreign policy was fully compatible with membership 
of the Common Market.  The main result of accession would be the creation of 
a vast market of 280 million people in Europe which would enable a unified 
Europe to meet the United States and the Soviet Union on an equal footing. 
On 2 Octobe"r Lord Chalfont,  the Minister in charge of negotiations 
with the EEC,  spoke (3)  at a meeting of the Labour Committee for Europe: 
(1)  Combat - The Times, 2 October 
(2)  The Times, 2 October - Le Monde,  3 October 
(3)  The Times - The Financial Times,  3 October; Le Monde 4 October 
-100-'British entry is now,  I believe, a real and immense possibility ••••. As far 
as we  can gather, the Commission's report is on balance favourable to us. It 
recommends without any equivocation that the one way to remove difficulties 
and obstacles to our entry is to negotiate. ' 
Referring to the opposition of certain Labour members, Lord Chal-
font stated that 'any impression that Britain was losing its solidarity over the 
Common Market would play right into the hands of those who don't want to let 
US in. I 
On 5 October, before the final vote was taken on the Government's 
European policy, the Foreign Minister, Mr.  George Brown, pleaded! (1) for 
the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market: ' •.••• What became clear 
to the prime minister and myself as we went round Europe, was that provided 
we accept, as we have said we do,  the policy, the system, then a whole lot 
becomes negotiable  at that stage and, countries' attitudes differ ••••. And 
the big issue is really this one,  not I repeat, unconditional entry but whether 
we so stipulate our negotiating position that we  cannot start negotiations or 
whether we so stipulate it that we can get into the negotiations in a meaningful 
way.  And our conclusion,  the cabinet's and the executive's, is that in fact ne-
gotiations could start, should start, and we probably will always be able to 
find at the end of the day,  the sort of situation that would enable us to join ••••• 
Why should we want to join ?  ••••• I believe in 1967 that the economic 
advantages are on our side ••••• 
. . . • . But then the real big argument is political • . . • •  • • • • • we 
cannot believe in integration of Europe, or our part of the world,  and at the 
same time fight to keep that little part of western Europe divided • • • • •  • •••• I 
want us to remain committed and aligned . • . • •  But the way for smaller coun-
tries to avoid the world being polarised between two super powers is in fact to 
organise themselves so that they are part of a grouping which can match the 
size and resources and opportunities of those two super powers - and Europe 
organised on the basis of the EEC,  our other EFTA partners, and as I would 
hope with other Eastern. European countries - would of course be a very pow-
erful bloc indeed ..•.• 
. • . • .  Now let me turn to the consequences of not doing so  ••••• 
• • • • • There is an assumption that somehow the EFTA nations will always stay 
out unless we go on.  There isn't much truth in this ••••.•••••  Does 'the Treaty 
of Rome contain things that would be fundamentally objectionable? ••••• 
• • • • • But there is nothing in  the Treaty which we fundamentally couldn't accept, 
(1)  Le Monde- The Guardian- Le Soir- The Times, 6 October 
- 101-provided we can resolve the problems like agriculture and so on, like the 
balance of payments, like the financing arrangements .•••. 
. . , •• I believe we can influence the development of Europe in the 
way that we want it to develop.  I believe we can avoid remaining or becoming 
an inward-looking rich man's club.  I think we can enable it to play its rOle in 
the world  •. ,, •.•.•.  A Europe of this size could play a very large rOle indeed 
and I believe it would be part of our duty to go and see that it did •....  ' 
The Conference finally approved the project for British entry to the 
EEC by more than 4 million against 2 million votes and rejected a counter-
resolution. 
3.  Opinion of Mr.  Mend~ France on the European economic situation 
and on Britain's candidature 
The statement made at a diplomatic press luncheon by Mr.  Mendes 
France, former President of the Council,  on 5 October,  was as follows: 
' ••.•.  If  we were to accept the official argument on this point, then 
the Common Market would always be achieved from below.  The Europe of 
tomorrow must not be made in the opposite way to that which appeared to be 
emerging only a few years ago.  The Common Market must be an institution 
for co-operation against crises and for the joint organization of better pros-
pects of prosperity and not a tool for propagating deflation and unemployment. 
In the European economic unit which is being built, there are no 
discussion or decision-taking centres comparable with those that exist in our 
own countries.  We  should not therefore be surprised if difficulties arising 
here and there occasion concern in neighbouring States or provoke reactions 
which are, in the final analysis, liable to aggravate the evil trend,  spreading 
it rather than mastering it. 
The abolition of customs protection between the Six on 1 July 1968 
will not be a fearful or really large-scale event. 
On the other hand, we shall begin to feel on that date the effect of a 
keener trade rivalry than hitherto experienced from industries in the United 
States,  Japan,  Canada,  the United Kingdom,  etc. ,  as a result of the entry into 
- 102-force of the common external tariff decided upon by the Six,  and of the effects 
of the Kennedy Round and various other circumstances.  This is the main n~w 
factor. 
This is something which should interest and concern all the mem-
hers of the Community.  Faced with a common danger which is to be reckoned 
with,  they should tighten their links in action and together work 
1out  their aims, 
their means of defence and even,  in many cases, their means of offensive ac-
tion on third country markets. 
Setting up a European political authority would not be enough to 
solve the whole problem at one fell swoop.  I am quite convinced that we shall 
need a central authority vested with specific prerogatives.  Yet this authority 
will be effective only if the European countries and public opinion in these 
countries and their Governments realize that they have to take joint action ••••• 
Mr.  Mend~s France then dealt with more technical problems: 
' .....  first of all it would probably be desirable, leaving aside balances of 
payments, for settlements to be made between the Six (or the Seven or Eight 
or Nine,  if the number of member States were to be increased at some future 
date).  Thissystem did exist for a time: it was the European Payments Union 
(EPU), which rendered considerable service during a difficult period ..... 
An agency of the same sort should be reconstituted. It could be a 
place for standing consultations so that a watch could be kept on the risk of 
deflationary of inflationary movements being propagated, for debating fluc-
tuations in bank rates or the co-efficients of liquidities or minimum reserves, 
consumer credits in the banking systems of the Associated States, etc. 
The funds thus made available to the Community would be used for 
the purpose that it might choose, for example, for loans to developing coun-
tries, for credits designed to increase trade with the East European countries 
or, again,  (and this is a problem to which 1 shall come back) to give effect to 
an agreement designed to bring a final solution to the crisis of the pound ster-
ling  .••.• ' 
·Mr.  Mend~s France finally tackled the problem of Britain's acces-
sion: 
' .....  For the negotiations to be unequivocal,  the British must make 
their position abundantly clear, particularly on the agricultural and monetary 
questions ..... 
- 103 -The United Kingdom is short of reserves.  Yet the Europe of the 
Six has more than $ 2  ,OOOm of reserves which is more than it needs to finance 
its trade  ••.•• 
If the United Kingdom were part of the Community, the European 
reserve currency pool, which I suggested setting up a moment ago,  could · 
make a major contribution to the solution •••.. 
~he continentals, furthermore, . could help to consolidate a part of 
the foreign-balances on London by proposing, to holders of sterling balances, 
a long-term loan written out in an attractive accounting unit, which could be 
the currency of the States of the economic Community. 
Lastly, the Europeanization of sterling would make it possible to 
build a bridge between Europe and a great many markets that it has too often 
ignored in the past • . • . .  · 
The so-called Trojan Horse argument, which has so often been  used 
against Britain's entry into the Common Market, would,  in fact,  be much 
more applicable and much more suited to some of our EEC partners than the 
United Kingdom.  Instead of keeping on saying "let the United Kingdom sever 
its. links with the United States and we will then review our attitude to its re-
quest for membership", we should argue the other way round: "Let us asso-
ciate the United Kingdom with Europe and let us propose a complete and ef-
fective monetary and economic system to the British and we shall then see 
them freeing themselves from the foreign hold which we criticize the United 
Kingdom for being under. " 
.  'One of the conditions', he thought, 'which we should lay down for 
Britain's joining the Community should be an agreement on patents under a 
system for protecting inventions and making them generally available on a 
European basis.  The British have given us to understand that they are not op-
posed to such ide~s.' 
(Le Monde,  7 October 196 7) 
- 104-4.  Meeting in Munich of French and German parliamentarians 
On 15 and 16  October 1967 at Feldafing, near Munich, SO parliamen-
tarians of the Franco-German Friendship Group held a joint working meeting. 
Members from the main parties (both of the Government and the Opposition) 
of the French National Assembly and of the Bundestag took part in the meeting 
which was conducted on the German side by Professor Merkatz (Christian 
Democrat) ; Mr.  Louis Terrenoire (Gaullist) led the French delegation. 
The main subject of discussion was the applications for EEC mem-
bership of the United Kingdom and other European States. It was quite clear 
from the discussion how far the German and French viewpoints on the acces-
sion issue differed. 
The Germans made clear to their French colleagues that if no direct 
accession negotiations were possible, then there should at least be talks 
between the Six and the United Kingdom.  These talks could take a long time. 
Indeed, this might perhaps be inevitable in order to bring the weighty econo-
mic problems closer to a solution; this was fully recognized on the German 
side. 
The French parliamentarians replied that the talks would have to be 
carefully prepared because inadequately-prepared interim negotiations would 
lead to a dead-lock. It would be better, in the German view,  to wait first to 
see what the 'British candidate' had to say on the problem arising. It would 
not be possible, until talks had been held with the British, for anyone to say 
whether the problems arising from Britain's wish to enter the EEC  were in-
soluble; this view was expressed by Mr.  LUcker,  the Christian Democrat 
member. It was perfectly possible that the negotiations would indeed lead, 
in the ii'litial stages, to a dead-lock but it would then be time to draw the re-
levant conclusions.  When one thought of the difficulties the Six had overcome 
to complete the customs union,  this justified a certain optimism on the ques-
tion of Britain's accession to the EEC. 
Mr.  Terrenoire the French MP  asked what would become of the 
Community of the Six after the accession of the United Kingdom,  Ireland and 
the Scandinavian countries.  To date the Six had been, to some extent, united 
vis-:1-vis the United States on certain points (monetary problems and the Ken-
nedy Round);  yet one had to ask whether this would still be the case if the 
Community were enlarged to include ten members.  Mr. Apel (Socialist, Ger-
many),  the Social Democrat member, said that Britain's request for acces-
sion had to be considered.  One could not simply leave the United Kingdom out-
side the Community: if one did so, then Europe would have a lot to lose. 
- 105-The parliamentarians broke up without being able to reach any def-
inite agreement and in their closing communiq1.1~ it was stated: 'Both delegat-
ions will look further into the problems arising relating to the Rome Treaty 
in order to try to work out a common solution. ' 
(Le Monde,  17  October 1967  - Le Figaro,  16  October 1967) 
5.  The Conservative Party discusses its foreign policy at the Brighton 
Conference 
Two weeks after the Labour Party Conference, the Conservative 
Party held its Conference in Brighton.  The major debate on foreign policy 
and Europe was opened by Councillor Rodney Smith (South East Essex) on 
20  October.  He moved the following resolution: 'This Conference affirms its 
support for a Conservative foreign policy designed to maintain British inter-
ests by contributing to a greater unity of Europe and by carrying  out efficiently 
our specific and limited commitments overseas  •••.• ' 
-Mr.  Noel Picarda (Cities of London and Westminster), then sug-
gested: 'An alternative strategy should be thought out now in case Britain 
does not gain entry to the Common Market.  The Conservative Party should 
prepare a contingency plan. ' 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home then took the floor to stress 'the twoaspects 
of our European policy which are beyond contention. 1 
'Britain is useless as an ally and partner within the Commonwealth 
if Britain is economically weak.  And Europe is a total liability to the Com-
monwealth when she is divided in strife.  Certainly we can reconcile our new 
rOle in Europe with our old loyalties to the Commonwealth.  Patterns of trade 
may change but hearts do not and it is for the Conservative Party to prove to 
the Commonwealth that this is true. ' 
(The Times -The Guardian, 21  October 1967) 
- 106  -6.  A debate on uniting Europe between Mr. Mitterrand and Mr.  Giscard 
d'Estaing 
On 21  October in a programme broadcoast on Europe No.  1, 
Mr. Fran9ois Mitterrand,  PresidentoftheFederationofthe Left,  and Mr. Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing,  President of the Independent Republicans,  came face 
to face in connexion with Mr.  Servan-Schreiber's recent book on "The Amer-
ican Challenge'. 
The two were agreed on how this challenge should be met. 
Mr. Mitterrand said: 'Europe is at present lagging behind and its leeway is 
growing all the time.  In my opinion this is because there is no power to plan, 
because there is no common political  power or authority and because of a failure 
to enlarge the responsibilities of the Community institutions ••••• ' 
For his part,  Mr.  Giscard d'Estaing said: 'it has become apparent 
that for the European context to become meaningful,  some authority is needed 
to assist it in its pursuit of a high rate of growth. It is not enough for there 
to be a vast neutral market. It needs someone to be able to give their support, 
their backing,  in the same way as the federal authority does in the United 
States.  Hence the need,  economically, for an authority of a federal nature in 
the economic Europe of tomorrow.  Such an authority could lead development 
in certain sectors, provide support, award contracts and so on. ' 
And he added: 'We live at a time when the dynamic factor must free 
itself from this kind of inferiority complex, this sort of general conservatism 
(which is, in fact,  more in the nature of a holding-back) and it must be capa-
ble of proposing a fundamentally new action.  And this is the heart of the mat-
ter: it is a kind of renewal of confidence on the part of Europe in its ability 
to exist as such in the second half of the century and in the quality of themes-
sage it would be able to spell out if it existed.  The problems of organization 
would thereafter be relatively secondary. ' 
Mr. Mitterrand's reply was as follows: 'If we do not frame a techno-
logical and research policy by recourse to genuine education, which is the 
basis of any future policy, to permanent education, to enable all young people 
and then all adults to take advantage of these opportunities, if we do not do 
this, I am convinced that France, our country,  and Europe will fail to with-
stand the American challenge. 
- 107-Your expression was most apt: we must take up every challenge. 
Let France and Europe take up the American challenge, the objective chal-
lenge, and I am sure that civilization will be the better for it. ' 
(Le Monde,  22/23 October 1967 - Le Figaro, 23  October 1967) 
7.  French Opposition leaders define their European policy (17  October, 
7 November) 
The importance of the talks what were to take place in Luxembourg 
on 23  and 24  October on Britain's  possible entry into the EEC and on the future of 
Europe was fully recognized in the ranks of the Opposition, which disapproved 
of the Government's policy on several points, even though the critics did not 
conceal their own disagreements.  This is why at meetings and conferences 
the leaders of the Opposition made their positions on European problems clear. 
FGDS (Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left) 
It was, first of all, Mr. Fran9ois Mitterrand, President of the 
FGDS,  who discussed the Atlantic issue, a possible cause of misunderstand-
ing with the Communist Party, at a talk he had with journalists (1).  He said 
he was convinced that 'it is .obvious that one cannot ask France both to leave 
the Atlantic Alliance and not to build Europe.  No one can imagine that the 
Federation would consider basing France's foreign policy or security on 
nothing more than the goodwill of others, be they American or Russian.  The 
Atlantic Pact is simply one of the tools of French foreign policy.  To leave the 
Atlantic Alliance without building Europe, without devising a mutual assistance 
and collective security pact between East and West Europe, without initiating 
the nuclear disarmament of the two great powers, without paving the way for 
a settlement of the German question, would mean giving up the idea of inter-
national balance which might be open to criticism, but is none the less real. 
General de Gaulle has left NATO but not the Alliance.  He has remained under 
the American nuclear umbrella.  That is the truth.  To leave this umbrella 
would be conceivable only within the framework of an overall policy within 
which it must be recognized Europe is the first link in the chain. 
(1)  Le Nouvel Observateur, 18 October 1967 
- 108-••••• One could give up the Atlantic Alliance if one gave to the 
Europe to which France has committed its future the chances and the means -
notably the means of economic expansion, which is the true field of battle. 
today- of achieving its independence.  Such a Europe would be the best trump-
card for peace in harmony with the Soviet Union and with the United States.  1 
It was then the turn of the Convention of Republican Institutions, the 
third branch of the FDSL, which represents all the 'clubs' together, to hold 
its conference in Paris on 7 and 8 November (1).  On this occasion, 
Mr.  Jacques Maugein,  Member of Parliament for the Gironde,  submitted a 
report embodying original proposals that came from the clubs:'The need for a 
supranational authority with definite, albeit limited, powers will, in tum, demo~ 
strate the need for common foreign,  economic and social policies ••••• ' 
Mr.  Maugein stressed the need to secure 'the triumph of socialism  1 
in the European context. Political integration had to come about through the 
election of a Parliament by universal suffrage, which would define a common 
diplomacy,  control the European budget and organize a Community economy. 
The President of the Convention, who is none other than the Presi-
dent of the FDSL himself,  Mr. Fran9ois Mitterrand,  dwelt at some length on 
the problems of building Europe: 'If this Europe is at present a sick man,' he 
said, 'it is because, for some years now,  French policy has constantly been 
the obstacle which the Community Europe has run into. If the Left were in 
power, it would never advocate the breaking up of the Co~mon  Market for 
this would be a return to an autarchic policy but it would not be content with 
what exists as a consequence of Gaullist policy.  The Europe of business has 
been built; what remains to be built is the Europe of the peoples, that is social-
ist Europe. ' 
He accused those responsible for French foreign policy of having· 
'abandoned the veto to fall back on procedure'.  The former presidential can-
didate said that the geographical enlargement of Europe was essential: 'Amer-
ica's hold on Europe cannot be shaken off.unless Britain is part of Europe. It 
is true that there are many disadvantages but Britain's accession would be 
coupled with a considerable technological contribution.  There is no question of 
giving way to the United Kingdom nor of dispensing it from subscribing to the 
Rome Treaty obligations but we must agree to hold discussions.  These must 
take place and it is in the interests of France to find a new forum for them. 
The EEC Commission should be asked to undertake a precise exploratory mis-
sion  which might make it  possible to unfreeze the situation  ••••• 
1 
(1)  Le Figaro, 4-5 November 1967 - L'Aurore, 6 November 1967 - Le Monde, 
7 November 1967. 
- 109-The speaker did not conceal that there were divergences between 
the parties on the Left concerning the common European supranational author-
ity. 
Lastly, he condemned out of hand the 'Gaullist nationalism' which 
could never secure true national independence and' •..••  the maximalists of 
Europe whose ideological behaviour pleases me but whose strategic line of 
conduct is one I cannot appreciate. ' 
Following the debates, the Convention tabled motions in favour of: 
a)  the gradual and simultaneous dissolution of the North Atlantic 
and Warsaw Treaties; 
b)  the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market, it 
being understood that the conditions for such accession must be 
carefully weighed and that the enlargement of the Community 
must not in any way slow down the strengthening of the European 
structures or the common policies in respect of planning, region-
alization or agriculture; 
c)  a  European socialist and democratic federation that would keep 
the door wide open to co-operation with the Eastern countries; 
d)  the election of a  European Parliament by universal suffrage. 
The Secretary-General of the SFIO (Socialist Party), the main 
branch of the FGDS,  of which he is Vice-President,  Mr.  Guy Mollet, tookpart 
in a debate at Sarcelles on 20 October (1).  This was organized by the 'Temps 
Nouveaux' Club.  He said that the countries of Europe had to be in a position 
to speak with one tongue to the USSR and to the USA.  It was for this reason that 
Mr.  Guy Mollet deplored 'the regression of the European idea in Germany, 
where the idea of a man 
1 s  house being his castle seems to be prevailing. (  •••••  ) 
Those in France who have held back or made impossible the construction of 
Europe will carry a very heavy responsibility. 
1 
On 24 October, the former President of the Council, who was the 
guest of the Ecole sup~rieure des sciences ~conomiques et commerciales 
(ESSE  C),  discussed at length (2)  international political problems facing the 
Federation and the Communist Party. 
(1)  Le Monde,  22/23 October- Le Figaro,  23 October 1967. 
(2)  Combat,  25 October - Le Monde,  26  October 1967. 
- 110-'We must,' he said, 'really thrash out all those points of disagree-
ment to make sure we do not mislead the general public.  Let us imagine, for 
example,  a Government of the Left which today, now that Europe has come 
through difficult straits, did not agree with the idea of pursuing the building of 
Europe.  The result would be an insurmountable crisis. 
Yet we ourselves say that the building of a united Europe is a key 
component in peaceful co-existence,  a contribution of the greatest importance 
to the peace of the world  ••••• ' 
A united Europe in which Socialist democracy is capable of playing 
a decisive part would have a real influence  and would  be able to take effective 
action in the interests of a co-existence which would not be based solely on a 
balance of terror.  On the other hand,  an isolated France,  an isolated Germany, 
an isolated Italy and an isolated Britain would get scant or poor attention and 
they would be liable to find there was nothing for it but to fall into line with one 
of the two major powers. 
This is one of the reasons why we seek a united Europe, why we 
ask for its enlargement through the accession of Britain and other countries, 
why we want it to be outward-looking and able to join with the East as with 
the West and in trying without anxiety, towork out the lasting agreements 
that are necessary for co-existence. 
The Vice-President of the Radical Party, the second branch of the 
FGDS,  Mr.  Michel Souli~, wrote in the bulletin of the Radical Socialist Infor-
mation Agency (1):  'General de Gaulle is going to make it his business, as he 
did in 196 3, to ruin the chances of an enlarged Europe in which the United 
Kingdom would have too much weight for his liking •.••• 
The game which will be played in the coming year will be a tough 
one.  The result,  how~ver, is not a foregone conclusion, despite the trump-
cards held by the President of the French Republic.  He has to reckon with 
British tenacity and with the will of the other countries of the Common Mar-
ket, which are all, with varying degrees of conviction, however,  in favour of 
the entry of the United Kingdom. 
He  also has to reckon with French public opinion,  which is, no 
doubt,  divided and often misled by clever propaganda, but which is increasingly 
(1)  Le Monde,  20 October 1967. 
- 111-realizing the need to build a solid and well-armed Europe to play its part in 
the world of today. 
Apart  from such a Europe, who could succeed in this context? 
••••• Faced with a Gaullist power entrenched in its refusal and in 
its national egotistical resolve, it falls today to the Federation of the Left -
and to the Federation alone as a political movement - to assume the respon-
sibility of leading the struggle for a Europe having an organized economy, 
social justice and political democracy,  in which the United Kingdom and most 
of the States of Western Europe would find their place.  The Federation will 
not evade this responsibility for it sees in the construction of this Europe the 
key to the prosperity, independence and peace of ?ur continent. ' 
The Unified Socialist Party 
At the close of a meeting of its national Political Committee, which 
met in Paris on 4 and 5 November, the USP adopted (1)  a resolution on inter-
national policy,  in which it considered that: 'withdrawal from the Atlantic 
Pact by a refusal to renew it in 1969 must constitute for the working class 
movement in France an essential objective, as well as a duty,  to demonstrate 
international solidarity. ' 
With reference to the building of Europe, the Th.rty came out against: 
'any new supranationality which might operate to the benefit of neo-liberal 
circles and aggravate the tendencies towards a European dissolution, which 
are beginning to emerge. ' 
The Communist Party 
In a wide7ranging interview which he gave to the  publication'  La  nouvelle 
critique' (2),  Mr.  Waldeck Rochet, Secretary-General of the French Commu-
nist Party, discussed the drafting with the FGDS of a joint programme. With 
regard to the European question he recalled that: 'The Communist Party is 
proposing to the other parties of the Left that they should fight together to en-
sure that the institutions which govern the EEC lose their technocratic charac-
ter. • • • •  and that France is not economically, scientifically and technically 
cpnfined within the framework of the Common Market. ' 
(1)  Le Monde,  7 November 1967. 
(2)  Combat,  12 October - Le Monde,  13 October 1967. 
- 112-The organ of the Communist Party,  'L'Humanit~', furthermore 
published two series of articles between 16  October and 2 November by 
Mr.  Jean Kanapa,  a member of the Central Committee of the Party, entitled 
'Europe and the Left' (1). 
After fifteen years of the building of Europe, the criticism of the 
Communists remains the same with regard to a  Europe of cartels which is 
geographically limited: 'One can not claim that Europe should be restricted 
to its Western and,  to boot,  capitalist half (or quarter)', he wrote.  'We mu~St', 
he wrote,  'leave "this caricature of Europe" to the friends of Mr.  Pompidou 
and to those of Mr.  Lecanuet. '-He went on: 'It is one thing to recognize the 
existence of the Common Market, which we do because it is now a fact and 
because it has already involved the French economy into a network of relation-
ships which cannot be broken off overnight without adverse effect. 
It is another thing to intend to pursue the present policy of the EEC 
- as the Gaullist representatives are still asking in the European Parliament. 
For ourselves, we are fighting and we shall go on fighting without the least 
concession, against this policy which is geared solely to the capitalist interests 
of the various countries ••••• ' A number of guarantees had to be given to the 
Left,  Mr. Kanapa felt: a representation 'with real rights' for the workers' 
organizations and first of all the trade unions in the European organizations, a 
participation by Communists that had been elected in the European institutions 
(which must become less technocratic) and a control by the French Parliament 
over the policy of the EEC ••••• ' 
The Democratic Centre 
In Chartres,  on  22  October,  at the Democratic Convention of the 
Eure-et-Loire,  Mr.  Jean Lecanuet, President of the Democratic Centre, 
stated (2):  'We ask that negotiations on Britain's entry into the Common Mar-
ket be initiated with a determination to succeed.  These are bound to be chal-
lenging but they should ·be frank and conducted in a spirit of good faith ••••• 
But the heart of the matter is political',  Mr. Lecanuet went on. 'Is 
France, which is being swept along by the nationalist and neutralist illusion, 
going to ignore what the United Kingdom,  which has so long been attached to a 
splendid isolation, has at last finally understood ••••• ?  The recent crisis in 
the Middle East showed that the divided Europe has faded from the world scene. 
(1)  Le Monde,  5-6 November 1967 
(2)  Le Figaro, 23 October 1967 
- 113-A United Kingdom rejected from Europe could only swing over to 
the American clan and increase its predominance.  A European Community 
that included the United Kingdom,  on the other hand,  could face up to the 
American challenge. 
Without the United Kingdom,  the Community of the Six would lose 
its identity in a so-called Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic which would, 
in fact,  be exposed to the Soviet hegemony. 
Without the counterweight of the United Kingdom,  the Six would run 
the risk that Germany might move away from France and turn to the East to 
obtain its reunification and France would experience isolation. ' 
Mr.  Lecanuet concluded: 'A free Europe,  including the United 
Kingdom,  could play this part. It  would at once be a  Europe in which there 
would be a  d~tente with the East and a  Europe in which there would be a bal-
ance with the United States in a new Atlantic Alliance. ' 
On 4 November Mr.  Jean Lecanuet gave a press conference at 
Aix-en-Provence and the following day he spoke at a meeting organized by the 
Democratic Centre (1).  With reference to Britain he trusted that: (the United 
Kingdom)  ' ••••• will clearly state that it desires to go beyond economic inte-
gration to political unity.  Either it goes into Europe or else it does not and 
turns towards the United States, thus reinforcing the hegemony of that coun-
try.  Britain must enter for Europe to be able to compete both with the East 
and with the West.' 
8.  Views of Messrs. Pisani, Giscard d'Estaing,  Baumel and Buron on 
Britain's candidature (17  October,  5 December) 
Mr.  Edgard Pisani ,  the former Minister for Agriculture addressed 
on 17  October 1967 members of the French Chamber of Commerce in Canada, 
pointing out, however, that he was giving his personal opinion.  'I think', 
Mr.  Pisani said,  'that Britain's entry into the Common Market is desirable 
but not at any cost.  I believe Britain should be in the Common Market, but 
not before it has become deeply and completely European. ' 
(1)  Le Monde,  7 November 1967 
- 114-He then referred to what he described as Britain's 'contradicto~y 
attitude': after having propounded the idea of the Common Market through 
Winston Churchill, Britain refused to take part in the preparatory talks and 
was then the prime mover of the European Free Trade Association.  This was 
the Trojan Horse that was designed to damage the Europe of the Six and that 
eventually,  in view· of the Common Market's succes, applied for membership 
and does so again after an initial refusal in the belief that 'France will even-
tually give in. ' 
However,  Mr.  Pisani pointed out, France is not the only member 
State to be opposed to Britain's application.  'Do not delude yourselves into 
thinking',  he added,  'that if de  Gaulle were not here everything could be 
settled.  He has the courage to face problems which others, for various rea-
sons, do not dare to face,  but none of his arguments are disputable. 
Is it not a fact that Britain, owing to its special relationship with 
the United States, exposes the Europe of the Six to a form of allegiance to-
wards the American continent from which Europe wants to keep aloof? 
I do not take umbrage at American power,' Mr.  Pisani concluded. 
'But I am not American and my ambition is to build,  in my own fashion,  a 
European continent that could exist by its  own means. Is Britain capable of 
having the same outlook?' 
(Le Monde,  18  October 1967) 
Adressing  on 20 October 1967 the 'Young Economic Chamber' of 
Strasbourg during a 'dinner-debate',  Mr.  Val~ry Giscard d'Estaing,former 
Minister of Finance, stated his firm objection (1)  to what he described as 'Lon-
don's attempt to sub-let a flat in Europe'.'Britain's attitude', he said,  'which 
until quite recently was not clear seems to have changed. If  this is so and if a 
deep resolve has emerged,  then  the economic, financial and even monetary 
problems raised by its entry into the Europe of the Six,  could and should be 
the subject of a thorough-going negotiation and the problems will gradually be 
solved.' 
(1)  Le Monde,  21  October 1967 
- 115 -Addressing on 2 December 1967  the 'Perspectives  etRealit~s'clubs, 
at a  meeting in Lyons,  Mr.  Giscard d'Estaing defined (1) the conditions of a 
'rendez-vous' between the British and the Six.  'We cannot merely be content 
with simplistic solutions. We  cannot allow the idea of unification to be implan-
ted on the present European pattern. 
Europe is a sort of catalyst of problems, but there is a particularly 
important one,  namely that of Britain's entry into the Common Market.  The 
intellectual aspect of the question comprises five basic elements. 
First of all, in order to achieve the very objectives which the Com-
mon Market had set itself when it was created, I mean the economic objecti-
ves, and in order, furthermore, to achieve the international policy objectives 
of France, which aim at counterbalancing the tremendous power of the United 
States, Britain's membership is desirable. 
In the second place,  Britain's participation in the European Com-
munity can only be considered if deep changes are carried out in that country. 
This is borne out by the conclusions drawn by the Brussels Commission it-
self. 
Thirdly, one fully understands Britain's concern not to carry out 
these deep changes,  and all that they would imply for that country, unless it 
were certain to be accepted after that as a full member of the Community. 
Fourthly, this new problem which is in fact additional to the Com-
mon Market's existence must not result in a slowing down of the unification 
process within the Market from the moment Britain joined it. 
Finally, it is obvious that a Community of seven member States or 
more should have a modicum of political organization failing which there will 
be total paralysis. 
These being the basic data of the problem, one can see emerging 
progressively the elements of an answer -an attitude. 
(1)  Le Monde,  5 December 1967. 
- 116-One must not speak of membership or of a specific rendez-vous, but 
one must rather envisage a kind of "space rendez-vous" ,  where everyone must 
arrive in a state of predetermined readiness. 
The political authority of the Six, that is the Council of Ministers, 
must take over, as it were, the listofrequirements to be met. That list, which 
should have the value of a questionnaire,  should be finalized with Britain  and 
the fulfilment of the conditions put to that country should result in its automatic 
membership of the Common Market on a given date.  This would be for the 
British the preparations involved for a space rendez-vous. 
At the same time, the Community would lay down the problems to be 
settled and the new stages to be covered (i.e.  economic,  agricultural, fiscal, 
monetary and political problems).  This would be the Community's preparations 
for the rendez-vous. 
It is essential that the monetary stage should be covered . This is 
becoming increasingly necessary in a world-wide context.  We must gradually 
set up a European monetary union.  We  must also create a reserve bank and a 
merger of quotas.  At the same time, we  could envisage the accession to the 
Community of further members,  and I refer in particular to Spain. 
The conditions of the rendez-vous would then have to be fixed.  The 
transitional system, from a commercial and tariff  point of view, would become 
permanent if Britain did not join. 
The answer to the problem cannot be found in the provisions of the 
Rome Treaty. A new treaty is needed : a treaty of Paris whereby fulfilment of 
the conditions required for Britain's membership would automatically entail 
its entry into the Community.' 
Mr. Jacques Baumel, Deputy for the Hauts-de-Seine constituency, 
and former Secretary-General of the UNR Party delivered a speech at Rueil-
Malmaison on 22 October 1967 in which he stated in particular : 'Negotiations 
for Britain's accession, bearing in mind the difficulties to be overcome, espe-
cially in the agricultural and monetary field should be prepared by means of a 
preliminary agreement between the present six partners of the Community. 
With regard to farming  - an  item of considerable concern to the French  - it 
is not possible to pay for Britain's entry by ruling out Europeanfarmingagree-
ments and particularly the financial agreement which is one of the tenets  of 
agricultural policy. 
- 117-On this point,  and before anything else is done, our partners and in 
particular Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, must enter into a formal pre-
liminary undertaking, Britain,  since its industrial revolution and  Richard 
Cobden,  sticks to a low farming price policy and direct subsidies to its six per 
cent farming population. This traditional policy conflicts with continental  policy 
and in particular with France's policy which maintains farming prices above 
the level of world prices and which also subsidizes the higher living standard 
of farmers. 
If Britain enters the Common Market,  will it accept to comply with 
that new policy ?' 
(Le Monde,  24 October 1967) 
The latest issue of a monthly bulletin published by 'Objectif 1972' a 
political group sponsored by Mr.  Robert Buron, former M. R. P. Minister, is 
devoted to the question of Britain's bid for accession to the Common Market. 
The following is a significant extract.  'Strange paradox : the entry  of a Labour 
United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries,  more or less  jointly, into the 
Common Market,  runs the risk of rendering practically impossible the  con-
struction of an independent Europe in relation to the capitalist United States, 
whose international liberalism is mainly justified by the desire to conquer all 
available markets. 
No  doubt the European Community did not do much to spread the 
germs of socialism embodied  in the Rome Treaty  .....  The Communists are 
not altogether wrong when speaking of a Europe of monopolies.  Without any 
complex and without any scruples the  Common Market is asserting itself as a 
capitalist and a liberal system where authority flows from the public powers 
associated in discharging mere regulating and cyclical duties. 
The enlargement of Europe will certainly worsen that trend. . . . .  In 
that respect one may wonder whether the leaders of the French Left are fully 
aware of the consequences of Britain's membership ..... 
With or without Britain Europe will only achieve its full significance 
if socialist forces are mobilized.  In so far as Mr. Wilson's pressing  request 
has any chance of getting Europe's Left out of its lethargy, it must be accepted 
- 118-as a fortunate omen. If that Left is not in a position to influence the Brussels 
construction then in any event nothing will stop Europe from being turned into 
an American dominion. 
(Le Monde,  22,  23 October 1967) 
9.  Europe and the UNR  - UDT 
On 5 November  the UNR  - UDT  (Union for  the New  Republic -
Democratic Labour Union) assembled its members at twenty regional meetings 
which were addressed by well-known Gaullists (1). 
In Paris, Mr.  Chalandon,  deputy for Hauts-de-Seine,  spoke about 
the building of Europe : 'The Common Market today is still only a free trade 
area in which the States have lost some of their means of action without, so far, 
any •Corresponding gain in  the form  of a  political  structure, :and more espe-
cially of a common economic policy  •.... 
This is why I suggest that the Government  should not  hesitate to 
take,  in certain sectors,  safeguard measures which will remain in force pend-
ing the introduction of a minimum of common policy, particularly at fiscal 
level,  and impose on the sectors concerned the obligation to transform and 
modernize themselves.' 
Three weeks later, on 25 and 26 November, the party held its 
national sessions at Lille (2).  Mr.  Maurice Schumann, Minister for Scientific 
Research, referred to the proposals made by France on European co-operation 
to show that Gaullist foreign policy was not in conflict with the European ideal. 
Mr.  Couve de Murville,  Foreign Minister,  spoke of the problem of Britain's 
accession to the Common Market : 'What we have to find out is whether  •.... 
Great Britain is going merely to join Europe or to become an integral part of 
it. I 
(1)  Le Monde,  7 November 1967. 
(2)  Le Monde,  28 November 1967. 
- 119-10.  Conference of the Chairmen and Secretaries-General of the 
Christian Democrat Parties in the six EEC States 
The Chairmen and Leaders of the Christian Democrat Parties in the 
six EEC States and the Chairmen of the Christian Democrat Groups in the 
national Parliaments and in the three European Assemblies met on 5 Novem-
ber in Eichholz (Fed.  Rep. ) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rumor, President 
of the EUCD; Mr.  Bruno Heck, Vice-President, was also present. 
The meeting dealt with the most urgent problems of European  unifica-
tion and particularly the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Mar-
ket, the Atlantic Alliance,  East-West relations and the draft treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
All parties emphasized, that they were determined at all costs to 
further the enlargement of the EEC and the consolidation of the Atlantic 
Alliance in the service of peace and security. 
It was decided to continue the discussion at the next meeting of the 
Conference of Chairmen and Secretaries-General. 
(Communiqu~,  European Parliament,  Christian Democrat Gro4p, 
Doc/G/57  /67  I Afr.) 
11.  Mr.  Rumor reaffirms the commitment of the European Christian 
Democrat parties to support the unity of Europe 
The European unification commitment,  which stemmed from a com-
mon ideology and a large identity of views,  and the r5le of the political forces 
of Christian inspiration working in the world for three-cornered co-operation 
between Europe, the United States and Latin America were discussed by 
Mr.  Rumor,  Political Secretary of the Italian Christian Democrat Party and 
President of the European Christian Democrat Union,  in an interview with the 
Italian weekly 'L'Europa'. 
We quote hereunder certain parts of the interview which are of par-
ticular interest : 
- 120-'Q.  - All the Christian' Democrat parties are committed to the construc-
tion of a united Europe. Is the Union considering institutional projects 
which will make it possible to achieve this union ? Will it be possible 
to make use of the plan worked out at the time of negotiations on the 
European Defence Community ? 
A.  - I do not think that the reference to the EDF is wholly relevant.While 
there is an underlying thread of continuity, the problems of European 
integration, even when seen from the standpoint of institutional plans, 
have today to be seen against a new and different and,  at the same 
time, far more complex background.  The nexus naturally remains 
that of the Treaties of Rome which set up the Communities. 
These had proved their worth in the advent and in the development of 
the Common Market.  They also constitute,  I would repeat,  a  firm 
basis as regards Britain's application for accession  ~ as you know 
the Chri-stian Democrat Parties intend to support this application for 
they are convinced of the prospects that would be open to an outward-
looking and integrated Europe.  Naturally, the Christian Democrat 
Parties have jointly and severally  given their attention to all the Com-
munity aspects, with particular reference to those relating to  the 
institutions. 
The most immediate task rests with the Christian Democrat Group 
in the European Parliament. 
This is not only for obvious reasons of function and competence but 
also because of the importance we attach to the idea of a European 
Parliament elected by universal suffrage. This is not an easy aim to 
attain but one which we will have to pursue tenaciously if we really 
desire European unity, not only politically but also as a reality that 
takes roots in the hearts of the European public. 
Q.  - The European Christian Democrat Parties are linked with those of 
Latin America.  Is the Union studying any policy to foster a closer 
association between Europe and Latin America ? 
A.  - As you know,  the European Christian Democrat Parties are linked 
with all the other Christian Democrat movements throughout the 
world, particularly those in Latin America; this is done through the 
agency of a world committee.  At our world congress in Lima last 
year,  we discussed how these links could be made more flexible and 
more effective. 
In this context, the conviction grew as to the desirability, and! should 
say the necessity, of a close co-operation between Europe and Latin 
America  ..... 
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tion to the grave and complex problems of the LatinAmerican  con-
tinent without three-cornered co-operation,  as defined in Lima, be-
tween the United States, united Europe and Latin America.  This con-
viction is shared by all the Christian Democrat Parties and,  in par-
ticular, by the Italian Christian Democrat Party. 
It seems to me that particular importance should be attached to the 
fact that the idea of three-cornered co-operation is also gaining 
ground among the American leaders. This theme was,  in fact, are-
current one in the discussions which I had on my recent visit to the 
United States. 
The speech which Vice-President Humphrey made on that occasion 
was most explicit in this context and it brought out into the open a 
policy line which I hope will gather strength because it will serve the 
purposes of world stability and peace, in which regard the demo-
cratic development of the Latin American continent is undoubtedly 
one of the essential conditions.' 
(L'Europe,  10 November 1967,  No.  8) 
12.  Spanish federalists criticize EEC-Spain negotiations 
Following the resumption of negotiations between the EEC  and the . 
Spanish Government on a possible preferential trade agreement, the Spanish 
Federal Council of the European Movement issued the following  statement: 
'The draft of a preferential trade agreement resolves none of the 
major economic problems facing Spain but on the contrary may aggravate them. 
In the industrial sector, it could lead to a crisis in,  and the ultimate collapse 
of,  industries which have grown up in the shelter of old protectionist barriers, 
and speed up the economic colonization of Spain by large European and Ameri-
can industries. Spain's major agricultural exports are virtually excluded from 
the negotiations.  The economic and social consequences could therefore prove 
disastrous for the Spanish people. 
The six year period  fixed under the draft agreement before a decision 
is taken as to whether a real customs and economic union can be established 
between Spain and the Common Market countries conceals, under the guise of 
proper diplomatic negotiations, an unacceptable display of political hypocrisy. 
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economic problem but above all a political one because, according to the 
Treaty of Rome,  a country cannot join the Community unless it is governed 
by democratic institutions. 
For its part, the Spanish Government is not rushing into negotia-
tions because it does not wish to give the public the impression  that it is facing 
political obstacles stemming from its fascist nature. 
The Spanish Federal Council urges that the ingenious formula of an 
unacceptable agreement shoulq not be  allowed to conceal the indefinite shelving 
of the real problem, that of ensuring the accession to the Community of a fully 
democratic Spain. ' 
(Avanti,  17  November 1967) 
13.  Tenth National Congress of the Italian Christian Democrats in 
favour of European integration 
The Tenth National Congress of the Christian Democrats opened in 
Milan on 23 November with a comprehensive report by Mr. ·Rumor, the Polit-
ical Secretary. 
Among the many questions of national and foreign policy discussed, 
Mr. Rumor paid special attention to the problem of European integration. 
' ••••• The easing of tension has brought a calmer climate to Europe, but it 
appears to have weakened the drive to~ards integration which was, and re-
mains, a moral and historic choice, despite the fact that a number of major 
problems thrown up by the second world war are still a long way from being 
solved.  Among these is the German question.  Nobody believes that this can be 
solved unilateraly  •••••  It is a problem which,  in my opinion,  can only be 
solved through close European co-operation,  and it is in this respect that the 
French President carries an extremely grave responsibility. 
It took Britain's decision to join the Common Market  - a decision 
we continue to view with approval  - to bring into the open the crisis of will 
that is slowing down a process of integration which alone can enable Europe to 
make an ordered and effective appearance on the world scene. Letusnotdelude 
ourselves. No way out can at present be seen from the stalemate over the en-
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yet enlargement and integration are essential if Europe is to play its part in an 
age characterized by outsize dimensions. 
It is just as unrealistic to conceive of Europe without France :  not 
only would this put paid to the historic design of a truly integrated Europe, but 
it would not perhaps be of interest even to Great Britain.  At the same time it 
would plunge the whole painstakingly erected structure of the Community into a 
crisis, perhaps with fatal results.  Does this mean we should yield to the black-
mailing tactics of the French ? Of course not.  Nevertheless these  should not 
be made a pretext for a flight into irresponsibility.  French opposition must 
therefore be met point by point until that Government is forced to recognize the 
unflinching and clearly defined will of the other five member States.  Britain 
must be shown,  by a firm display of common determination, that the Five are 
not prepared to yield to the attempt to exclude it from the process of European 
integration. This is the real, the only practical road we should travel;anyother 
will spell crisis for the institutions and,  ultimately, the indefinite shelving of 
European integration. 
European development is also pursued in the vertical plane.  The 
measures necessary for the unification of the Community must therefore be 
carried out in their entirety : 
(a)  at joint level on the world market,  as  has fortunately occurred in the 
Kennedy Round; 
(b)  at multilateral level in relations with the developing countries, whether 
associated or not; 
(c)  in the harmonization of national legislations with Community law; 
(d)  in creating the necessary psychological and political conditions in the 
individual countries through the election by universal suffrage of the 
European Parliament.' 
European policy was enlarged upon by a large number of speakers 
during the debate following Mr.  Rumor's report. 
Among others, Foreign Minister Fanfani emphasized that Italianfor-
eign policy should aim particularly at two objectives : European integration and 
Western solidarity.  These objectives had been bracketed together with a view 
to making European unity a decisive factor for progress and to bringing home 
the presence of the peoples of Europe in the Western Alliance.  The efforts 
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curing for the common cause the immense moral and material assets accumu-
lated by that country over the centuries,  and at increasing the worth and oper-
ating force of the European group which,  in the  Atlantic Alliance, was partic-
ularly interested in bringing about a constructive dialogue with the countries of 
the Eastern bloc. 
'Italian efforts to promote European integration and unity and West-
ern solidarity,' added Mr.  Fanfani,  'were not intended,  even in the original 
form conceived by De Gasperi, to hamper the dialogue between East and West. 
The conditions of security since established have,  indeed,  smoothed the way 
for such a dialogue,  so much so that today we can note with satisfaction that, 
despite all the interruptions that cause so much concern, this dialogue con-
tinues to serve as a natural means of easing tension and fostering disarma-
ment.' 
Mr.  Colombo,  Finance Minister, pointed out that' .•...  the Euro-
pean problem today lies in Europe's acquiring wider responsibility as regards 
not only its economic and non-military development but also anything that 
makes for a well-planned and peaceful order in the world of tomorrow. 
This is the vast and exciting prospect held out by the seventies 
which we  should preserve and keep before our eyes in our country and in 
Europe.  But for some years Europe has been proceeding rather than prog-
ressing.  Two factors are acting as a brake.  The first is the contradictory at-
titude of General de Gaulle who on the one hand opposes the enlargement ofthe 
Communities through British entry on the ground that it would dilute the sub-
stance of Europe,  and on the other will not allow the construction of Europe, 
even without Britain, to go forward so as to embrace political aspects ..... 
This is the real flaw in the Gaullist conception of Europe : a European set-up 
in which France would have a dominant influence. 
The second factor impeding European progress is that the spectacu-
lar success of European reconstruction and the apparent lessening of external 
dangers make it harder, in the other countries too,  to accept somethingwhich, 
in the immediate post-war period, could have been suggested and more readily 
agreed to and carried out, through political synthesis, by the leaders of those 
days. 
. .•••  The real strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance will come about 
through the building of Europe, but the road in that direction will be a difficult 
one because the countries belonging to the Europe of the Six are divided over 
the question of enlarging it; our state of mind today sways between fear of a 
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difficult work of construction now under way,  and fear of drawn-out and eva-
sive negotiations which would strain relations between the Six. 
In this event we  shall require all our prudence and strength of mind, 
and above all the unity of vision of the five countries which are at one in want-
ing Britain in the Common Market. We  cannot ask Britain to enter Europe with 
her head covered in ashes; we must consent to negotiate  - strictly but sin-
cerely  - on the basis of Britain's accepting everything that has so far been 
established in the Community. ' 
Mr.  Moro,  President of the Council of Ministers, wound up by say-
ing that ' .....  within the framework of western political and military solidarity 
there has steadily emerged  - for some time without any contradiction  - a 
policy aimed at European unity; economic and then political, co-operative and 
then supranational, first restricted and then more and more broadly based, 
finally to include Great Britain and other countries that accept the aims  and 
principles of the Rome Treaty. 
We know that a united Europe  - that is, in the limited form it could 
assume in the future  - would extend over an area barely,sufficient to sustain 
European policy and give it weight and influence in the world,  to establish a 
significant measure of equilibrium and friendly collaboration in its relations 
with the United States or to resolve the problems of technology and of the di-
mensions needed for an efficient market.  For all these reasons the presence 
of Great Britain is essential, no matter how serious the problems its acces-
sion might entail. ....  We  must therefore firmly get down to tackling these 
tasks.  Should we,  unfortunately, fail within a reasonable period of time to 
strengthen European solidarity and to create the conditions necessary for inte-
gration, we shall have lost an irreplaceable mainspring of action and goal for 
the new generations,  an indispensable supportforworldpeace andequilibrium.' 
The importance which Italian Christian Democrats attach to  Euro-
pean integratien was finally jointly emphasized in three motions reflecting the 
various views held within the party which were adopted by Congress on 26 No-
vember. 
The majority motion,  after recognizing the important results 
achieved in  the field of European economic unification ' ..... reaffirms its com-
mitment to work for political unification,  a task made all the more necessary 
by the  present obstacles and  difficulties.  It again  underlines the  need for 
Britain's entry to the European Economic Community,  not only for economic 
but also,  and above all, for political reasons. 
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internal structures to the new European dimensions, will constitute a major 
contribution to peace,  a precondition for closing the technological gap  - of 
even greater importance for independence than for economic growth - and an 
instrument for a policy to stimulate a surge forward among the peoples of the 
developing countries in line with the precept that the development of these 
countries is not only dictated by Christian justice but also essential for real 
peace.' 
(II Popolo,  24,  25,  26,  27  November 1967) 
14.  Statement on European policy by Dr. Erhard, former Federal 
Chancellor 
On 24 November 1967 Dr. Erhard, former Federal Chancellor,dis-
cussed the political and economic rOle of the European Economic Community  in 
critical terms : the  EEC was a first step towards European unity but not its 
final expression, he said. 
Speaking at the American and Common Market Club to approximate-
ly 200 representatives of the European Commission, Belgian business and 
American industry in Belgium, he said : 'We can reasonably suggest that it is 
open to question whether the EEC  alone is the solution to getting us out of the 
straits of protectionismand nationalism. 'Mr. Jean Rey,  President of the Euro-
pean Commission, was also present.  Europe was at the halfway point but had 
not yet had the heart to bring into being a community going beyond the compass 
of the EEC.  He trusted that the United Kingdom would be able, in preparation 
for this, to cope with the after-effects of the devaluation of the pound. 
Dr.  Erhard said that large economic areas could only be justified in 
so far 'as they do not become closed in on themselves'.  He went on : 'Europe 
in its present form has had a great deal of success but it must not stop within 
its present borders. It was for Europeans to work out a modus vivendi so that 
they would not be stifled in an atmosphere of technocracy and so that the indi-
vidual would not be left without any personal responsibility for his work.  To 
begin with he described the Marshall Plan as 'the practical beginning of a com-
mon European policy'.  In this connexion he came out strongly in favour of 
maintaining close links between Europe and the USA. 
(VWD,  Europa,  24  November 1967) 
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bridge with Scandinavia 
On 18 December 1967, Dr. Walter Hallstein, former President  of 
the EEC Commission, proposed  there should be  links between the  European 
Economic  Community and a closed Scandinavian market. 
In an interview on German television, he said that such a link was a 
third alternative worth considering, i.e.  as opposed to full membership of the 
EEC or association  with the Common Market. He  saw this as a kind of 'bridge-
building solution'. He considered that the present state of a closed Scandinavian 
market, as foreshadowed by EFTA,  would be  acceptable in this  form to  the 
EEC. He thought it regrettable  that the Scandinavian request to join the  EEC 
should stand in the shadow of the British application. 
In his view the United Kingdom should accept a halfway solution with 
regard  to its  being linked with the EEC 'until there is a  change  in  French 
thinking'. He said  he did not think that the French position had been  'defined for 
all time'.  But while a French veto was  still to be reckoned with,  the Federal 
Republic should propose alternative solutions. The United Kingdom, for its part, 
should give  up its rigid attitude  and seriously consider  an association  or an 
interim period.  In any event, he advocated that talks  with Britain shouldbegin. 
'It would just  be improper, in the present situation, for no talks to be initiated', 
he said. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  20 December 1967) 
16.  Interview with Baron Snoy d'Oppuers onproblemsraisedbyBritain's 
application for membership (23 December) 
Baron Snoy d'Oppuers, signatory to the Rome Treaties on Belgium's 
behalf,  replied to questions put by a Belgian daily on the disagreement within 
the Council in connexion with action to be taken regarding the applications for 
membership received  from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark  and Norway : 
'There is no doubt that France's unilateral refusal to open negotia-
tions with a view to finding the means whereby four European States could be-
come Members of the Communities is a disastrous event for the history of 
Europe.  It is obvious that we are faced with a serious crisis because,  once 
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State prevailed over that of all its partners.  This crisis follows an erosion of 
the authority of the institutions. It sanctions, to some extent,  certain deplor-
able developments and it must be frankly admitted that the Common Market is 
now no more than a mere customs union.  This was, undoubtedly,  the funda-
mental wish of General de Gaulle, it is also the end of a great hope. ' 
Referring to sterling, Baron Snoy d'Oppuers stated : 'The rlHe of a 
reserve currency can no longer be conceived of in a country of European di-
mensions.  The solution, here again,  would have been to admit the British into 
the Common Market and to purs_ue with them a common monetary policy capa-
ble of turning European currency into a great reserve currency for the world. 
This prospect has nowbeen rejected, but all our countries will, nevertheless, 
in their own interests, have to continue supporting the British economy and the 
pound.  They will now have to do  so under less favourable conditions than ifthe 
United Kingdom were part of the Common Market and subject to its discipline.' 
Baron Snoy d'Oppuers went on to refer to European integration and 
ways of achieving it : 
'Following this week's crisis, neither the EEC  Treaty nor theECSC 
Treaty, nor even the Euratom Treaty are any longer adequate instruments for 
achieving the United States of Europe  - the aim of our European policy for the 
past twenty years. We  are reduced to merely retaining the customs union, 
successful though it may be,  and trying to make it work in .the best possible 
way.  The national rivalries that bedevil Europe and the veto system that is 
being applied render sterile any efforts made to achieve a political construction. 
Under these circumstances, there is no point in trying to derive 
from the Rome Treaties what the participating countries no longer allow them 
to yield. The federal future of Europe,  more necessary now than ever  pefore, 
must be sought elsewhere.  How could this be done  ? It is too soon to suggest a 
way but it is clear that,progress in building up Europe must be sought through 
a different approach. 
This must be started without delay.  Indeed, time is working against 
Europe.  Suffice it to read "The American Challenge 
11  to realize the disparity 
in growth and,  hence,  in power between Europe and America.  It is probably 
too late already to make up this leeway.  Moreover, nationalism is regaining 
everywhere its hold on the peoples of Europe.  Europe must be "relaunched 
11 
once again,  but this is no longer possible within the framework of the Six.' 
(Le Soir,  23  December 1967) 
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1.  The French iron and steel industry concerned about the effects of 
Britain's joining the EEC 
At a press luncheon on 2 October,  Mr.  Ferry, President of the 
Syndical Chamber of the French Iron and Steel Industry,  outlined the industry's 
development.  He came out against' the anarchy in trade within the ECSC' and 
deplored the discrepancy that had emerged between the increase in steel pro-
duction and the increase: in intra-Community trade  ..... 
Such a distortion cannot be regarded as the result of dyna-
mic efficiency.  The end result,  if one takes into account the steep falls in 
prices and profits everywhere,  has been advantageous to no-one ..... 
As frontiers open up and as trade expands - which is desirable -
there is bound to be some change in the flow pattern of trade. If  this change is 
too sudden,  if it comes against the tide as it were during periods of recession 
or jeopardizes legitimate national preferences or obvious social interests, it 
inevitably calls for safeguard measures.  Beyond certain limits competition 
kills competition ..... 
Questioned on this subject,  Mr.  Ferry explained his views on the 
possible accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market.  ' The iron 
and steel industry ·on the continent', he said,  1 would be particularly vulne-
rable at this moment to the introduction of a new competitor,  especially ifthe 
latter whose market rate is lower, tried to penetrate to the detriment of the 
continental steel industries.  This argument is not a decisive one in the long 
term but it is parti9ularly pertinent at the moment.  Then again, the British 
iron and steel industry is highly concentrated and has been acting since its 
recent nationalization,  in a monolithic manner.  This would be liable further 
to aggravate our difficulties: under present circumstances the entry of the 
United Kingdom into the Common Market would involve very serious risks for 
the European iron and steel industries. ' 
(Le Monde,  24  October 1967) 
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The preparation of decisions on agricultural prices to be taken by 
the Council of Ministers gave rise to several statements of attitude during the 
month of October: · 
At its meeting on 10 October 1967, the Committee on Prices, which 
comes under the Belgian Ministry for Economic Affairs,  felt bound to return 
an opinion on the Common Market agricultural negotiations as a matter of ur-
gency,  so as to draw the Government's attention to the importance of the pro-
blems under discussion and to.their repercussions on the cost of living.  This 
opinion,  however, was not shared by the agricultural delegates on this Com-
mittee. 
The Committee noted that 'the increase in the prices of agricultu-
ral products has been accompanied with the setting-up of protectionist machi-
nery designed to maintain a specific price level for agricultural products. 
The effect of this machinery is to place a heavy tax on certain imported agri-
cultural products and it has m·eant exporting at a loss other agricultural pro-
ducts in which there is a surplus within the Common Market; lastly its effect 
has been the organization of a systematic destruction of various quantities of 
foodstuffs. ' 
The Committee on Prices added that ' while the Common Market de-
cisions have led to an increase in prices of agricultural products and triggered 
off an increase in the cost of living, they have still not solved the problems 
facing the farmers.  The demonstrations staged in the farming world, both in 
Belgium,  France and other member States,  show that the common agricultur-
al policy is far from satisfying the farming population. Nor does it give much 
more satisfaction to those who consume agricultural products, for they have 
to pay taxes in the form of Community levies to finance a policy of exporting 
or destroying goods and foodstuffs,  the purpose of which is to maintain the 
prices of agricultural products at a high level. ' 
(Le Soir,  14 October 1967) 
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Mr.  Emile Scoumanne,  Secretary-General of the Union of pro-
fessional farmers in Belgium (UPA)  explained the reasons behind the violent 
reactions of farmers in Belgium and in Europe. 
1 The various Belgian demonstrations have been geared to two ob-
jectives: 
1)  Continuing the trade union action which we initiated in Belgium on 
31  May; 
2)  A concern to demonstrate our solidarity with farmers in France, 
in particular,  and those in the Community in general: our problems 
are the same and our aims are identical.  1 
1 It may be noted that the action taken on 2 October was synchro-
nized and co-ordinated in Belgium and France by a decision taken in Paris 
at an interview between Mr.  Marcel Bruel, Secretary of_ the FNSEA (Union 
of Farmers in France) and myself on 27 September. 1 
Mr.  Scoumanne considered that raising agricultural prices was the 
best way of redressing the situation characterized by deficiencies, with which 
the farming population has to contend.  1 In drawing up a list of remedies 
likely to boost farm incomes,  one might consider modifying the structures 
of production,  processing and sales by means of co-operatives and groups of 
producers; one might consider the retreatment of land,  improving buildings 
and techniques or of regional infrastructure adjustments. We can and we 
must defend the idea of credit facilities for investments.  But we are com-
pelled to conclude that if all this proves essential, the effects we may expect 
from these measures will stretch over a more or less long term. 
And during this time the situation in agriculture is steadily getting 
worse, whereas it is getting better in other branches of the economy,  which 
only accentuates the disparity between them and ourselves, instead of reme-
dying it. Without underestimating what are known as parallel policies, the 
latter can be no substitute for a sound and honest farm price policy which is, 
in the last analysis, the mainspring of farm incomes.  1 
- 133-The Secretary-General of the UPA considered that the main claims 
of the Belgian Farmers were the same as those of farmers in the other 
member States.  It was their firm wish 'that the prices that the EEC set for 
their products by reference to 1964 and 1965 should be logically readjusted 
to allow for the development of production costs, monetary depressions and 
a legitimate participation of the farming world in the general improvement in 
living standards.  It had to be noted that no trade union organization would ac-
cept for 1968 the same wages as for 1964; not only,  therefore, must our agri-
cultural prices be readjusted by the EEC Council in the weeks ahead, but the 
principle of bringing prices up to date regularly must also be adopted.' 
(Le Soir,  5 October 1967) 
The Supreme Agricultural Council met on 25 October 1967 and, inter 
a.lia,  looked into the effect on Belgian agriculture of the policy pursued by the 
responsible authorities of the EEC.  The Council decided to draw the Govern-
ment's attention to the fact that the Council did not underestimate the possible 
medium and long-term effects of the policy for improving agricultural 
structures. It considered, however, that although the social,  commercial and 
structural policies were necessary, they could not take the place of a sound 
markets and prices policy.  Consequently it expressed the urgent wish to see 
the Minister for Agriculture employ all the means at his disposal to support 
an adjustment of agricultural prices on the EEC Council and to bear in mind 
the steady rise in production costs,  monetary depreciation and the general 
improvement in living standards in the other branches of the economy. 
With reference to 1 structure  1  policy1  the Council noted that under 
the EEC's general policy,  several of Belgium's partners had made provision 
in their 1968 budgets for such substantial appropriations for structural issues 
that Belgium would be unable, with its very low-level estimates for 1968, to 
meet the competition within the EEC. 
(Le Soir,  26  October 1967) 
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increase in the agricultural budget for 1968  ' derives solely from Belgium's 
commitments in the EEC, the main beneficiaries of which are the less-de-
veloped agricultural regions of Europe.  Then again,  since the whole Belgian 
economy benefits from the Common Market, the increase in the agricultural 
budget should be regarded much more as a counterpart to this economic bene-
fit.  It is therefore unfair to say that this simple fact means that a great effort 
has been made on behalf of Belgian agriculture. ' 
The Committee also noted that 'the credits written down in previous 
years for the improvement of farm structures, stock and occupational skills 
have been cut appreciably at a time when,  more than ever, great efforts are 
being made to improve structures and occupational skills.  Belgium's partners 
in the EEC are, moreover,  sparing no effort to secure an improvement in 
production structures and techniques.  1 
' As regards the extraordinary budget of the Minister of Agriculture, 
this is even worse.  Everybody lmows that production conditions in Belgium 
can still be appreciably improved byimprovingthe infrastructure. In agri-
culture it has already been noted in previous years that we have not been able 
to obtain the credits written down because of the restrictions imposed on the 
programme for infrastructure improvements.  The credits written down for 
1968 have also been considerably reduced in comparison with previous years. 
A programme has been drawn up for the sum of 594m francs but it will proba-
bly not be implemented; this comes at a time when,  in the Netherlands -which 
already had a considerable advance in this field - 2, OOOm francs are being 
appropriated for work on the re-grouping of lands. ' 
The Committee cannot agree with this budgetary trend and asks the 
Government to review its policy in order to guarantee that the farmer and the 
horticulturist in Belgium will, within the EEC, have the same opportunities 
as farmers in the other countries. 
(Le Soir, 22, 23 October 1967) 
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(October-December) 
Speaking on Belgian television,  Mr.  Pulinckx, Director-General of 
the Federation of Belgian Industries stated that 1 July 1968 would not be the 
moment of truth for the Common Market.  Elimination of the final obstacles 
in no way meant that the Community had come to the end of its trials. 
' We need Europe and we need European unification to live and this 
unification will depend much more than in the past on the European· and Com-
munity behaviour of the Governments.  The work done so far has been re-
markable but it has undoubtedly been made easier because the Treaty of Rome 
laid down formal provisions and even a timetable, particularly as regards 
customs, in regard to which,  moreover, we are ahead of schedule. 
Now we can not take it for granted that there will be this automatic 
forward movement in the future.  We no longer have our backs to the wall to 
compel us to approximate laws or abolish the technical obstacles to trade, to 
frame a common policy for transport and a common energy policy,  to harmo-
nize direct taxation,  co-ordinate regional policies and to devise a European 
policy for scientific and technical research.  This is true for many other 
spheres as well.  This should,  however, be enough to give us an idea of the 
scale of the tasks still to be accomplished if  we are to achieve an authentic 
Europe, to convince us that the Governments will have more than ever to 
demonstrate a genuine Community spirit to bring them to a succesful con-
clusion. '  (1) 
Following the failure of the initial negotiations on Britain's entry 
into the European Community, the Federation of Belgian Industries wished to 
make clear that it had always been in favour of enlarging the Common Market. 
It expressed its views as follows: 
1 The Federation has, from the outset, been a firm supporter of 
European economic integration and,  in particular, of the Treaty of Rome,  its 
various institutions and what it has achieved; it is aware of the economic 
usefulness of enlarging the EEC,  provided that new members r~spect the 
(1)  La Derni~re Heure, 11 October 1967 
- 136 -basic conditions of this Treaty and tne essential provisions subsequently taken 
by the Community institutions. It deeply regrets that at the recent meeting 
held to examine the applications for accession to the EEC made by the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Norway,  no agreement could be reached on 
the Council of Ministers, - at least in so far as things now  stand - not even 
on the procedure for dealing witli these applications. 
• • . . .  The Federation would also like earnestly to draw the special 
attention of both the Belgian Government and Community authorities to the 
need to pursue the work of European integration that has been carried on with 
success for the last ten years by the European Community.  Any let-up in Com-
munity activities would be inconsistent with the economic and social interests 
of our country and its industry.  The Common Market is still a long way,  in a 
whole series of areas of particular interest to industry, from nearing com-
pletion in the work undertaken.  Full success has only really been achieved in 
the field of tariffs.  The Federation would particularly like to stress the 
urgency and the importance of the tasks awaiting the Common Market in the 
months ahead,  on the one hand as regards the customs and trade counterparts 
needed for the tariff union which will come into being on 1 July and on the 
other,  and above all as regards the various common policies.  These should 
enable the industry of our country and of the other member States to achieve 
adequate competitive dimensions to face up to the large industrial concerns 
of the major partners in international trade. ' 
(~lletin of the Federation of Belgian Industries No.  1, 1968) 
4.  German reactions to a statement by Mr.  Mansholt,  Vice-President 
of the EEC Commission on structural policy 
The need for a development plan for agriculture was stressed by 
Mr.  Mansholt when he spoke to journalists in Brussels on 23  October 1967. 
The present markets and prices policy was no longer enough to meet the exi-
gencies that would arise in future.  What was needed now was an agricultural 
policy that was structurally and socially adequate. 
Mr.  Mansholt wished to prevent such a new agricultural policy from 
remaining a matter of theory.  Following his recent statements on structural 
policy to the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg  and to the EEC Economic 
and Social Committee, which had aroused great attention, he was now calling 
upon the member States and the agricultural organizations to co-operate in a 
programme which would place the common agricultural policy on a new basis. 
- 137  -In a letter of 23 October 1967,  addressed to Mr. HermannHtscherl, 
German Minister for Food,  Mr.  Edmund Rehwinkel,  President of the German 
Farmers' Union,  drew attention to the appreciable resentment that had grown 
up among German farmers, which would not be kept within bounds if  the Federal 
Government was not ready to turn the existing agricultural policy opportunities 
to advantage. 
At the same time, he pointed out that adequate prices were the 
essence of a long-term agricultural policy.  In his capacity as President of  the 
EEC Farmers' Union,  he suggested to the Federal Minister of Food that he 
should strongly oppose Mr.  Mansholt's, intention to make structural policy 
the key instrument of agricultural policy. 
The family farm had_ to be the basis of a long-term policy for farm 
structures, declared Mr.  Oskar StUbinger, Minister for Agriculture for the 
I&nQ of Rhineland-Palatinate.  This was in response to the statement made at 
the end of the previous week by Mr.  Mansholt,  pointing out that an -improve-
ment in farm incomes  could  only be achieved by  revolutionary  structural 
measures and that a farm size of around 30 hectares could no longer be re-
garded as adequate. 
It would be superfluous to mention the strong reaction of the public 
at large to the statement made on 17 October 1967 by 1V£r.  Sicco Mansholt, 
Vice-President of the European Commission.  This point was made at question 
time in the Bundestag on 24  October by Mr.  Hermann Htscherl,  Federal 
Minister for Food, who said,  in reply to a question from Mr.  Rtshner con-_ 
cerning this statement, that it must rather be seen and understood as a whole. 
He opposed the view that it could be concluded from this statement that Europe 
was steering towards a'  collective farm' system.  There could be no question 
of this.  A viable family farm was not a static factor, but rather a dynamic 
one.  His view was that it was a question of farm potential and this could in-
volve a great many factors and it was not a question of area or other matters. 
In reply to the question as to how,  in view of Mr.  Mansholt' s 
statement, the fact that the British Government had also been called upon by 
the Germans to adjust its farm policy to that of the EEC would be judged, when 
it could be concluded from Mr.  Mansholt' s statement that this policy did not 
exist.  Mr.  Htscherl said: 'There is an EEC agricultural policy.'  Mr. Mansholt 
had made quite clear that the market regulations, which were a very interest-
ing feature of the EEC farm policy, had often been criticized  !by those countries 
which wished to supply the EEC market.  The request to England to bring its 
farm policy into line with that of the EEC only concerned the harmonization of 
the two systems.  German farm policy would only be affected in that it would be 
able to bring the large UK market into the Community. 
- 138-In an article entitled' The road to the EEC '• Mr.  HHcherl discussed 
the effects of the common farm policy on national policy.  This article ap-
peared in the bulletin of the Federal Government on 20 October.  Mr.  HHcherl 
recalled that in Stresa, along with the Community customs cuts,  a decision 
was taken on the common agricultural policy which broke with the line taken 
so far.  Mr.  HHcherl went on to say: 'Although there are three forms of Com-
munity guidance under the agricultural policy,  namely common directives or 
the co-ordination: of national market regulations and,  lastly, as the mainstay, 
the common European market regulations with common prices and a common 
trade policy, the most intensive form has been selected in this sector where 
people still cling to old-fashioned, provincial ways,  even though climate, 
structure and tradition and a provincial backwardness constitute almost insur-
mountable obstacles here. 
Sectors as changing and subject to variations as transport, economic 
affairs, taxation and social policy,  on the other hand,  have lagged behind and 
are still at the early stages of integration.  The agricultural policy has opened 
the door for the customs union in Europe on 1 July 1968,  i.e.  in  afewmonths' 
time, and this will make possible the tax-free movement of goods within the 
Community. 
(German Parliament 5th Electoral Period, 12th Session,. 24 October 1967;' 
Bulletin of the Press and Iilformation Service of the  Federal Government, 
No.  116,  20 October 1967) 
5.  The position of the Dutch Federation of Employers and Trade Union 
Congresses on the accession of the United Kingdom and other EFT  A 
countries to the EEC 
According to a public statement issued by the Board of the Feder-
ation of Employers and the Consultative  council of three Trade Union Congresses, 
these organizations consider that the enlargement" of the Common Market is 
essential for the economic expansion of Western Europe and that, hence,  ne-
gotiations to enable the United Kingdom to join the EEC should begin at an 
early date. 
The Board and the Consultative Council saw a direct relationship in 
the long term,  at any rate, between the enlargement of the EEC and the de-
velopment potential of Dutch industries. 
-139-They theref-ore urged the Dutch Government to spare no effort in 
ensuring that the United Kingdom and the other EFTA countries that had applied 
for membership became members of the EEC as soon as possible. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  1 November 1967) 
6.  Luxembourg Workers and Europe 
The National Congress of the General Confederation of Luxembourg 
workers met in Luxembourg on 18  and 19  November 1967.  Several resolutions 
on the international policy and the economic and social policy of  the Luxembourg 
Government were passed. 
With regard to uniting Europe, the Congress passed the following 
resolution: 
1 The Congress finds i'l regrettable that, in the merger of the 
Executives of the European Communities, the influence of the trade unions 
has been reduced and it is most critical of the anti-trade union attitude of 
various governments. 
It urges that when the treaty is drawn up for the forthcoming merger 
of the Communities, the trade unions should be called in to co-operate in an 
active way and asks,  on this occasion, that there should be an appropriate' di-
rect trade union representation in the new bodies to be set up. 
The Congress calls for a greater emphasis on social policy at the 
European level in order. to offset the untoward effects of economic rational-
ization and concentration on the workers and their families.  It pledges its 
full support for the efforts being made to this end by the European Trade Union 
Secretariat. 
The Congress is in favour of accession of other European democratic 
States to the Communities but considers that this should not lead to a weakening 
of the inner solidarity of the existing union. 
- 140-The Congress renews its appeal to its related organizations to pur-
sue their efforts with a view to setting up a European trade union organization 
that is conscious of its objectives and firm in its structure.  The adverse ef-
fects of economic concentration can only be effectively dealt with by a corre-
sponding concentration of trade union power. 
The Congress advocates co-operation with the European tradeunion 
organization in every direction. ' 
(Tageblatt,  21  November 1967) 
7.  Dutch Chambers of Commerce and the European Commission's 
proposals on tobacco 
A number of Chambers of Commerce in the Netherlands sent a 
letter to the Minister of Agriculture asking that the European Commission's 
proposals on tobacco should be turned down. 
The proposals,  in the form submitted, were completely unaccepta-
ble to the Netherlands,  particularly as regards the setting up and operation 
of the common market for raw tobacco.  The draft regulation on the harmo-
nizing of EEC excise duties on tobacco would also - unless radically amended-
do great harm to trade and industry in the Netherlands. 
Representatives of the Dutch tobacco trade and industry enjoyed 
close relations with third countries,  above all with Indonesia. The Netherlands 
imported' only limited quantities of tobacco from EEC countries. Judging by 
the EEC Commission's proposals protection of tobacco production in the Com-
munity could be regarded as one of their main objectives.  The Chambers of 
Commerce were worried and anxious about the extent of protection contem-
plated in the Commission's proposals. 
The proposed system for the protection of Community production 
of tobacco was therefore deemed unacceptable.  The premiums that would have 
to be paid to planters in the EEC would be very high,  and France and Italy 
would be almost the only countries to benefit.  A substantial proportion of the 
necessary funds,  on the other hand, would have to be raised by other EEC 
countrie.s,  the Netherlands' contribution being about 10 per cent,  a relatively 
high figure. 
- 141-The system proposed was all the more unacceptable because it 
would impart a fresh stimulus to tobacco production in the Community, where-
as this ought to be progressively reduced.  The Commission's proposals were 
liable to be a serious threat to exports of the tobacco-processing industry. 
The Chambers of Commerce, in their letter to the Dutch Minister of Agri-
culture, firmly rej~cted the proposed regulation on trade with non-member 
countries. 
(De  Tijd ,  11 December 1967) 
8.  Italian Confederation of Farm Managers on the need to bring the 
common agricultural prices  up to date 
Mr.  Bvnomi,  President of the Italian Confederation of Farm Manag-
ers, put forward his views on the problem of common agricultural prices. 
1 In the interests of agriculture it is essential to bring the prices of its products 
up to date,  at a suitable moment,  in relation to the costs and overheads actu-
ally incurred by farmers.  1 
Serious obstacles were, however,  being put to this justifiable de-
mand of the producers owing to the fear that updating their prices would raise 
the cost of living, wages,  and industrial overheads,  and lead to imbalances 
in exports. It was also feared that increased agricultural prices could cause 
farm output to rise and discourage imports,  creating payments difficulties 
for countries importing Italian farm products. 
Concurrently,  speeches and proposals had been made in Brussels 
reflecting these misgivings and contrasting sharply with the ·requirements of 
a general rise in farm incomes.  Because it was considered difficult to raise 
the level of common pr~ces, it was felt desirable to induce farmers to make 
structural changes calculated to step up productivity while absorbing increaselt 
overheads.  Insufficient attention,.  however, was paid to the fact that such 
changes would take a long time to. come into effect, whereas producers had, 
as a matter of urgency,  to square their accounts.  In addition,  the problem of 
raising the substantial funds needed for investment was underestimated. 
Mr.  Bonomi said that these arguments,  and the fears underlying 
them,  could be countered on several grounds: 
- 142-(i)  prices at consumer level were often not determined by the increase 
in producers' costs.  Bread was an everyday example: although grain 
prices fell the previous year, the price of bread was rising; 
(ii)  while pressure was put on producer's prices there was a marked 
tendency to forget,  in considering factors affecting the price to the 
consumer, that the effect exerted on it by the costs of middlemen 
and distributors was becoming more and more pronounced; 
(iii)  the increase in wage rates resulting from ,'he greater bargaining 
power of the trade unions was leading to substantial increases in 
prices of technical farming equipment and facilities, with a conse-
quent rise in agricultural costs. 
The result - said Mr.  Bonomi - was a tendency to make agriculture 
support the effects of increased wages and inflated costs and to offset the in-
evitable monetary deterioration by a policy of containment of producers' 
prices, on the false assumption that retail prices could in turn be checked 
and contained to an equivalent extent.  The final outcome was a worsening of 
the financial position of farms -particularly the least efficient- and a growing 
disparity between agricultural and other incomes, price being for farmers 
one of the main components of revenue. 
(II Giornale d'Italia,  13 J 14 December 1967) 
9.  German industry and the enlargement of the European Community 
German industry firmly maintains its view that the preservation 
and further development of the European Community and its enlargement to 
embrace the United Kingdom and the remaining European states wishing to 
enter constitute two ·equal-ranking and complementary objectives of European 
policy.  This was the main point to emerge from a meeting of the BDI (Feder-
ation of German Industries) Committee on European Integration held in 
Cologne under the chairmanship of Dr. W. A.  Menne,  Member of the Bundes-
tag, Vice-President of the BDI;  also present were Professor Hallstein, 
former President of the EEC Commission,  and Mr. John Davies, Director-
General of the Confederation of British Industry.  The Committee took the 
view that the existence of the Community should not be challenged but that at 
the same time no veto should be raised against the · opening  of negotiations 
with the United Kingdom.  Neither of these was in the German interest. 
- 143,;.. The BDI again emphasized its view that only a greater Europe going 
beyond the compass of the six member states would be able to hold its own, 
economically and technically,  against the USA and the USSR.  It did not share-
the objections against enlarging the Community as long as the latter\ 'main-
tained its character and capacity for taking action.' 
In view of the conflict over Britain's accession to the EEC, there 
could be a further serious crisis disrupting the European Economic Communi-
ty; this was the view expressed in Cologne on 13 December 1967 by Dr. 
Wilhelm Alexander Menne,  Chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee of 
the Bundestag.  He was speaking at the close-of-the-year press conference of 
the Cologne Fair Council; he expressed the hope that all those envolved and 
especially France would review their attitudes once again. I  German industry, 
he said, could not simply acquie:sce in a French' No'. It expected rather that 
France, too, would co-operate in working out :compromise solutionsthatwould 
be economically attractive and acceptable to the other five members and to 
the United Kingdom.  The Federal Government must see to it that fresh ne-
gotiations ensued.  The EEC, he said, had fulfilled economic expectations but 
politically had got nowhere near doing so. 
(Industriekurier,  12 December 1967) 
- 144-DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
l.  COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 
1.  Comments on the results of the Council of Ministers' meeting  of 
18/19 December 1967 on negotiations for entry to the EEC 
The President of the Commission of the European Communities 
Mr. Rey,  President of the Commission of the Communities, in ad-
dresses given to the Li~ge Association for Planning and Expansion, the Grand 
Catholic Conferences and the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry  in 
Brussels, outlined the political situation in Europe as it appeared at the mo-
ment of France's refusal to open negotiations on Britain's accession. 
Mr.  Rey did not believe that the situation in Europe was, on balance, 
negative.  Progress had been made in many economic sectors, particularly 
customs union,  agricultural markets, commercial relations with non-member 
countries, tax harmonization, medium-term policy and even transport. It was 
only on the political plane that things were going badly.  Complete disagree-
ment existed on political union and on the enlargement of the Community. In the 
absence of a common policy, Mr. Rey suggested that joint action be taken in 
the political field with a view to achieving political union stage by stage. It  was 
in this way that Europe should have tackled the Middle East problem. 
It was on the enlargement of the Community that the divergences 
were the most difficult to overcome. If the countries of Europe wanted to with-
stand U. S.  competition they would have to extend membership beyond the Six. 
There was no doubt that Britain had presented herself in 1967 under worse 
conditions.thanin 1961. But it was precisely because Britain's economic  and 
- 145-financial poiicies called for changes that the Six ought to aid her and guide her 
efforts in order to prevent her from taking measures that might be harmful to 
the Community.  Now,  such aid could only be considered in the course of nego-
tiations between the Six and Britain. To refuse to talk - said Mr. Rey- was to 
condemn Great Britain without listening to her case,  an attitude contrary to 
Community traditions. 
France's refusal was drawing Europe into a disquieting situation, for 
her five partners could well feel resentment towards her. It would be months 
before the full extent of the damage caused by French  policy could be measured. 
But Mr. Rey declined to take too tragic a view of the events of  De-
cember.  As he had said at a  m~eting  held in Brussels on 8 January by the 
French Chamber of Commerce and Industry, there was, as in 1963, every rea-
son to believe that the Community would start  going ahead again in a few months' 
time. 
The European Community's future was being shaped for the moment 
by the Six,  and it was with the Six that a resumption of progress had to be 
made. 
Mr. Rey was not in favour of separate moves by CommunityGovern-
ment~, whether two,  three or five. It was as Six that they should continue to 
act until they became more numerous. 
He criticized as ill-timed certain methods by which it was desired 
to further European unification. It was wrong, to try to spur on the Community 
from without the institutions responsible for it.  Moreover, he could not under-
stand why the Governments sent their representatives to the Council with per-
emptory mandates.  Both good sense and the sound operation of the institutions 
demanded a suspension of judgment until the arguments on all sides had been 
heard.  He  realized that it was harder for France than for the other countries 
to come round to its partners' ·point of view; and this fori 'intellectual reasons', 
France being convinced that her opinions were indispensable to the success of 
common action.  Nevertheless the opinions of others could also be valuable and 
effective.  It was not enough to believe one was right; account' had also to be 
taken of the opinion of others, and action in common, like life in common, 
called for concessions and compromises. 
(La Derni~re Heure,  23  December; La Libre Belgique,  23/25  December 1967; 
Le Soil",  9 January 1968; Le Soir,  17 December 1967) 
- 146-On a proposal from members of the Christian  Democratic, Liberal 
and Socialist Parties, the Chamber of Representatives passed the following 
motion as a matter of urgency on 23 November 1967 : 
'The Chamber is in favour of : 
(1)  the immediate opening and the rapid conclusion of negotiations on the 
part of the EEC with a view to the entry of the United Kingdom into the 
European Economic Community with the same rights and obligations as 
the six countries that are already members; 
(2)  the accession of other democratic countries of the European Free Trade 
Association under the same conditions or, failing this, of their associ-
ation in an appropriate form. 
The Chamber urges the Government to take all necessary steps to 
achieve these objectives as quickly as possible. 
(Signed)  V. Larock,  Th~o  Lef~vre,  Ren~  Lef~bvre,  H.  Fayat, 
L. Tindemans,  M. Piron.' 
At the close of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, which was 
held in Brussels on 19 December, the Belgian Government made an official 
statement: 
'The Belgian Government deeply regrets that it has been impossible 
for the Council of Ministers of the Communities to reach an agreement today. 
The Government finds it all the more regrettable as it  was not a question, at this 
stage, simply of pronouncing on the accession of the United Kingdom,  Ireland, 
Norway and Denmark. 
It was a question,  as the Commission said and as five States have 
noted, of taking the decision 'to open negotiations along the most appropriate 
lines with States having submitted applications for accession to look more 
thoroughly, as is necessary, into the problems brought out in the present do-
cument and to look into whether solutions can be found to meet the conditions 
which must secure the essential cohesion and dynanism of an enlarged Com-
munity.'  · 
- 147-Belgium has, from the outset, defended the cause of European unifi-
cation stubbornly, faithfully and imaginatively.  True to this ideal, it felt it 
essential to consider, with those European democracies that have applied for 
accession, how an enlarged Community, which would be even more united and 
stronger, could be constituted without giving up any of our structures·  or 
achievements in order to achieve in full and within a reasonable term the poli-
tical and economic objectives of the Treaty of Rome. 
Today this hope has been shattered under conditions which are 
seriously hampering the progress of European unification.  The Government 
finds it regrettable that the efforts of the Belgian delegation were unable to 
avert this conclusion. 
The Government is unable to believe as of now that it will be impos-
sible, while respecting the Treaties and the duties of reciprocal solidarity, to 
find a solution to the disagreement which arose today. 
The Belgian Government will, in consultation with its Community 
partners, use every endeavour to achieve this end.  The Belgian Government 
trusts that the applicant States will maintain their applications, thus demon-
strating their confidence in the ideal of European unification, which remains 
for Europe the best, if not the only possibility, of becoming a great power.' 
In an interview with a Parisian newspaper, Mr. Vanden Boeynants, 
Prime Minister, stated : 
'The Community method consists in  \exploiting all forms of  procedure 
which offer. a chance of settling a disagreement, so that the latter may only 
emerge if, in the final analysis, it proves to be insoluble.  This is why we fear 
that the development of the Community may be hampered for as long as the 
problem of its enlargement has not been settled by a decision which everyone 
can endorse without bitterness.' 
In reply to an urgent question which Messrs. ITindemans (Christian 
Democrat) and Larock (Socialist) asked in the Chamber of Representatives 
concerning the talks on Britain's accession to the EEC, Mr. Van Elslande, 
Minister for European Affairs and for Dutch Culture explaiiled the attitude of 
his Governmen~  following the Council Meeting held on 19 December : 
'The Belgian Government considers that loyalty  to the aims and 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome implies constant efforts to promote a true 
unification of Europe in the economic and political fields.  It, therefore,  con-
- 148-siders as being on the same Level the obligation to strengthen and develop the 
Community and the duty to join with the European democracies that  have applied 
for membership in looking into how  European unification within an enlarged· 
Community can be achieved in greater fullness. 
Despite the understandable bitterness engendered by the events of 
18 and 19 December, the Government is determined to pursue the consolida-
tion of the European Community.  It is also firmly resolved to seek, with its 
partners and with the applicant States, the most adequate way of promoting a 
rapprochement between their economic systems and that of the Community. 
This particular point was discussed by the Five after the failure of the Council 
session on 19 December . 
At the beginning of next year the Belgian Government will again get 
in touch with those of its Community partners that are in favour of initiating 
talks with the applicant States.  It attaches great importance to the success of 
this move because it is the only one likely to preclude a division between the 
democratic countries of Europe. ' 
(Chamber of Representatives, Summary Report,  23 November 1967 and 
21 December 1967;  Le Soir, 22  and 30 December 1967;  Le Figaro, 29 Decem-
ber 1967)  · 
On 20 December, the Minister of Information, Mr. Georges Gorse, 
commented (1) as follows on the statement made by Mr. Couve de Murville to 
the Council of Ministers regarding the Brussels meeting: 'The fact is now 
recognized :  as long as the present state of the British economy has not im-
proved, there will be no negotiations.  So what is going to happen ?  !This is  not 
something for us alone to decide.  It is possible that some difficulties may be  . 
met in the operation of the Common Market, but these difficulties\willprobably 
not be worse than those we would have encounter-ed if negotiations with Britain 
had been started for, then, the Common Market would have. been paralyzed in 
its operation pending the outcome of the negotiations.  No important measure 
would have been taken without reference to British reactions.-•.••  ' 
(1)  Combat, Le Monde,  The Times, 21 December 1967. 
- 149-The fact that 'the enlargement of the Community would deeply modi-
fy the nature and methods of running the Community is a reality that was re-
corded in the final communiqu~ at the request of the French delegation only.' 
Mr. Gorse added that General de Gaulle had paid a tribute to the 
manner in which Mr. Couve de Murville had conducted the negotiations : 'With 
precision, restraint and firmness'. 
On 21 December, Mr. Couve de Murville was interviewed on the 
TV  (1).  He noted that whilst the 'fall-out' produced by the lack of any decision 
on the part of the Six would continue to be directed against France, the contrary 
would have been surprising. 
France was accused of paralyzing Europe but the Minister for 
Foreign Mfairs uttered his belief that 'if there ever was a country with a Euro-
pean policy, a country that has done a great deal to introduce that European 
policy, it is indeed France.  For, after all, it is as a result of our endeavours 
and those of the present French Government that there is a Common Market. 
And when we  say that serious consideration must be given to the new applica-
tions and that we must not embark blindly on negotiations -one does not know, 
in fact,  about what -it is precisely because we intend to .safeguard what has 
been done and,  consequently, to preserve Europe's future such as we  conceive 
it'. 
Asked whether Britain should be left to carry out its change on its 
own or whether it should be helped through negotiations, Mr. CouvedeMurville 
replied : ' I get the impression that our partners imagine that the Six will take 
Britain in tutelage, that they will discuss with Britain what it should do to get 
back on its feet ••••.  We  say :  This is of course Britain's responsibility. 
Furthermore, Britain has never said that it needed our advice and assistance 
to carry out this essential task, and we add: "If, in the process, Britainneeds 
external assistance .then we shall naturally consider the thing'.' 
The Minister went on to say : 'Political Europe has been blocked for 
years precisely because our partners do not wish to envisage what they say 
they propose to achieve in admitting Britain into the Common Market, that is 
an independent Europe, a Europe that is not simply a dependency of the Atlantic 
world •...•  ' 
(1)  Le Mende,  Herald Tribune, 21 December 1967; 
La Nation, 22 December 1967~ The Times, 23 December 1967. 
- 150-'In fact', the Minister pointed out, 'France's partners wish to nego-
tiate with Britain, 
(a)  in order  not to discuss with France extremely difficult problems 
of substance  and 
(b)  because it makes the right impression to say that one is negoti-
ating. 
We say that one must be serious in this matter : problems must be 
considered as they are; Britain is not in a position at the moment to join the 
Common Market.  It will certainly restore her position and,  when that day 
comes, we shall seriously discuss matters.' 
Political opposition groups immediately stated their views on the 
outcome of the meeting.  The Steering Committee of the Democratic Centre 
Party, which met (1) on 20 December 1967,  condemned 'recent initiatives of 
the Government's foreign policy' and its attitude in Brussels.  The Committee 
affirmed that in 'refusing to open negotiations, in resorting to the veto and the 
crisis, France destroyed Europe's community spirit and revealed to the world 
the authoritarian aspect of its r~gime. 
Three consequences will,  according to that Committee, result from 
this situation :  'The impossibility to achieve any progress on political Europe; 
France's isolation in Europe following its isolation in the Atlantic Alliance and 
the strained relationship that is now prevailing between France and the other 
countries of the Common Market' . 
The Democratic Centre felt that France should have 'proposed to its 
five partners a consolidation of Community structures; this should have been 
presented, in agreement with them, to the United Kingdom  as the necessary 
condition' for its admission to the Common Market. 
'Thus', the Democratic Centre added,  'it would have been clearly 
established that France's demand for European cohesion was sincere and that 
Britain intended to become fully European .....  ' 
The Committee concluded that it  would be necessary, 'in the near 
future', to replace the present majority by a 'new European and democratic 
majority in  order that Europe should not be plunged into an insurmountable crisis. ' 
:1)  Combat, 21 December 1967;  Le Monde,  22 December 1967. 
- 151-On the same day, the Steering Committee of the French Socialist 
Party (S. F.  I.  0.) issued a  communiqu~ in which it 'urgently calls public 
opinion's attention to the seriousness of the refusal signified by the Gaullist 
Government to the opening of negotiations between Britain and the Common 
Market.' 
'In spite of warnings from various sectors of public opinion', the 
communiqu~ added 'the Government rejected the request for negotiations and 
did so in its usual manner, that is without a debate in Parliament.' 
The Steering Committee denounces and disowns the choice and atti-
tude of the Gaullist power. Consequently, it has instructed its representa-
tives at the National Assembly to propose to the Socialist Federation  (F~d~ration 
de la Gauche d~mocrate et socialiste) •to choose the most appropriate form by 
which Parliament may be informed and thus enable groupings representing 
public opinion to state their position on the refusal to open negotiations' ..... 
At the same time, the political bureau of the Federation invited all 
the member organizations of the Federation to initiate, at all levels, an infor-
mation campaign throughout the country on the consequences, for the French 
economy and for the future of Europe, of the decision taken by the Gaullist 
power. 
On 21 December, the Centre and Federation rep~esentatives re-
quested in vain a debate on Europe in the National Assembly.  Mr. Duhamel, 
chairman of the Progress and Modern Democracy Group recalled that he had 
asked the Government, on the previous day, whether it intended, before the 
end of the session, to explain and, possibly, to comment upon the results of 
the conference of the Six in Brussels, that meeting having been important 
enough for Parliament to be informed of the stand taken by France's repre-
sentative.' 
The Government's reply was giv.en by the Minister of State responsi-
ble for Relations with Parliament, Mr. Roger Frey, who  considered that 
'France's position has not changed since it was clearly and publicly defined in 
this Parliament, and the Government, therefore, does not deem itnecessary 
to discuss it again' .  However,  if there should be further developments he 
would malte it his duty to supply the National Assembly with all the information 
requested by Mr. Duhamel. 
Mr. Duhamel was surprised that it should be claimed that there had 
been no new developments 'at a time when France appears to be isolated from 
- 152-its five partners and when European unity seems in jeopardy to some. He then 
expressed his Group's 'reproval and the astonishment  for what is at stake in 
this matter, is Parliament's right not only to legislate but also to supervise 
and,  consequently, to be kept informed.'  Despite protests from Gaullist 
benches, he added that France alone could not pronounce on measures which 
Britain should be taking to join the Community but that it was important for 
Britain that the French Government should have a clear notion of the accept-
ance of the principle of Britain's accession. 
Basing his intervention on Article 29 of the  Constitution (convening 
an extraordinary session) Mr. Gaston Defferre,  Chairman of the Socialist 
Federation Group,  stated that his Group had considered tabling a motion of 
censure against the Government 'owing to its attitude at the Brussels Confer-
ence' but that it had given up the idea 'for the time being' ....• 
He then declared that the Federation Group was now ready to table 
a motion of censure but added that for the Brussels conference and Britain's 
accession to form the subject of a proper debate the Assembly must decide to 
devote to it the time required.  In addition,  the Government and the majority 
had to accept the extraordinary session requested for the beginning of January. 
It appeared, however, from various comments made on the meeting 
that no agreement could be reached between the 'Federates' and the Commu-
nists, on the one hand,  and the Federates and the Centre party members on 
the other, on a suitable motion of censure.  Communist deputies, in  particular, 
alleged the need for them to consult 'higher authorities' before agreeing to the 
text of a motion suggested by the Federates.  However,  as the meeting was 
held at the end of the session, a decision had to be taken on the spot. As for 
the Centre Party members, they certainly did'not vote for the project. 
Mr. Gaston Defferre finally read the following communiqu~ : 'The 
parliamentary group of the Socialist and Democratic Federation regrets that 
as a result of the end of· the session, the initiative could not be usefully im-
plemented. 
The Group which has never accepted the idea of a field of action 
exclusively reserved for the President of the Republic, protests, once again, 
at the fact that Parliament has not been consulted in such a grave circumstance 
for France's interests and for the future of Europe.' 
Agreement was finally reached between Federates and Communists 
on  10 January 1968.  In this connexion,  the Secretary-General of theCommu-
- 153-nist Party, Mr. Waldeck Rochet stated (1) at an 'information gathering': 'The 
question is whether Britain's entry into the Common Market is likely to induce 
it to free itself from American domination or whether, on the contrary, this 
would not enable the United States of America to increase its hold and pressure 
on Europe by making use for this purpose of its privileged ally, namely, the 
United Kingdom. 
It is because the latter hypothesis represents a real danger that the 
political bureau of the CommWlist Party considers that any negotiations on 
Britain's entry into the Common Market can only  be held if, prior to such 
negotiations, Britain has renoWlced its privileged alliance with the United 
States ..... 
This is the position which our Party will defend in the National 
Assembly when the latter meets in an extraordinary session, as requested by 
us.' 
Mr. Gaston Defferre, for his part, introduced an oral question with 
debate on 11 January,  asking: 'the reasons why the Government has been 
opposed to the opening of negotiations for Britain's accession to the Common 
Market, against the opinion of our five European partners ? ' 
In a different connexion,  Mr. Jean Monnet stated on 20 December 
that 'the French Government's refusal to discuss with the United Kingdom is a 
fundamentally anti-European decision. 
The construction of Europe is in fact based on applying to relations 
between the coWltries of Europe the principles of our civilization and,  in par-
ticular, the right to be heard before being judged.  This basic right was denied 
yesterday, by the French Government to the United Kingdom,  a democratic 
coWltry if ever there was one. 
Whilst it is true that Britain's economic situation requires an over-
haul, it is equally true that it is only by negotiating with Britain that we can 
define the difficulties that separate us and find the means to overcome these 
difficulties. It is not by replying ourselves to the questions that we shall re-
place the answers which we should seek from Mr. Wilson. 
(1)  Le Monde,  12 January 1968. 
- 154-Europe was on the way to becoming a universal power. The French 
Government's refusal is arresting its development. This arbitrary act is a 
retrograde step in the construction of Europe.  The blow dealt to the future of 
Europe and of each of the countries that make up Europe is a serious political 
error. 
However,  in the troubled and difficult situation in which we now find 
ourselves, Britain's decision to maintain its application for membership 
restores some of our confidence in the future. 
I find in Britain's attitude, once again,  an example of the resolve 
which the British display in difficult moments, as they have done in 1940 in 
defence of liberty. ' 
Germany 
On 20 December 1967 the Federal Government deplored the fact that 
the Community had not yet opened accession negotiations with the United King-
dom.  It indicated, however, that with the consent of all concerned, including 
France, the accession application should remain on the agenda.  As a result, 
the mipimum objective of the German Government had been achieved and it 
trusted that, after a certain interval, discussions on compromise solutions 
would be possible. 
The spokesman for the German Government explained, after a 
meeting of the Cabinet at which Mr. Brandt and Mr. Schiller reported on the 
Brussels Conference, that the outcome of that Conference could have a nega-
tive effect on the work of the Community.  At the same time, the Community 
was going forward without a crisis, even though there was dissent on an im-
portant point.  The European institutions would now be  left in some confusion 
but they would continue as before.  The Cabinet  wished to stress that Mr. Brandt 
and Mr. Schiller had played an important and active part in Brussels so that 
things were made clear and so that the accession application remained on the 
agenda.  This latter point would be emphasized by Mr. Schiller, as President 
of the Council, in his official letters to the British, Irish, Danish, Norwegian 
and Swedish Governments. 
In Brussels, therefore, a formal veto on the issue had been avoided, 
for this could have been misinterpreted as a rejection of the accession appli-
cations.  It was,  on the other hand, formally noted that no member State had 
- 155-any objections_ on principle to the accession, that all regarded it as necessary 
to consolidate relations with the United Kingdom and that five of the EEC mem-
ber States wished to act together in this consolidation, only France wishing to 
do so at a later date. 
The German Government welcomed the British Government's agree-
ment  .to leave its application on the agenda.  It was felt that after the setback  of 
the first round had lost its initial impact, it might be possible, in bilateral and 
other talks, to discuss the possibility of compromise solutionspendingBritain's 
accession as a full member.  Bonn particularly wished toaskPariswhatFrance 
understood by the 'arrangement' that President de Gaulle had referred to as 
possible.  The Federal Government would press for the continued development 
of the EEC for a paralysis of its progress would be prejudicial to all member 
States. 
Federal Minister Wehler (SPD) stated in his constituency that it 
could only be hoped that States wishing to accede would now,  in their legitimate 
disappointment, not give up their efforts to secure accession.  The tough line 
taken by the French Government confronted France's partners with the diffi-
cult task of preventing a paralysis of the Community and of ensuring that the 
possibility of its enlargement were not jeopardized.  As far as Germanpolicy 
was concerned, the further development of the Community and Franco-German 
friendship were equally important. 
Mr. Majonica,  the CDU  Member_,. said that the hope that the French 
Foreign Minister would have a little room to manoevre had unfortunately not 
come true.  Bonn would, however, continue to work for Britain's accession. 
Mr. Starke_,the FDP Membe~  spoke of a victory for  de Gaulle's Machiavelli  sm. 
The Federal Government was now paying the price of its indecision. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  21 December 1967) 
Great Britain 
Mr. George Brown, Foreign Minister,  spoke in the House of Com-
mons (1) on 20 December about the consequences _of the rejection of Britain's 
(1)  The Times, The Guardian, Combat,  21 December 1967; 
Le Monde,  22 December 1967 
- 156-application to join the Common Market.  He  said :  'In spite of strong insist-
ence by the representatives of five of the governments, and the clear recom-
mendation of the European Commission, the representative of one of them 
-France -refused to permit the opening of negotiations on our application.· 
Here let me pay a tribute to these five governments and to the Com-
mission for the very considerable efforts they have made individually and col-
lectively to bring this enterprise to a successful conclusion ..•.. 
We  continue to believe that the long-term interests of this country 
and of Europe require that we should become members of the European Com-
munities. 
. ..•.  We  confirm that our application stands. We do not intend to 
withdraw it. 
We now propose to enter into consultation with those five members 
of the European Community who  supported the Commission's view that nego-
tiations should be started at an early stage ..••. 
As regards the content of the consultations, to which I have referred, 
and which will begin at once we, for our part, want to see the links between us 
forged as strongly as possible.  But we cannot expose ourselves to any further 
vetoes on the part of President de Gaulle • 
. . . . . We think that the attitude taken by the French Government re-
presents a false view of the future of our continent of Europe. 
We think it contains a deplorable number of mistaken ideas about the 
realities of the various questions at issue.  We question its motivation.  But I 
think it important to stress that this is not an Anglo-French affair.  This is a 
European affair. 
We regret, of course, that Europe has been held  .back temporarily 
from achieving the unity which it now aspires to .....  ' 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, for the Opposition, said :  'This is not only 
a set-back for us.  It is a blow to European unity as such, and to work for 
European  unity must  be the long-term  objective ofthis country and of others. 
- 157-I am glad to hear the Foreign Secretary intends to keep in touch with 
the Five .••..  ' 
Mr. Alfred Morris, a Labour Member, said :  'There is a sense of 
outrage in the country at the manner in which we have been treated and it is 
time to return to the Leader of the Opposition the course we ought never to 
have taken from him.  1 
Mr. Brown replied :  'I do not believe that there is a sense of outrage 
in the country about this. • • . •  I believe the country wanted a straight answer 
- yes or no  - on this point and I believe the country wants the Government to 
organize its affairs from here on in the light of that decision and in the light of 
our determination ultimately to become members ..•.• 
1 
Mr. Jay,  another Labour Member, took the floor to say :  ' .••••  The 
worst possible policy now would be to fail to get into the EEC  and fail to pursue 
all the other alternatives available . 
1 
In reply to a Member from the Opposition Benches, who  asked the 
Foreign Office to enquire exactly what France understood by 'commercial 
arrangements 
1 
,  as opposed to trying to bring the Five together against France, 
Mr. George Brown said :·'I entirely reject your unfounded assertion to the 
effect that we are trying to get the Five to form a coalition against France. 
What we are at pains to achieve is the integration of a Europe which will in-
clude both France and the United Kingdom.' 
On  1 January 1968, Le Monde (1) and several other European news-
papers published a letter by six
1 Conservative M.P.  1 s stating :  'The refusal on 
the part of one member of the Six to allow negotiations to be opened on Britain's 
application to join the EEC is a blow at all those in the United Kingdom who 
believe that their country is part of Europe and that the Community as much as 
the United Kingdom would benefit from our accession and would suffer from our 
being excluded. 
Despite the French veto our convictions remain unchanged: 
1.  The reasons for which the Government and the  Opposition remain com-
mitted to pursuing their request  for membership  have not changed and 
cannot be changed by the attitude of the French  Government. It is  for 
(1)  Le Monde,  2 January 1968. 
- 158-economic, technological, but above all for political reasons that we 
desire to be part of the EEC, as full partners accepting the obliga-
tions of the Treaty  of  Rome without reservations. 
2.  We are convinced that the great majority of the British p~ople today 
regards their future as lying essentially in a United Europe • 
• • • • •  In short we have no intention of taking'Nd for an answer.  We 
remain true to our friends in Europe, both in France and in the other five 
countries.  We are sure that one day, with their help, the United Kingdom will 
join the Community and you will no doubt be in agreement with us that the 
sooner, the better. ' 
In an official statement released to the press at the end of a meeting 
of the Italian Council of Ministers, the Government expressed its regret at the 
results of the Brussels meeting.  The statement reads : · 'The Foreign Minister 
Mr. F anfani, reported on the work of the Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities and on the decisions taken on it regarding the applications for 
entry received from Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway.  The Italian 
CoU]J.cil of Ministers approved the action taken by the Foreign Minister, in accord-
ance with the voting in Parliament and the Government's decisions, with a view to 
firmly supporting acceptance of the negotiations on agreements for accession  to 
the Communities. It  deeply regretted the failure to reach a favourable decision 
which would have enabled the Communities to be substantially enlarged and would 
have  been a major step  forward towards European  unity. It agreed on  the attitude 
to be adopted under these circumstances, as illustrated  by Mr. F anfani.' 
Mr. Fanfani told Italian journalists :  'I think that the first thing to 
do is to reflect carefully on the consequences, which  will be neither  unimportant 
nor few in number and will go on multiplying in an unforeseeable way.  The 
second thing to do is to find a way of not discouraging those who, pressing 
their applications for entry in Brussels, have shown that they believe  in the 
objectives laid down in the Treaty of Rome.  The third thing to do is to co-or-
dinate the action of the Five who have come down in favour ·of opening negoti-
ations with Britain and the other countries.  Another thing that must be done is 
to ascertain whether, and up to what point, the chaotic moves for enlarging the 
1t  Community should be supported, even if  only in a secondary way, for the con-
venience now of this, now of that party, now that we have witnessed such inabi-
lity to grasp the profound political meaning of the radical turning-point that has 
just been presented for the unification of Europe.  We must not succumb to the 
- 159-light temptation to act without reflection or, for that matter, to believe that 
reflection alone will suffice - action is also necessary. ' 
Interviewed by 'Le Figaro', Mr. Fanfani reviewed the events that 
had led up to the decisions of 15 December, adding : 'Can we regard these 
prospects with more optimism because the Six consider the applications of 
Britain and of the other three countries as being still on the table ?  The Brit-
ish statement that immediately followed publication of the Brussels  communiqu~ 
- namely, that London has no intention of withdrawing its application - appears 
to leave room to hope that the question has not been finally thrashed out.  This 
does not mean, however, that it can be taken up again and solved overnight. 
Would to heaven this were the case !  We  could then make up,  before it was too 
late, the serious mistake committed in Brussels on 19 December by refusing 
negotiations which, had they been conducted with tact, patience and farsighted-
ness, would certainly have opened the way to a new future for Europe both in 
the economic and in the political field. 
In conclusion, 1968, which could have been for Europe a year of 
real promise, is starting out in circumstances that do not augur well for the 
future.  The clouds over Europe can only be cleared if the countries that have 
confirmed their candidature remain patient and  if the Five, which have wel-
comed these applications,  can act so as to encourage the ·applicants to perse-
vere and at the same time persuade the Community to refrain from creating 
new obstacles at the very moment when the new applications could become ripe 
for consideration.  Italy, for its part, which has always been in favour of 
accepting the demands of the four countries and,  therefore, of opening nego-
tiations, will continue its efforts to ensure that what has been denied to us in 
the past can be achieved in the near future.' 
Mr. Zagari, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, also commented 
on this qliestion.  'This last round has resulted in a line-up of the Five which 
has increased the strength and confidence of the advocates of British entry and 
the consolidation of Europe.  As pointed out by Mr. Fanfani, we must resist 
the temptation to act without thinking and,  equally, to assume we have given 
the matter sufficient thought.  We must therefore reflect on the matter without 
slowin,g down the action we take, firmly grasping the fact that the problem is a 
global one.  In other words, it would be quite wrong at this moment to search 
for compromises in the form of limited agreements, sector-by-sector arrange-
ments, or two- or three-way link-ups within the Community or between mem-
bers of the Community and Great Britain.' 
This problem was also referred to by the President of the Italian 
Republic, Mr. Saragat, in his end-of-the-year message to the nation.  After 
stating that the Community should be defended from the attacks made every 
- 160-now  and then 'in order to slow down the process of European integration', 
Mr. Saragat added :  'The last of these attacks was stoutly resisted in Brussels 
in the last few days.  1967 offered the European Community the historic oppor-
tunity of accepting the accession of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway aild 
thus stepping up the process of European unification.  The spirit  of the Euro-
pean Economic Co:q.tmunity lies, on the economic plane, in opening up markets 
and,  on the political plane, in supporting the European idea.  In Brussels we 
came up against the very opposite, that is, nationalism.  Our country's at-
tempts to ensure that negotiations with Britain were immediately opened re-
ceived the backing of four other Community countries but did not bring about a 
unanimous decision to go ahead.  A great opportunity was lost and this mistake 
will not easily be remedied.  Fortunately Britain has already expressed its 
intention to do its utmost to co-operate with countries that will go on sincerely 
working for European unity.  We realize that it is only with Britain's contribu-
tion that Europe can hope to serve as an effective intermediary between the 
two world giants -the United States and the Soviet Union.  Only thus, enriched 
by Britain's high level of scientific and technological achievement and,  above 
all, by its high standards of freedom, democracy and social conscience, can 
Europe make itself felt as a factor for progress and peace in the world - first 
and foremost for peace, of which the world and Italy stand in such great  need.' 
On 29 December Mr. George Brown, British Foreign Minister, came 
to Rome to meet representatives of the Italian Government.  As the visit was 
of a semi-private nature no press release was issued.  Nevertheless certain 
statements made by Mr. Brown before setting out for Italy can be reported. 
Britain could not -he said- expose itself to a further French veto.  Other ways 
would have to be  found of speeding up the movement towards E1;1ropean unification, 
without, however, undermining the bases of the Community. Mr. Brown added 
that  the idea  of his Rome visit  was not so  much to discuss what Italy and England 
'  could do together as to study  the consequences of the French  veto and the various 
means  by  which the drive for a larger, integrated Europe could be maintained. 
Statements were also made  by Mr. Scelba, Chairman of the Political 
Affairs Committee of  the European Parliament.  'The idea of European  unity -and 
of a free and democratic Europe -which in the space of ten years has captured 
Britain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries and which in many other States 
is regarded with sympathy and interest, will not be blotted out by the conduct of a 
government which will not remain in  power indefinitely. It  must  be obvious to the 
French  Government that  none of  the European countries is prepared to accept 
something amounting, if  not to  despotism, at least to French supremacy, and less 
than ever  before to barter its links with the United States for protection from 
F ranee, itself  in need of protection. ' 
(La Stampa, 20 December 1967; 11 Popolo,  21 December 1967; Corrierredella 
Sera, 30 December 1967,  2 January 1968;  11 Giomo, 2 January 1968; 
11 Giornale d'ltalia, 2,3 January 1968) 
- 161-Luxembourg 
On 5 December 1967 Mr. Gr~goire, Foreign Minister, outlined his 
Government's viewpoint on the problems raised by the enlargementoftheCom-
munity, and especially those raised by the application for accession made by 
the United Kingdom: 
'For us, the answer is that Europe needs Britain. We do not dispute 
the right of certain other member States to be concerned about the form that 
Europe would assume if the British were in the EEC.  These are questions of 
principle which we must spell out before we can establish what it is that we 
wish to achieve. 
Looking into our hearts is, of course, an abstract exercise and it 
should not make us forget that there are certain practical problems about 
which we need to negotiate before we can open the door of the Six under con-
ditions acceptable to both sides.' 
Mr. Gr~goire fully shared the conclusions reached by the EEC Com-
mission and he added : 
'One of our· partners in the Common Market, that is to say France, 
does not, however,  appear ready to endorse this conclusion.  So far, at 
meetings of the Council,  it has not vetoed the British application but it de-
mands that the application be studied in all its implications within the Six be-
fore there is any kind of official contact with the British.  Among the impli-
cations to which France refers, two are paramount :  one concerns the danger 
of breaking up the European Community if the United Kingdom were to join at 
this stage .  It is just as difficult to substantiate the validity of this argument 
as it is to disprove it.  At all events it is to be feared that a Community with-
out the United Kingdom could also be close to breaking up. 
The second French argument consists in requiring that the United 
Kingdom did not enter into the Communities until it has itself remedied the 
economic and monetary difficulties it is experiencing.  Seen from the French 
point of view,  the impression is that this restoration must go much further 
than restoring the dynamism of the British economy.  It would,  in fact,  mean 
that the United Kingdom should give up its rOle in the world monetary system. 
Is this possible  ?  Is this desirable  ?  Above all, is it necessary  ? 
What would be the practical consequences for Luxembourg of a larger 
EEC  ?  At the purely economic level, it would have little to fear and little to 
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hope from the accession of the United Kingdom and the other applicant States 
because the volume of its trade with these countries is relatively small;  yet 
there could be certain deflections of traffic which could be prejudicial to us. 
In the long run, however, both our producers  and consumers would benefit 
from wider markets. 
There is, however,  a serious institutional problem.  Enlarging the 
Communities will mean enlarging its governing bodies or, more specifically, 
increasing the number of members of the Council, the Commission, the Par-
liament and the Court.  This will reduce our country's proportional weight. 
At present this is to our advantage because our institutional influence in the 
Communities is determined much more by reference to our institutional status 
as an independent and sovereign State than by  reference  to our economic or 
demographic weight.  The accession of new members could not but reduce our 
institut~onal impact;  this is a very real and very heavy sacrifice that we 
should no doubt have to accept in view of more fundamental political and practi-
cal interests. 
Before closing, I would like to draw attention to the unity of views 
on this question that exists between the three Benelux Governments.' 
Following the meeting which the Council held on 19 December, 
Mr. Werner, Prime Minister,  said to a Parisian newspaper :  'I trust, in a 
general way,  that the Community may not suffer in its development because of 
the stance taken on 19 December. 
Above  all, I note from the Communiqu~ issued after the meeting of 
the Council of Ministers, that Britain's application remains on the table.  In 
my opinion, this means that we  shall discuss it again, and we should already 
and on every side begin to prepare for the next meeting. 
Naturally, this involves a number of'economic and financial decisions 
on the part of the British Government so as to facilitate this 'space rendez-vous', 
if I may use the expression which was employed by one of you, Mr.  Giscard 
d' E staing, I believe . 
We shall have to try to spell out a certain number of ·questions 
clearly and even to ask ourselves whether, for our part, we should not make an 
additional effort towards integration which would facilitate the entry of the 
United Kingdom. 
- 163-There is one point that the Commission made rather too diffidently, 
i.e. monetary co-operation.  There has, for a long time, been scepticism on 
this subject but things have changed a little since reforms were made in the 
international monetary system, notably by the creation of special IMF drawing 
rights.  It is in this, you see, that a certain solidarity is finding expression.' 
(Le Figaro, 29 December 1967; Documentation Bulletin of the Press and 
Information Service of the Ministry of State of the Grand  Duchy of Luxembourgt 
No. 14, 10 December 1967) 
Nether  lands 
Asked for his views on Britain's application to join the Common 
Market, Mr. Luns,  Minister for Foreign Affairs, made the following state-
ment before the Second Chamber of the States-General  on 21 December : 
'It is the Government's duty at this grave hour in Europe's post-war 
history to inform you of the latest developments in the EEC Council of Minis-
ters.  At that meeting it became clear that five member States are not only 
prepared to open negotiations for entry with the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark, and Norway but insistent that this be done. 
One country, however, is not prepared to do this.  It could not be 
persuaded to accept the opening of negotiations, let alone the question of  ac-
cession. 
That country thinks that the overhauling of the British economy must 
first be completed before Britain's application can be reconsidered.  At the 
moment, therefore, tpere is no agreement on the Council as to going on with 
the procedure. 
The Government is  deeply shocked by this new refusal -not because 
it came as a surprise but because a great European State which in many re-
spects can justly claim an eminent, even a leading position among the peoples 
of Western Europe, a State and a people generally admired, in the Netherlands 
too, in so many fields,  should be pursuing such a negative policy. 
- 164-Once again we have been unable to seize the opportunity of giving 
Europe's future a new form;  of enabling her to apply the creative energies 
with which she is so richly endowed - and which have so often been frittered 
away in internecine strife -for the common good;  of securing for Europe a 
place in the world enabling her to be a fully-fledged and effective partner in the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
Like you,  the Government now faces the question of how to view the 
future of Europe.  A hasty, unreflecting reaction is clearly out of the question. 
EYen less can we  silently pass on to the next item on the agenda.  TheGovern-
ment proposes to take action in the light of the following three considerations : 
First, the applications of Great Britain and the other countries have 
not been rejected and therefore remain on the agenda.  This means that so 
long as the applications are not withdrawn,  a subsequent favourable reply from 
the Council is still possible. 
How this is to be accomplished is still under investigation but the 
fact remains that any member of the Council can bring up outstanding appli-
cations for membership for discussion.  The Government, moreover, intends 
to do this whenever it considers it desirable.  This provid~s an opportunity of 
judging any moves of the Communities in the light of the requirements and 
consequences of applications pending. 
Secondly, so long as the present situation continues, the European 
Communities cannot be regarded as the outstanding embodiment of the ideal of 
a united Europe  • 
.l''or all this, the Dutch Government's policy will continue to flow 
from the conviction that the European Communities, despite their flaws and 
limitations and the recent serious setback they have suffered, form the foun-
dation on which European unity can one day be built.  Nor has it ever doubted 
that the Communities are Europe's best means of attaining that goal. 
The Government must place it on record that, for the third time in 
less than ten years, France has blocked a development expected and desired 
by the vast majority of the European public,  a development falling squarely 
into line with everything that has been promising and constructive in Europe 
since 1945, that is, with the trend towards a really united Europe. 
- 165-Three times in ten years is a good deal, indeed too much to explain 
or justify on the grounds of special circumstances at a given moment or of 
special problems in one form or another.  We  are here faced with systematic 
and obstinate action springing, in all probability, direct from the basic tenets 
of the French Government's foreign policy.  It is this aspect of the matter  that 
lends so much gravity to the current situation.  This is the background against 
which we must view the consequences for ourselves and for the Community. 
In November 1958 the French Government put an end to the nego-
tiations for the creation  of a European Free Trade Association  Whatever may  have 
been the rights and wrongs of the project then contemplated, it is a fact that 
the Government of one of the six member States brought to a stop, without 
consulting its partners and despite previous assurances of co-operation, a 
process which,  even if in a roundabout way, might perhaps have led towards 
a united Europe. 
In January 1963 the French Government brought to a halt - at an 
already advanced stage -the negotiations on the admission of the UnitedKing-
dom and other countries to the European Communities, once again in the most 
arbitrary way and without consulting her partners. Ifthefirstvetowas serious, 
that of January 1963 was even worse because everything seemed to point tothe 
culmination of a historic process for which all true Europeans had been im-
patiently waiting.  The shock was felt on all sides and, despite subsequent 
signs to the contrary, the effects were to make themselves felt for many years. 
Once again France acted with complete disregard of its repeated declarations 
and of the Treaty itself, in which the Six call upon other European States 
ready to accept the provisions of this Treaty to join in their efforts. 
Now,inDecember 1967, we have to  record  that France has again 
frustrated a historic process to which major importance was attached.  The 
reasons given have once again nothing to do with the heart of the problem. This 
time it was not even possible to open negotiations.' 
The Second Chamber went on to examine the following draft motion 
presented by representatives of the six main political parties. 
'The Chamber: 
deeply disappointed by the French Government's refusal to enter into 
negotiations on the accession to the EEC of the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway; 
- 166-believing this refusal to be harmful to the outward-looking character 
of the Community and the progress of European unification; 
invites the Government : 
(1)  to try to overcome France's opposition through the greatest possible 
measure of solidarity among the six other countries that favour British 
accession; 
in close co-operation with Britain and the other applicants, to make the 
necessary preparations to facilitate and speed up the accession of 
Britain and the other countries concerned; 
(2)  to take steps to ensure that talks can shortly be held between the Five, 
on the one hand,  and Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway on the other, 
on suitable forms of co-operation such as the creation of a European 
Technological Community open to all European Communities that wish to 
join and based on the principles set forth in the Treaties of Rome.' 
During the debate on the motion Mr. Den Uyl, for the Socialist 
Group (Labour Party), asked : 
'What would the Dutch Government's attitude be should the steps ad-
'  vocated in the motion prove unsuccessful ?  The Netherlands alone cannot force 
its partners to co-operate.  If  this policy is not put into effect, the Dutch 
Government should seriously consider whether the moment has not come to 
pursue an 'empty chair' policy.  A slowing-down of Community activities in 
certain sectors calling for new initiatives already appears inevitable, but the 
Netherlands need not necessarily concentrate on these sectors. 
Failing this, the Dutch Government must exert maximum pressure 
- within the Six - on France whenever decisions of great financial importance 
for that country come up for discussion.  I am thinking about the renewal of the 
arrangements for the financing of agriculture and of the Yaoundli  Convention. 
I do not feel that the aim should be to exclude France from the EEC 
and replace it by Britain.  I believe that France, under its present rligime, 
would be an even greater danger outside the EEC.' 
According to Mr. Van Mierlo, Chairman of 'Democracy '66', adopt-
ing a hard line would render a country like West Germany more vulnerable to 
French blackmail in every possible sphere.  He pointed out that the Yaounde 
Convention, which would normally come up for renewal next year, in addition 
- 167-to development aid for a number of African countries, gave substantial devel-
opment aid to France itself.  He thought it would be a good thing to consider 
whether the Five, while not depriving the African countries of anything they 
may be entitled to, might not put an end to the disproportionate advantages 
France derived from the provisions of the current Convention.  Mr. Van 
Mierlo also thought that the negotiations on the final settlement of the financial 
regulations could well take place in a somewhat different atmosphere.  As to 
what the Five might do outside the EEC Mr. Van Mierlo had the following to 
say: 
'The five countries should first hold serious talks with Great 
Britain, if necessary on a bilateral basis and in the light of the European 
Commission's report.  In my opinion we should institutionalize permanent 
consultations during which we could study,  jointly with Britain, all the prob-
lems mentioned in the report.  One of the first subjects ought, I feel, to be 
technological co-operation. ' 
Mr. Van Mierlo asked whether the moment had not arrived for the 
Five to start political talks with Great Britain to which France would be in-
vited. 
The motion was passed by a large majority by the Second Chamber 
of the States-General. 
(Debates in the Second Chamber, Session 1967/68, discussion on Government 
statement) 
EFT  A Council meeting 
The representatives of the EFTA States' delegations resident in 
Geneva (including that of Finland) met on 21 December 1967 under the chair-
manship of Mr. Pierre Languetin, head of the Swiss delegation;  this was the 
last meeting of the EFTA Council and of the heads of delegation of the member 
countries in 1967.  The latest meeting of the EEC Council in Brussels and the 
fresh French veto on Britain's entry into the EEC were discussed. 
All the representatives of the EFT  A States showed deep concern at 
the fact that France had not been able to reach agreement with its five EEC 
partners regarding Britain's application for membership and that,  as aresult, 
- 168-there could be no accession negotiations with the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden.  The communiqu~ issued at the· close of the EEC Council 
meeting suggested, however, that the present crisis in integration policy  wo~ld 
not seriously jeopardize the continued operation of the EEC.  It was pointed 
out by the EFT  A States that the desire to enlarge the EEC found widespread 
support in Europe. 
The heads of the British, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish delega-
tions pointed out that their countries would not withdraw the applications for 
accession.  The delegations of the other EFT  A States had no objection to this. 
It was argued that the withdrawal of the applications would cause the bids for 
accession to be regarded as not really serious .  It was also recognized that 
France's five EEC partners had made it clear that they wished to continue 
their work on paving the way for accession negotiations with the United King-
dom. 
All the heads of delegation of the EFT  A States were agreed that 
their countries should not pursue a policy that might create the impression 
they had given us hope of building a bridge between EFT  A and the EEC. 
Switzerland, which had not been at all surprised by the recent veto of the 
French Head of State, did not have the impression that the present integration 
policy situation in Western Europe was likely to change in the near future. 
(Neue Zttrcher Zeitung, 23 December 1967) 
2.  Mr. Mansholt's press conferences in Brussels on European agri-
cultural problems 
On 4 and 5 October, the Commission of the Communities gave a 
press conference to agricultural correspondents.  Discussing first the con-
ditions for the possible entry of the United Kingdom into the Common Market, 
Mr. Mansholt expressed optimism when comparing the present situation with 
that obtaining a.t the time of the 1961 negotiations : 'At that time nothing final 
had been decided.  The time was not right for negotiations with the United 
Kingdom.  Today we have a market policy, a common political line and, ifthe 
policy for financing agriculture is not final,  at least the policy for financing 
the market policy, agreed on last year, provides a sound \basis for discussions. 
The situation in the six countries is not so different as to require a change in 
the common agricultural policy to adjust it for new member States. Details 
could be changed but the general rule of the Community remains : 'You must 
accept what we have done.' 
- 169-Mr. Mansholt considered, however, that the financing regulations 
could be adjusted to meet the needs of a transition period.  If there were no 
agreement on the final financing arrangements, it would still be possible to 
prolong the transition period.  In his opinion this would be essential on the 
most delicate point :  getting any new partners to adjust to the habits of the 
Community.  With regard to prices, negotiations and agreement were possible 
because the member  States discussed these to bring them closer into line with 
each other every year. 
A fortnight later, Mr. Mansholt gave another press conference, at 
which he broached the question of agricultural structures.  In his opinion 'the 
Ministers of the six countries must associate closely with the Commission in 
making a complete and bold analysis of the situation so that it may perhaps be 
possible to extrapolate the most reasonable solutions.  Starting next Spring, 
they should devote a major part of their time to this task, taking it as their 
aim to initiate regional development plans concerning all branches of the eco-
nomy but clearly specifying the rOle to be played by agriculture' • 
'This regional policy will be expensive, very expensive,  and it is a 
budgetary problem that those responsible for public finance will have tore-
solve.  I should, on the other hand, prefer to devote a good deal of money to 
something which will one day bear fruit rather than to see ever more substan-
tial sums sunk every year ,  and to no purpose,  into suppoFting the markets. ' 
The new aspect of agricultural policy which the Common Market is 
going to envisage has nothing to do with prices, nor with the current demon-
strations by  the farming population.  It was envisaged last May and June. The 
purpose of this policy should be to reshape European agriculture.  We n_eed to 
be careful as regards prices because if we change them, we may create dis-
tortions.  This is, for example, the case for milk;  the price of milk has 
already gone up  and possibly beyond the limit.  Bearing in mind that consump-
tion increases by only 4 per cent per year, it is immediately evident that if no 
action is taken over prices, farm incomes will not grow at the same rate as 
incomes in other branches of the economy.  Hence greater attention will have 
to be paid to productivity.' 
(Le Peuple,  6 October 1967;  Le Monde,  24 October 1967; 
La Libre Belgique,  25 October 1967) 
- 170-3.  Mr. Deniau discusses the trade policy of the Six 
Interviewed by Le Monde,  Mr. Jean-Fran9ois Deniau, a member of 
the Commission of the European Communities, gave his views on the various 
aspects of the Community's trade policy. 
With reference to the Kennedy Round, he felt that : 'The substantial 
cut in customs duties at international level will facilitate trade between the 
various European countries, particularly those of the Common Market and 
EFTA.  From this point of view the Kennedy Round may be regarded as having 
had a beneficial effect not only technically but also politically.' 
In reply to the question 'Can the results be regarded as satisfactory 
for agriculture ? '  Mr. Deniau replied : 'It is true that less was achieved for 
agriculture than for industrial products.  Apart from a certain number of 
practical, albeit limited,  solutions, the Kennedy Round introduced a funda-
mentally new factor.  I mean the realization that agricultural problems are 
international.  and,  hence, that to achieve satisfactory solutions, we must 
think in terms of a real confrontation of all the agricultural policies and of 
every feature i.1l.  those policies.' 
Mr. Deniau then said: 'There are, indeed, many plans afoot of a 
protectionist nature aimed at reintroducing quantitative restrictions; these are 
now before Congress.  Some are quite general in scope and. others are aimed 
at specific products.  This opinion trend is indeed perturbing but since at 
present it is only a question of plans, we should avoid any specific, over-hasty 
reaction.  It is our duty to alert the American authorities to the fact that any 
protectionist trend in the United States with regard to world trade would not be 
without provoking some reaction in the Community. 
There could be no justification for accusing the EEC of protectionism 
as a pretext for introdu9ing protectionist measures in the United States.' 
Mr. Deniau then discussed the trade policy of the Six in general : 
'There may always be some hesitation between a concern to work on the basis 
of Treaty commitments or a concern to work by reference to practical neces-
sities as they emerge from day to day.  In fact, both these concerns should be 
present simultan-eously.  In the months ahead I think that we should, in com-
pliance with the Treaty, settle issues when the need arises and because the 
need arises. 
-171-Then again, our assessment of the EEC's trade relations should be 
an economic one.  There are certain observations which should be made on 
what EEC trade as a whole with the various parts of the world represents and 
on the problems of balance or imbalance that may arise. 
Irrespective of negotiations, we should not simply think in terms of 
the protection that is necessary but also of the kind of expansion of trade that 
is desirable.  The idea of a consortium in each individual case for joint oper-
ations is one that we ought to be able to turn to again.' 
Lastly, Mr. Deniau gave his opinion on the future of the Commis-
sion: 'The Commission has several parts to play, including that of guardian of 
the Treaties.  In this sphere there could be no question of pragmatism.  It is 
rather a matter of proper balance :  placing this emphasis exactly where it 
should be.  Then again, the Commission has a general responsibility to stimu-
late and to take the initiative.  To play its part, which is in particular to be 
useful, the Commission should  always see the Community as it should be and 
the member States as they are. ' 
(Le Monde,  17, 18 December 1967) 
- 172-II.  MOVEMENTS,  ORGANIZATIONS AND  PROMINENT FIGURES 
1.  The International Catholic Intellectual Movement states its attitude 
on the construction of the European Community 
The International Catholic Intellectual Movement wished to draw 
attention to the values and to the spirit which should provide a basis for the 
construction of any human community. 
There was no question,  as far as it was concerned,  of seeing the 
European construction as the privileged expression or the rampart of tra-
ditional Christian values.  Europe could,  however,  constitute the basis of a 
humanism with which every man of goodwill,  whatever his philosophical and 
ideological options could identify himself and to whose advent he could devote 
himself. 
' At the political level, it is Europe's vocation to be constantly 
striving after institutional conditions that may secure a genuine democracy. 
We must realize that democracy can never be taken for granted.  It is always 
something that has to be created. Whatever may be the changing pattern of our 
society, there are several fundamental requirements which must govern every 
effort to translate the democratic idea into institutional terms: a real partici-
pation by the electorate in the political decision-taking process, the possi-
bility of their exercising effective control over power, the independence of the 
legal authority, the institutional guarantee. of the fundamental rights of the 
individual,  such as they were defined in the encyclical 
11 Pacem in terris 
11
,  the 
recognition of the pluralism of groups, both in their cultural expression and 
in their political,  economic,  social and trade union expressions. 
The natural and fundamental rights to which we have referred, and 
which are of a higher order than any State or international power, must be 
guaranteed and subject to the control of independent legal authorities at the 
national and supra-national levels.  All States have the right to be part of Euro-
pean organizations that exist already or which may be created in the future, 
by accepting the obligations stipulated in the ' European Convention for the 
Protection of Haman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' and in its additional 
protocols.  Every European citizen must have the right to address an individual 
appeal to the internal tribunals and to the European legal authorities. 
- 173-It is also important that the European construction - which naturally 
predicates superseding traditional nationalism - does not lead to a new type 
of nationalism at the European level.  It cannot be envisaged as an instrument 
of defence vis-a-vis those countries of Europe which,  however different in 
ideology and political system,  also contribute in certain sectors towards en-
riching the common heritage. Nor must it be envisaged as an instrument of 
power vis-a-vis the other regions of the world.  The European Community 
that is being built must be regarded as the first stage in the construction of 
the world Community which Pope John XX:Ill  and Pope Paul VI  called forwith 
such insistence and as a way of making a more active contribution to solving 
the problems put to the contemporary conscience by ignorance, poverty, 
sickness and hunger in the world.  1 
The International Catholic Intellectual Movement cannot accept that 
European integration should result in aggravating the disparities within a 
single country or between regions in different countries.  ' It is a political re-
sponsibility to ensure economic and social equality between regions and be-
tween individuals and a genuine freedom of the individual is conditional on this. 
The idea of political democracy must be coupled with that of economic de-
mocracy, which puts an end to the exploitation of man by man,  along the lines 
laid down in the encyclical "Populorum Progressio  11•  It would be a serious 
delusion to believe that this end can be achieved without a profound change in 
the economic and social structures which Christians should be the first to de-
vise and foster.  1 
(Bulletin Social des Industriels, October 1967) 
2.  Conference in Trieste on relations between the European Community 
and the East European countries 
A conference was held in Trieste at the end of September on  1 The 
European Community and the East European countries 1;  those taking part in-
cluded representatives from the Italian Government,  a  group of economists 
and specialists from the East European countries and officials and experts of 
the European Communities. 
The conference was opened by Mr.  Tolloy,  Minister for External 
Trade, who recalled that from 1958 to 1966 trade between East European and 
the Community countries had almost trebled in value: EEC imports had risen 
from $677 to $1, 797m and EEC exports to East European countries had gone 
up from $625 to $1, 670m.  It was worth noting here that Italy's trade had ex-
- 174-panded the most, whereas trade between the member States as a whole had 
trebled; the value of trade between Italy and East European countries was now 
at least five times what it had been in 1958. 
Despite the progress made,  Mr.  Tolloy said, there were still diffi-
culties in the way of an expansion of trade; these were due to the centralised 
planning  techniques  and  to  the  diversity  of  interests  of  the  EEC  states 
which made the creation of a common trade policy problematical.  The Western 
countries had,  none the less,  endeavoured to work out a new approach; the 
United Kingdom,  West Germany and,  recently,  Italy had taken further steps 
to ' liberate' a vast range of products.  These endeavours were not limited to 
trade relations but also covered economic and technical co-operation.  It was 
sufficient to recall, in the industrial sector, the recent agreement between 
Fiat and the Soviet Union. 
The East European countries were asking that the West European 
States should abolish restrictions, particularly the quantitative ones and that 
thay should apply the most-favoured nation clause unconditionally.  The West 
European countries, for their part, had always maintained that the special 
treatment extended to the State-trading countries was designed solely to pro-
tect their market against the inevitable disturbances due to the different way 
in which prices were arrived at in the two economic areas. 
The Italian Government,  Mr.  Tolloy concluded, would try to pro-
mote the adoption of new measures in the sphere of trade by looking into the 
possibilities of freeing the trade in further products to be added to the list 
decided upon last April and granting export credit facilities (which could be 
made easier by the law which came into force this year on credit insurance 
and finance); there could also be economic, industrial and technical co-oper-
ation because, in this field, there were very interesting development oppor-
tunities. 
Mr.  Caron,  Under-Secretary of State for Finance and Economic 
Planning,  stated that in view of the favourable influence it had on political re-
lations, afurther increase in trade was to be hoped for.  He outlined the main 
features of the Italian economic development plan which,  he said, would help 
to open the national economy system to an ever closer integration with the 
economies of other countries in a way consistent with the options that had 
characterized Italy's action since the war.  In particular,  Mr.  Caron recalled 
the two-fold direction of the programme,  a balance of external payments and 
monetary stability and added that it had been an irreversible choice for the 
Italian economy to opt for a free and open market.  ' The reactions of the East 
European States to the Community experiment', he concluded,•have progressed: 
- 175-from the apprehension and. incomprehension of the past to a better assessment 
which embraces the interests of these States and constitutes a source of at-
traction for them. ' 
The state of trade relations between the Community and the East 
European nations was desribed by Professor Rifflet,  Principal Private Secre-
tary of Mr.  Rey, the President of the unified Commission; Professor Rifflet 
drew attention to the rapid growth in trade which was much greater than that 
between the EEC  and other regions.  Excluding China and Yugoslavia,  this had 
reached a total figure of $3,468, 500 in 1966 representing a 16 per cent in-
crease as opposed to the 8 per cent increase in trade between the EEC and 
third countries and amounting to 5. 8 per cent of the total. 
There is a chronic deficit in the EEC's balance of trade with the 
State-trading countries as a whole (this was nearly $127m in 1966); in fact, 
a surplus in relation to the minor countries was more than outweighed by a 
substantially adverse balance of trade with the USSR.  France and West 
Germany are the only two countries which have an overall surplus, whereas 
Italy has the largest deficit (nearly $157m in 1966). 
As to the structure of this trade,  it  is  worth  noting the predominance 
of primary products, particularly agricultural, in the EEC' s imports from 
the East European countries despite the implementation of the common agri-
cultural policy.  Raw materials and food products account for 75 per cent of 
the EEC's imports whereas capital goods imported (68 per .cent from East 
Germany and Czechoslovalda) to a value of 68  m.  accounting units in 1965, 
represent only 2 per cent of the Community's imports of these products.  The 
desire on both sides to increase trade is still running up against a  larg~ 
number of difficulties which originate in 
(a)  the difference in the price-setting machinery as between the market 
economies and the State-trading nations; 
(b)  the State monopoly of external trade in the East European countries 
which is based on national planning; it is in this way that they side-
step the principles of the world market and the GATT machinery; 
(c)  in the poor convertibility of East European currencies which means 
that it is sometimes necessary to create artificial trade to arrive at 
a balance of payments and 
(d)  in the heavy-going in drawing up  a common trade policy for the Com-
munity which,  apart from a few provisions of limited effect,  could 
be described as still being non-existent. 
- 176-Yet amidst these obstacles and difficulties, the very logic of devel-
opment and the new pragmatic approach which is gaining ground in Europe, con-
stituted reasons, Professor Rifflet felt,  for co-ordinating  efforts to  reach 
agreements.  These should be negotiated on an equal footing - not involving any 
wholesale revision of economic systems - which would be the  expression of 
two-way interests; this might call for adjustments on both sides  which the 
Commission has already advocated,  calling for co-ordinated liberation meas-
ures, credit facility arrangements extending to export credit insurance. 
Professor Yanakiev,  of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,  and 
Professor Tauber,of the InstituteofinternationalPolitical Economy in Prague, 
expressed the viewpoints of the East European countries. Generally speaking, 
they recognized that the time had come forworld-wide trade to be regarded as 
an integral part of development plans; this involved the abolition of  quantative 
restrictions, easier credit facilities over a longer term and the application, 
to the East European countries,  of the most-favoured nation clause.  It was 
realized in the East European countries that international trade, which was by 
definition a constituent of the various development plans,  involved a review of 
the criteria by reference to which export prices were set, adjusting the econo-
my to the structure of world trade and a greater convertibility of currencies. 
Yugoslavia was leading the way here : as a result of economic ad-
justments and reforms, its exports of industrial products,  as distinct from 
conventional exports of agricultural products and raw m·aterials, had been 
increasing as had its imports of machinery and finished products.  The federal 
plan for 1966-1970 provided for an even greater boost to trade as an external 
economic factor.  This postulated the aim of securing the convertibility of the 
dinar which in turn necessitated building up  gold and convertible currency re-
serves amounting to at least $ 500m. Against this background, Yugoslavia while 
not being, for political reasons, interested at present in an association with the 
Community, was favourably inclined towards a special trade agreement. 
The Conference concluded  with a  speech by  Mr.  Z agari,  Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  'If Italy can today consider itself as 
btling in the vangua_rd in trade with the East European countries', Mr.  Zagari 
said, 'the credit must go to the economic operators  and to the workers who 
have taken up the challenge purposefully and tenaciously and to the Government 
which has backed this action.  Economic, technical and scientific co-operation 
with the East European countries should today move into a new key which 
should be that of political co-operation within a framework of security.' 
'To this end,' Mr.  Zagari went on to say,  'greater use should be 
made of the modern instruments of economic co-operation: industrial, techni-
cal, scientific and financial agreements and a more direct contact between 
firms and economic operators. ' 
- 177-'But this action,' Mr.  Zagari concluded,  'cannot be carried  through 
solely at the bilateral level.  Today we have about forty trade agreements be-
tween the EEC countries and the East European States and we certainly cannot 
go on this way.  We need a common trade policy as soon as possible. We need 
to enlarge the Community, to include the United Kingdom  and the Scandinavian 
countries and we need to establish multilateral relations  between  Western 
Europe, particularly the EEC States and Eastern Europe.' 
(ComunitA Europee, No.  10, October 1967;  Relazi<;>ni Internazionali, No.  39, 
30 September 1967} 
3.  Conference of European Journalists discusses European problems 
The Association of European Journalists held a meeting at  the Palais 
du Heysel in Brussels on 9/12 October 1967 with Mr. Charles Rebuffat in the 
chair.  Among the many speakers, Lord Chalfont, British 'Minister  for Europe' 
backed his country's application to become a full member of the European 
Community. 
Regarding the opening of the negotiations,  Lord Chalfont said he did 
not believe there would be an outright veto by France. It was said in Paris that 
the negotiations would be long and difficult.  Britain was ready to enter into 
them, however long or difficult they might prove to be.  If. the veto was now 
applied, it would have very serious consequences for future relations between 
London and Paris, but also for the whole future of the European Community. 
Mr. Willy Declercq, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister, outlined 
Belgium's point of view on a number of major problems posed by Britain's 
application : 
'In principle Belgium is in favour of enlarging  the Community, namely 
in accordance with Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, provided that countries 
wishing to join are prepared to accept the irrevocable economic and political 
aims of the Treaty without calling into question any major decisions  already 
taken. 
. .••.  As far as we  are concerned Europe can only develop under 
two conditions : the presence of the major powers in her ranks and equality of 
all partners. Naturally the smaller European States are prepared, with this 
equality, to concede wider powers in the Community to the larger countries, 
- 178-but only on condition that these establish,  among themselves, a state of  balance. 
So in welcoming Britain's application  we also hope  that a way will be found 
during any negotiations not to disturb the existing  balanced relationship between 
large and small countries in the Community.' 
The Conference of European Journalists shared out its tasks among 
several committees, each of which submitted a resolution : 
The Political Affairs Committee submitted a  resolution  urging the 
Council of Ministers of the Communities to open negotiations as soon as pos-
sible on the entry of Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway,  in the light of its 
expert opinion. 
It called on the Governments  of the Six  to strengthen  Community 
structures at the time of the merger of the Treaties, and  underlined the need 
to bring  into being,  without delay,  a truly political community which would 
enable Europe to carry its full responsibility at world level, particularly in 
the cause of peace. 
The Information Committee stressed the need for wider dissemina-
tion of facts about Europe. In the process, the regional press, which had pre-
viously been neglected despite its great influence on public opinion,  should not 
be forgotten. 
The Committee on Professional Problems concerned itself  especial-
ly with freedom of movement.  Its resolution  referred to a·meeting, held  in 
Brussels on 1 June 1967  under the auspices  of the Community Services, at 
which these problems were discussed jointly with representatives of the pro-
fessional organizations.  The wish was expressed that a Standing Advisory 
Committee should,  in close collaboration with the Community Services, be set 
up for this purpose.  The Association naturally wished to be adequately repre-
sented on the Committee. 
The resolution called upon the European Parliament to make known 
its views on the project submitted in 1964 by the EEC Commission so that the 
procedure could be pressed ahead with.  Freedom of movement ought,  in the 
long run, to be the same for staff and freelance journalists, whether in press, 
radio or television. 
This last requirement should be met by establishing a European 
Statute for journalists on which work should be started up without delay. 
(La cote Desfoss~s, 12 October;  Le Soir,  10 and 11 October; Luxemburger 
Wort,  18 October 1967) 
- 179-4.  The CGIL-CGT Conference on problems of trade union unity at the 
European level 
A conference was held in Milan from 13  to 15  October between the 
Italian (CGIL)  and French (CGT) General Labour Confederations during which 
the two organizations discussed trade union problems arising from the new 
situation in Europe.  The leaders of the two confederations present included 
Messrs. Novella,  Mosca,  Lama, Foa for CGIL and Messrs. Segury, Bertheloot, 
Caille, Krasucki for the CGT; Mr. Saillant,  Secretary-General of the World 
Trade Union Federation (WTUF) was also present. 
Discussions focussed on reports which gave rise to numerous 
interventions. 
The first consideration to emerge from these was a recognition of 
the EEC as 'an objective reality' which had sprung from the need to adjust 
markets to technological progress and to all that had flowed from the second 
industrial revolution; it was a positive factor in the economic development of 
the member countries in that it increased trade,  removed customs barriers 
and counteracted any trend towards self-sufficiency 'on condition that it does 
not transfer to the supranational level the former national protectionism or 
become a Community closed to the outside world and open only on itself. ' 
Acceptance of the Community,  however,  was not the automatic 
soluti911 to the problems of the workers; on the contrary,  it implied a need to 
obtain contractual power for trade unions; the lack of this was at present 
making itself felt in dramatic terms. This lack was due not only to the short-
comings and discriminations in the Community as it is at present directed and 
administered but,  above all,  to the present division between the trade unions 
resulting from national and ideological frontiers, behind which they remained 
closed fn. 
This raised the need to transfer to the international level the pro-
cess of unification which had made such progress at the national levels. By 
uniting the efforts of the French and Italian General Labour Confederation it 
would be possible to exercise a positive influence on the direction taken in 
this unification process because the trade unions would then not be working 
-alone. 
Relations between other trade union organizations had thus to be_ 
developed more and more all the time so as to remove the ideological barriers 
which divided European trade unionism. 
- 180-These aims were embodied in the final resolution which stated, 
inter aJja: 
'The Conference ••••• has sought ways and means of overcoming 
the divisions between the trade union organizations in the· Common Market 
countries and,  more generally,  in Western Europe,  so as to make tradeunion 
action more effective in each of the other countries concerned and in the Com-
munity bodies,  which are strongly dominated by the monopolies • 
• • • • • It expressed a determination to increase the number of 
meetings at confederallevels, to analyze and work out joint solutions on the 
various problems (wages policy,  jobs,  social security,  manpower mobility, 
occupational training,  common policies of the EEC,  etc.). 
The progress made towards unity in France and in Italy called for 
coherent action by all the trade unions to achieve similar unity at Common 
Market level in the struggle against monopolies which,  in the name of com-
petitivity,  were increasing the exploitation of workers.  Such action was also 
necessary to bring about the recognition,  for all trade unionists,  of their real 
rights in Community bodies. Such recognition must mean an end to any form 
of discrimination against the French and Italian General Labour Confeder-
ations. 
The two organizations urged all trade unionists in Europe to over-
come present difficulties and resume joint action for a more effective defence 
of the interests of the workers.  The militants of both Confederations would 
play their part at every level in conjunction with the various trade union 
organizations of the EEC and West European countries.' 
(L'Unith,  14-18 October 1967;  Avanti,  14-17 October 1967) 
5.  EEC Banking Federation and the European capital market 
At a meeting in Luxembourg on 20 October 1967 the Council of the 
EEC Banking Federation discussed the effects of taxation on the establish-
ment of a European capital market. The Council devoted special attention to 
- 181-the progress of the work being done by Community institutions with a view to 
harmonizing taxes on stocks and shares and on debenture interest. In the en-
suing resolution the Federation makes the following comments: 
'In the light of the information at present available to it, the Feder-
ation,  conscious of the responsibility borne by the banks in this sphere, is 
deeply concerned with the economic and financial effects of the projects now 
being drawn up. 
It underlines the need to ensure that harmonization takes full ac  ... 
count of the following economic and financial requirements: 
a)  not to compromise the EEC's prospects of becoming,  vis-a-vis 
non-member countdes,  a major international financial centre en-
dowed with a vigourous and effective capital ma,rket; 
b)  not to h_amper policies aimed at encouraging investment in stocks 
and shares,  on which the improvement of the financial structure of 
European enterprises depends; 
c)  not to make compulsory issues,  whether in the EEC or on the inter-
national market,  more costly or difficult for CommonMarketunder-
takings than for their main competitors in non-member countries. 
The Federation emphasizes: 
a)  that the aim of setting up a capital market that meets the growing 
needs of investment should be given priority over the improvement 
of taxation procedures; 
b)  that abandoning the quest for a perfect system of taxing stocks and 
shares will by .no means lead to a substantial drop in tax revenues, 
and may even improve the budget position by increasing taxable 
items and lowering interest char-ges; 
c)  that under the system of currency convertibility,  which it has been 
agreed to maintain,  any measures likely to encourage capital in-
vestme~t outside the Community should be avoided;  · 
d)  that it is essential for the Community's future economic develop-
ment that savers continue to be willing to place their savings on the 
financial market; their propensity to save will be reduced if income 
tax strikes them as being excessive. 
- 182-The Federation asks the Governments of member states and the 
European Commission to bear in mind,  during the discussions now going on, 
the damaging effects taxation can have on the creation of a vast and powerful 
European capital market essential for economic union and consistent with the 
scale and rate of growth necessary if European industry is to withstand inter-
national competition. 
The Federation is prepared to continue collaborating in this field with 
the institutions concerned and hopes that no final decision will be taken before 
the banks have had a chance of enquiring into its effects. 
Its main concern is the abolition of taxation at source. The fact that 
subscribers to debentures can go to the international market (Euro-dollars), 
on which taxation at source does not exist,  tends to deflect funds tothatmarket 
to the detriment of Community markets. ' 
(Luxemburger Wort,  10 November 1967) 
6.  Lord Chalfont,  Professor Hallstein and  Mr.  Luns speak on the 
twentieth anniversary of the founding of the European Movement 
Lord Chalfont,  British Minister for European Affairs,  Professor 
Hallstein,  former President of the EEC Commission,  and Mr.  Luns, Dutch 
Foreign Minister,  spoke at a meeting,  held on 11  November in the 'Ridderzaal' 
at the Hague,  commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the 
European Movement. 
Lord Chalfont left no  doubt as to Britain's desire to join the Com-
munity.  Accession could perhaps be delayed but could not long be denied. 
Lord Chalfont would not say what would happen if Paris put a spoke 
in the wheel.  He  attributed to a misunderstanding the allegation that he had 
said in Lausanne that,  in that event,  Britain would turn its back on Europe. 
The British had naturally given some thought to what alternative solutions 
migb.t exist,  but that was a minor issue.  They were convinced of the ultimate 
success of the negotiations. 
- 183 -Lord Chalfont warned the Six not to waste too much time. If Europe 
wanted once more to play an effective r~le in the world, 'the need  for Europeans 
to co-operate was becoming more and more pressing from1year to year, indeed 
from month to month. If they failed to do this,  the major issues of the day 
-peace, East-West relations,  the problem of the developing countries -would 
be settled over their heads.  Only a greater measure of integration would en-
able Europe to make its proper contribution  •. 
Lord Chalfont welcomed the grasp shown in the European capitals 
of the political and technological arguments advanced by the Wilson Govern-
ment for enlarging the Community.  He was also pleased with the report sub-
mitted to the European Council of Ministers by the European Commission. He 
felt,  however,  that the Council had somewhat exaggerated the problems 
raised by the British economy and by sterling's international rtlle. 
He  saw no reason why the existing international  r~le of the pound 
should be regarded as incompatible with British membership.  There was 
nothing in the Treaty of Rome banning the use of reserve currencies.  After 
all,  the French franc itself was such a currency,  even though on a smaller 
scale.  Lord Chalfont thought that sterling could perhaps pave the way for a 
European currency.  He  did not think that sterling's international r~le ought 
to be abandoned without first safeguarding the interests of holders and de-
ciding what should take its place. 
Professor Hallstein considered it important that Britain be ad-
mitted to the EEC without delay.  The British application ought not therefore 
to be rejected on economic grounds.  He advised the Six to get down as soon 
as possible to working out a  8ommon approa  Jh on the question of opening 
negotiations.  The argument that one economic circumstance or other stood 
in the way of Britain's accession could be countered,  for instance,  by sug-
gesting some stage-by-stage arrangement.  Under present conditions some 
such approach struck Professor Hallstein as more reasonable than an ulti-
matum of the 'all or nothing' type. 
It was in the very logic of history that all the European peoples 
who were ready and willing to do so should take part in the "unification of 
Europe.  This,  after all,  was what the founders of the Community had had in 
mind,  and Britain's rejections of the invitation to join extended to her in 1950 
and 1955 had be~n merely setbacks. Professor Hallstein felt that the motives 
underlying European policy in those days were still the same and were as 
strong as ever. 
Although the Community's success in the economic field had been 
such that no-one withdrawing from it could escape irreparable damage, 
- 184-nothing like the same could be said of its progress in the political field.  The 
most that could be claimed was that war between the peoples of the Communi-
ty had become unthinkable and that the neutral background of economic inte-
gration had awakened among its inhabitants a somewhat clearer consciousness 
of al common citizenship.  But it would be absurd, historically speaking,  if 
the situation were to remain the same up to the year 2000.  It was, for exam-
ple, appalling to think of the German question being left to the mercies of 
such antiquated political machinery. 
Turning to the changes that had occurred outside the Community, 
Professor Hallstein said that European affairs no longer enjoyed the priority 
formerly accorded to them in American policy.  Nobody could blame the 
Americans for not knowing exactly what attitude to adopt towards Europeans, 
and it was largely up to the latter to create a real atmosphere of trust.  Initi-
atives always had to come from one side. Why,  for instance,  had Europeans 
for so long not put forward proposals on the reform of NATO? 
Professor Hallstein added that while United States interest in 
Europe had waned,  that of the Soviet Union had increased to such a point that 
one could expect greater Soviet diplomatic activity in the near future - the 
aim in this case being a different one,  namely,  to obstruct European unifi-
cation.  Even if one could assume that the Kremlin was not out for war,  a 
sudden swing round by the Soviet leaders could not be ruled out,  with the 
danger that they might use their massive military potential as a lever at 
diplomatic level.  While Professor Hallstein in no way denied the usefulness 
of a policy of easing tension,  he thought that the  results obtained should not 
be confused with real security. 
'It should not be forgotten, ' he added,  'that the Treaties are not an 
end in themselves but a means of achieving a higher objective - a political 
Community oased on a truly federal constitution and therefore embracing 
defence and non-econoJYik external policy. ' 
Mr.  Luns then took the floor.  'If real progress is to be made 
towards European integration, ' he said,  'then it must be ensured - once 
reasonable steps have been taken to preserve world peace - on the already 
existing basis for wider European co-operation so as to integrate Western 
Europe economically and politically.  To shut out the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Norway and Ireland from this process is to shut out any hope of progress 
towards the unification of our continent. ' 
- 185 -'I am not suggesting,' went on Mr.  Luns,  'that enlarging the Com-
munity does not raise big problems or entail certain risks for those concerned. 
But these problems are not insoluble and the risks can be cut down through 
sensible measures.' 
If  peace was to be assured in Europe, then a sound and vigorous 
policy of Atlantic Alliance remained essential.  'Is it credible that a  Europe 
split up into national States, each with its own means of defence,  could decide 
with one voice to resist a fresh aggression?' A Europe divided in this way 
could not muster the necessary economic, political or military strength. In-
deed,  the fact that one Western Eu~opean State had thought fit to withdraw 
from military integration was one of the most serious problems now facing 
Europe. 
(Nieuw Europa,  No.  12,  December 1967) 
7.  Views of the Union of Industries of the European Community on 
European economic policy 
The Union of Industries of the European Community (UNICE)  recent-
ly stated its views on two aspects of European economic policy, the complet-
ion of customs union and the introduction of a 'European' company. 
On 6 November 1967 UNICE passed a resolution on the conditions to 
be fulfilled on 1 July 196 8 to ensure smooth operation of the customs union. 
'On 1 July 1968 member States will abolish intra-Community 
customs duties and will apply the common customs tariff in "its  entirety. 
If this is to be a real customs union,  UNIC E regards-it as essential 
that the customs regulations and practices of the Six be brought into line, if 
not unified, by that date. Any divergence is bound to distort competition be-
tween Community undertakings; the Community and the member States would 
then have no option but to resort to measures tending to keep national markets 
partitioned off from each other. 
- 186  -.. 
• 
r 
Harmonization is made all the more necessary by the fact that the 
Kennedy Round will substantially reduce  the duties applied under the Common 
Customs Tariff in a way that will begin to make itself felt from 1 July 1968 
onwards. 
Community enterprises should also be protected from abnormal 
competition from .non-member countries.  Through the rapid adoption of a 
Community regulation conforming to the GATT anti-dumping code,  the Com-
munity will not only acquire an effective measure of trade protection but could 
set a good example spurring on the other contracting parties to bring their 
domestic regulations into line with the GATT code. 
In a resolution passed on 11  May 1966 the Council of Ministers 
agreed that tariff laws should be harmonized before intra-Community customs 
duties were abolished.  UNICE  also recalls that in commenting on " European 
industry in the face of economic and social integration " it asked that special 
attention be paid to the harmonization of tariff laws.  In view of the urgency of 
the matter,  UNICE  hopes that the Council of Ministers will forthwith make 
known its views without delay on the proposals submitted to it by the Com-
mission and on which the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Mfairs Committee have prepared an Opinion.  UNICE  is thinking especially of 
the proposals concerning anti-dumping measures and the definition of the ori-
gin of goods. ' 
Mter noting what had been accomplished by the working party of the 
EEC Council of Ministers and studying the report drawn up,  at the Com-
mission's request, by Professor Sanders,  UNICE  issued an Opinion covering 
a number of major features of these drafts: 
UNICE urges that the tax law issues that would be raised by the 
creation and operation of" European" companies should be dealt with.  Until 
tax problems have been solved,  the statute of such companies would be of no 
practical interest to businessmen and industrialists. 
- 187 -The ultimate goal must be to give access to the 
11  European 
11  compa-
ny to all natural or legal persons. 
Rejecting on principle any restriction on access that would smack of 
official controls,  UNICE  singles out as the least arbitrary criterion that of a 
minimum capital,  provided that this is not fixed at such a level as to compro-
mise, for certain activities, the economic ends pursued in setting up a 
11  European" company. 
For a transitional period - the length of which is still to be 
determined - certain other restrictions may however have to be considered. 
These should not,  however, be applied to the form of company so as not to 
exclude, in principle, undertakings other than public companies and,  in par-
ticular,  private limited companies. 
UNICE is unanimous in thinking that the justification for the 
"European" company ultimately resides in the practical interest it will arouse 
among businessmen and industrialists throughout the Community.  This is the 
angle from which the problems raised in Professor Sander.s' report should be 
approached. 
The European company will certainly not achieve the aims sought by 
its advocates if it is governed by an endless succession of government pro-
visions of a national character.  This would undoubtedly be the case if it were 
made subject to the measures on co-management. 
UNICE  cannot associate itself wi~h any arrangement that would en-
tail workers' taking part in the administrative work of the European company. 
In short,  decisions affecting the management of the company can only be taken 
by its members and the directors appointed to act on their behalf. 
l.JNICE  is therefore also against adopting any arrangements varying 
with the location of the registered office  of the company,  or its employees' 
workplaces,  such as suggested in Professor Sanders' report.  Such a course 
would already mean introducing,  at Community level, the principle of co-





jected to in most member ·states and quarters concerned.  It therefore 
appears that the question of co-management can only be resolved, in UN ICE 
1 s 
opinion, by adopting a uniform arrangement which does not provide 
for worker participation on the administrative side for European commercial 
companies as a whole. 
UNICE  is fully alive to the importance of industrial relations but 
considers that this problem should be treated as quite distinct from that of 
company law.  It would like to be consulted on any discussion of this question  . 
The system of bearer securities operated by five member states 
has proved effective and essential to the smooth running of the capital market. 
The " European " company must therefore be able to issue both 
bearer and registered shares, and this facility accorded to all European com-
panies without distinction so as to avoid discriminatory conditions. 
1 
(Bulletin de la Federation des industries belges, Nos. 27 ·and 29,  1 and 20 No-
vember 1967) 
8.  statements by the European Movement and by Federal European 
Action 
Two meetings of adherents of the European cause were held in the 
second half of November,  one in Brussels and the other in Paris. 
The Congress of Federal European Action,  held in Brussels on 
18  and 19 November,  dealt with the theme 1 No European policy without a po-
litical Europe  1•  It was attended by Mr.  Rey, President of the Commission of 
the European Communities,  Mr.  Van Elslande,  Belgian Minister for European 
Affairs,  Mr.  Brugmans, Rector of the College of Europe,  and Lord Gladwyn. 
The proceedings wound up  with an appeal by the European federalists of which 
the following is an extract: 
- 189-European federalists attach crucial importance to the de-
velopment of these Communities which remain the basis of any subsequent 
progress,  even outside the economic and social sectors.  The successful 
merger of their Executives falls into this general pattern; it should  be followed 
by the merger of the Communities themselves,  a decisive step forward in so 
far as the Community institutions will emerge stronger than before. 
The European federalists also urge the Communities to embark 
without delay upon a  common policy on research and technology,  essential 
pillars of the society of tomorrow,  and to make preparations for the monetary 
union without which economic union cannot be achieved. 
Europe cannot fulfil its r6le unless it is endowed with the necessary 
dimensions through enlargement of the Communities.  The United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Denmark and Norway should now be admitted so that Europe can  final-
ly play its r6le in world affairs.  A new European revival can take place if ten 
countries, numbering 250 million Europeans and prepared to accept and apply 
Community procedures and methods,  unite to take this new,  decisive step 
towards a united Europe and open the necessary negotiations without delay. As 
regards countries which are not yet ready,  it is the duty of countries already 
engaged in the European undertaking to aid their development so that they can 
join at the earliest possible date. 
The Communities should therefore be rapidly brought to completion 
in the diplomatic and defence fields by means of an international treaty between 
states desirous of co-ordinating,  and then gradually integrating, their domestic 
policies in these areas. 
For this purpose an effective system of supervision at Community 
level is essential.  European federalists call upon the citizens of Europe to 
assert their right to elect the European Parliament by direct suffrage.  The 
powers of the European Parliament should,  moreover, be widened without de-
lay,  more particularly as regards the drawing up and supervision of a Com-
munity budget. 
1 
At the end of November the Executive Bureau of the International 
European Movement met in Paris, with Mr.  Maurice Faure in the chair,  to 
study the current situation of Europe.  The following passage on the United 
Kingdom 
1 s accession to the Common Market is taken from a statement drawn 





'  '  \ 
' The European Movement is concerned at the delays and the obsta-
cles that are piling up on the road to European unity,  and fears that the vast 
political prospects which constituted both its essence and its justification will 
be lost sight of in the labyrinth of day-to-day activities. It calls upon the 
Governments and the executive authorities of the Communities to take vigorous 
steps to ensure that progress is resumed. 
In the immediate future,  the main issue - so important for the 
future of European unity- is that of the applications for entry received from 
the United Kingdom and three other countries. 
The Commission has submitted to the Council a report on the 
problems raised by these applications.  It states that, before clear-cut con-
clusions can be reached, talks must be opened with the applicants.  The 
European Movement invites the Council to instruct the Commission, before 
the end of the year, to start up such talks and to report to it on the results. 
It emphasizes that,  in its view,  these problems should receive a technical 
solution consistent with the common interest,  and that the accession of the 
United Kingdom and of the other countries is essential if the Community is 
to acquire the economic and technological dimensions,  political weight and 
democratic balance necessary to spread its influence. 
Furthermore, following the recent devaluation of the pound,  these 
talks  could. serve to steer Britain's economic policy decisions along a course 
favourable to the Community's development. ' 
(Documents issued by the European Movement in Luxembourg) 
9.  EEC European Farmers' Conference in Diisseldorl 
On 24 November 1967 a meeting of the EEC Committee of Farmers' 
Unions (COP  A)  was held in Dusseldorl.  Among the speakers were Mr.  Edmund 
Rehwinkel,  chairman of the German Farmers' Union and of COPA,  Mr.  S. L. 
Mansholt,  Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities, 
and Mr.  Hermann HCScherl,  Minister of Agriculture of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
Speaking to about 500 farming representatives of the EEC,  Mr. 
Rehwinkel called for farm prices that truly reflected costs and for an improved 
- 191  -agricultural structure in the EEC.  Moreover, if the common market was to be 
achieved,  priority ought to be given to the EEC' s own agricultural products. 
In support of his plea for cost-reflecting prices Mr.  Rehwinkel, 
pointed to the fact that in the post-war period the gap between prices and 
costs had been much wider for agricultural than for other products.  Although 
agricultural costs continued to rise, farmers were constantly denied per-
mission to raise their prices sufficiently.  During the period l963to 1965 alone 
prices for agricultural production facilities in individual EEC countries had 
risen by 3 to 9 per cent.  If increased labour costs on farms were taken into 
account,  the average rise in costs over a year came to about 10 per cent. This 
constant increase of all cost factors and the inadequate producer prices were, 
according to Mr.  Rehwinkel, the main reason why farmers' incomes were 
lower than those in other industries. 
Policy on the establishment of a  c~mmon  agricultural market had 
so far almost entirely confined itself to questions of market organization and 
prices; alignment of costs had as yet received little serious consideration.  In 
this connexion Mr.  Rehwinkel firmly opposed the attempts being made tore-
place a policy of fair prices by a structural policy.  Structural policy,  he said, 
was not a magic formula for raising farm incomes but merely served to shelve 
the key problem of disparities in income.  By itself, it was a 'policy of vain 
promises and consolation. ' He added that a structural policy could not beef-
fective unless accompanied by a prices policy enabling farmers to accumulate 
the necessary capital and to meet the interest on,  and repay,  the credits 
raised in the process.  The EEC Farmers' Unions by no means rejected a 
structural policy.  If, however, the departments of the EEC and of the regions 
used structural improvements merely as a means of breaking up the large 
number of family-operated farms,  then it would oppose such a step with all 
its might. 
Mr.  Mansholt,  Vice-President of the Commission of the European 
Communities,  agreed with Mr.  Rehwinkel that there was a considerable di-
vergence in trends as between incomes in agriculture and in industry.  In con-
trast to Mr.  Rehwinkel, who called for a 'fair price' policy and rejected its 
replacement by structural policy measures, Mr.  Mansholt felt that evenprice 
policy would be of only limited effect. While it was true that structural policy 
was no magic cure for disparities in income,  it was just as false to believe 
that price policy measures would have such far-reaching effects.  The right 
• 
approach,  he felt,  would be to round off an active price policy by structural  f 
policy measures. 
Because of their farm surpluses,  Community countries were facing,  , 
in certain areas, difficulties similar to those experienced in the coal and steel 
/ 
-192 -industries. Mr. HermannHocherl, Federal MinisterofAgriculture, pointed out 
that as against farm surpluses in some areas there were shortages in others. 
'•  Moreover, the problem with surpluses was one of quality.  The days of bulk 
production at whatever price were over in Western Europe. Only highgrade 
products could find an outlet,  and even here some difficulties were beginning 
to be experienced. 
On 24  November some 500 representatives of EEC agriculture 
'•  passed the following resolution : 
I.  Agricultural prices 
The meeting emphasizes that pricing policy remains the most im-
portant feature of the common agricultural policy and regards it as essential 
for the Community to pursue an active policy as regards the organization of 
markets and prices in order to ensure fair market prices. 
It deeply deplores the fact that the EEC Council of Ministers, in its 
decisions fixing agricultural prices for the 1968-1969 season, has paid insuf-
ficient attention to the wishes of COPA and to the  European Parliament's 
Opinion to the effect that farmers' prices should be brough~ up to date so as to 
cover the increased costs recognized by the Commission and to keep in step 
with normal income trends in other occupations. 
II.  Organization of markets 
Pricing policy should be supplemented by measures for organizing 
markets,  adapted to each product,  with a view to facilitating, for products 
whose pric!2ls are to be fixed,  the adoption of market prices as close r:.s possi-
ble to the level of target prices, and for all products remunerative market 
prices, notably through stabilization of markets. 
m.  Relations with non-member countries 
A.  Trade 
f  The meeting calls for the introduction of a common commercial 
\
policy for agricultural products as part of the common agricultural policy; 
such a commercial policy should cover, inter alia : 
- 193-a)  a forceful Community-based policy on agricultural exports enabling 
the Community to meet competition stemming from artificial prices 
or low standards of living.  Such a policy requires not only the gr~t  411 
of refunds at a  suitable level but also a search for new terms and 
conditions of credit; 
b)  adequate protection from imports which, by disturbing the state of 
the market, endanger the aims of Article 39  of the Treaty,  and the 
maintenance of prices at the requisite level; 
c)  measures against unfair competition,  in particular the introduction 
of a system of  Community quotas for products from state-trading 
countries. 
The Assembly notes that the results achieved in GATT have left 
gaps in the organization of several Community markets and have contributed 
little to the organization of world markets.  The modest scope they open for 
exports of the Community's agricultural products is liable to be jeopardized 
if the Geneva agreement is not ratified by the major countries concerned. 
The Community's enlargement through the accession of further 
members should,  in the opinion of the meeting, be carried out under the 
following conditions: 
a)  continued consolidation of the Community; 
b)  acceptance by the new members of the Rome Treaty aims in the 
agricultural ~ector and of the guiding principles embodied in the 
Regulations; 
c)  harmonization,  during the transitional period,  of their agricultural 
policies with that of the Community; 
d)  maintenance of the overall balance between the Community's re-
sources and requirements of food. 
- 194-
'  I As  regards association policy and policy towards the developing 
countries, it would be better to aim at graduated benefits for all these 
countries rather than to enter into treaties and agreements unsystematically. 
IV.  Improvement of structures and regional development 
The Assembly emphasizes that from the very outset COPA,  in its 
desire to help raise incomes,  called for a policy for the improvement of 
agricultural structures, that is, measures calculated to increase productivity, 
establish the best possible working and living conditions and improve manage-
ment and supply and sales facilities. 
The meeting views the first community programmes with interest. It 
regards them, however,  as onlyafirst steptowards the stage-by-stage adoption, 
at Community and national level,  of a policy for the improvement of agricul-
tural structures. 
(Agra Europe,  30 November 1967; 
Informations Syndicales Agricoles, No.  24  - 1967; 
Die Welt,  25 November 1967; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  25  November 1967) 
10.  Conference of the Socialist International Meeting in ZUrich of the 
General Council of the Socialist International 
The General Council of the Socialist International met in Zurich 
from 10 to 13  October 1967. 
The highlights of the debate were the speeches by Mr. Bruno Pittermann 
(Austria), Chairman of the Socialist International, Mr. Willy Brandt,  Federal 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Fritz Grlitter, National Councillor (Switzer  land) and 
Mr. Willy SpUhler,  who welcomed the General Council of the Socialist Inter-
national on behalf of the Swiss Bundesrat. 
In the resolution passed at this meeting it was stated, inter alia: 
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treaty is a  decisive first step  towards practical  disarmament  measures and 
calls upon all Governments to contribute towards its early conclusion. 
The Socialist International deplores the overthrow of parliamentary 
democracy in Greece by the present military regime and urges that individual 
freedom,  democracy and basic human rights may speedily be restored. 
The Socialist International expresses its complete solidarity with 
the political movements in Greece that are struggling for a return  to democracy 
in their country and renews its appeal for the immediate release of all political 
prisoners. 
The Socialist International earnestly calls upon the members of the 
Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and NATO  to abstain 
from any material support of the Greek military junta which could help to con-
solidate its dictatorship and to keep the situation constantly under review. 
The conference of the General Council of the Socialist Internation8l 
is convinced that : 
(a)  further integration in Europe 
(b)  rational use of aid resources 
(c)  maintaining full employment 
(d)  technical progress 
and 
(e)  planning  to pro.mote economic growth 
are necessary for social progress. 
The EEC and EFTA have played an important partin furtheringthese 
objectives.  The coming-together  of the EEC and EFT  A countries  should be 
directed at forging closer links with the rest of Europe and the world at large. 
This is an urgent need. Apart from the contribution that could thus be made to 
Europe,  such a rapprochement would help to make Europe a more effective 
instrument for comprehensive co-operation between nations and constitute a 
significant contribution to the fulfilment of the immeasurable task which faces 
the developing countries. 
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• The Conference welcomes the application of the British Government 
for membership of the European Community and the implications of such 
membership for the other EFT  A members which would  like to be  full or as-
sociate members of the EEC.  Negotiations should begin without delay. 
The Conference makes an earnest request to the Socialist countries 
in the EEC in particular to use all their influence in their own countries,  as 
they have done before, in order to induce the Governments concerned to begin 
negotiations at the earliest possible moment and,  in any case, before the end 
of 1967,  on the applications foT  accession of the United Kingdom and other 
countries and to bring these negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. 
'  The attitude of the Socialist Parties and their influence on public 
opinion and on the line taken by their national parliaments are of decisive sig-
nificance at this stage. 
The meeting at Cheguers of the Socialist International 
Heads of government and other leading politicians from seven Euro-
pean countries attended a meeting of party leaders of the Socialist International 
on 9 December at the country residence of the British Prime Minister, 
Mr.  Harold Wilson,  at Chequers near London; they stood firmly behind the 
British application to join the European Economic Community. This confidential 
meeting was attended by Mr. Willy Brandt, German Foreign Minister, as Chair-
man of the  SPD, and Mr.  Helmut Schmidt, as Chairman of the SPD Group in the 
Bundestag. 
Over half of the eight hours of talks were devoted to European ques-
tions.Mr.  Wilson,  Prime Minister,  and Mr.  George Brown,  Foreign Minister, 
made clear at the Conf-erence that the British Government was now, as before, 
interested in full membership of the EEC and rejected any form of association. 
They told their colleagues from other countries that they expected a definite 
answer from the Brussels meeting of the EEC Council on 18 December. 
Mr. Willy Brandt had a lengthy discussion on European issues with 
Mr.  Brown when they met at his country home in Dorney Wood on 8 December. 
It is thought that Mr.  Brandt wanted to know whether,  in view of the General's 
adamant attitude, the British Government could not opt for a half-way solution 
on the question of accession - something more in the nature of association and 
which would involve a stage-by-stage progress to full membership. Officially, 
- 197  -at least, the Prime Minister maintained his 'all or nothing' policy. Observers 
in London feel,  however, that this uncompromising British line should not be 
regarded as the last word on the subject.  There are already signs of political  t 
pressure being put on Mr. Wilson, either to accept an interim period or to 
withdraw the application for accession altogether. 
Those at the Chequers meeting included : Mr.  Brandt and the British 
Ministers, Mr.  Jens-Otto Krag,  Danish Prime Minister, Mr.  Tage Erlander, 
Swedish Prime Minister, Mr.  Raffael Paasio, Finnish Prime Minister,  , 
Mr.  Pietro Nenni,  Italian Deputy Prime Minister, Dr.  Bruno Pittermann, 
former Austrian Vice-Chancellor, Dr.  Bruno Kreisky,  Chairman of the 
Socialist Party in Austria and Mr.  Ramgoolam,  Prime Minister of Mauritius. 
(Socialist International,  London,  Circular 59/67,  23 October 1967 
Die Welt,  13 October 1967 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  11 December 1967 
Avanti,  10  December 1967 
Herald Tribune,  11 December 1967 
Le Nouveau Journal,  12 December 1967) 
11.  Proposal of the European Union in Germany for the enlargement of 
the European Community 
In letters to the European and national bodies, to Chancellor Kiesinger 
and to Mr.  Brandt, the Foreign Minister,  a proposal concerning the negotia-
tions of the six member States with the United Kingdom was put forward,  on 
11 December 1967, by Baron von Oppenheim,  President of the European Union 
in Germany; the text had been agreed by the Executive Committee of the Euro-
pean Union.  Under this plan, negotiations would begin with London as soon as 
possible for the purpose of introducing an interim period of not more than five 
years.  At the end of thiE?  period,  England would automatically enter the EEC 
as a full member by 1 January 1974 at the latest. 
The Committee of the European Union pointed out, however, that 
the plan would only work if the principle of qualified majority voting in the 
EEC could be brought into application. 




When the United Kingdom Treaty, which would also have to contain 
the provisions for accession, came into force, the interim period would begin 
and during this : 
(a)  customs and other obstacles to trade would be phased out on both 
sides, 
(b)  the EEC agricultural regulations would be introduced in stages for 
the United Kingdom.  The financing of this policy would continue 
along the lines now applicable between the Six, 
(c)  preferences for the Commonwealth would gradually be removed 
(with certain exceptions), 
(d)  there would be an escape clause (on both sides) to deal with disrup-
tions which might arise from a lack of co-ordination in the field of 
economic policy. 
Institutional : 
Provision would be made for joint bodies of the Six and the United 
Kingdom to be set up to implement the customs and agricultural union and  pave 
the way for accession (at the level  both of the Council and the Commission). 
Practical: 
(a)  Upon accession, the United Kingdom would adopt all the provisions 
of the Treaties of Rome and Paris (practical and institutional) that 
it had not adopted in the interim period. 
{b)  Within 3 years of the entry into force of the Treaty the following 
questions would have to be settled within the EEC and at the same 
-199-time between the Six and the United Kingdom,  so that the necessary 
implementation measures could be taken and preclude delay in 
Britain's accession : 
A.  For the movement of goods : 
(a)  harmonization of the rates of the added value tax and the system and 
rates of the most important consumer taxes (mineral oil, tobacco,  , 
alcohol); 
(b)  the removal of all frontier controls. 
B.  For the movement of capital: 
(a)  harmonization of the provisions concerning capital and of conditions 
for access to capital markets; 
(b)  co-ordination of the fiscal provisions on company tax and the taxa-
tion on interest and dividends; 
(c)  complete liberalization of capital movements in phase with progress 
in co-ordinating the monetary policy. 
C.  Final settlement of the financing of agriculture. 
D.  Research: 
Agreement on certain major joint projects : atomic,  space research, 
aeronautics, electronics, biochemistry, etc.  (joint organization and joint 
finance). 
E.  Devising a legal form for a European company (a project is submitted) and 
settlement of the concomitant ·fiscal problems. 
F.  Energy: 
A common external trade· system with a moderate level of protection 
~ause  cheap energy is vital to our competitivity; 
G.  Monetary : 
Gradual introduction of a European monetary system including the pound 
sterling, so that a European monetary system would take the place of the 
pound (with the necessary adjustment) in the world monetary syste~. 
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Institutional : 
For the phase beginning with accession : 
Apart from the monetary question,  in settling which the setting up of 
special bodies is proposed, the necessary authority for executing the tasks 
outlined here would be divided between the Council of Ministers and the Com-
mission. 
In addition to the proposed extension of the powers  of the  Council 
and of the Commission,  it would be necessary to increase the powers of the 
Parliament to have Members elected,  at least in part,  by direct universal 
suffrage.  This plan would  ~nly work if it  were decided to make a practical 
application of the principle of qualified majority voting. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  12 December 1967) 
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